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


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## MR. LLOYD'S SPEECHES

*IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES;*

ON

## MR. HILLHOUSE'S RESOLUTION

TO REPEAL THE EMBARGO LAWS;

NOVEMBER 21, 1808.

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I CONSIDER, Mr. President, the question now under discussion as one of the most important that has occurred since the adoption of the federal constitution. It is a subject, sir, deeply implicating, and perhaps determining, the fate of the commerce and navigation of our country ; a commerce which has afforded employment for nearly a million and a half of tons of navigation ; which has found occupation for hundreds of thousands of our citizens ; which has spread wealth and prosperity in every region of our country, and which has upheld the government by furnishing the revenue for its support.

A commerce which has yielded an annual amount of exports exceeding one hundred millions of dollars ; an amount of exports three times as great as was possessed by the first maritime and commercial nation of the world at the commencement of the last century, when her population was double that of the United States at this time ; an amount of exports equal to what Great Britain, with her navy of a thousand ships, and with all her boasted manufactures, possessed even at so recent a period as within about fifteen years from this date : surely this is a commerce not to be trifled with ; a commerce not lightly to be offered up as the victim of fruitless experiment.

Our commerce has unquestionably been subject to great embarrassment, vexation, and plunder, from the belligerents of Europe. There is no doubt but both France and Great Britain have violated

entertain the belief, and to make known to his government the expectation he entertained, that an adjustment would take place of the differences between this country and Great Britain.

But, sir, the apprehensions of the British nation and ministry gradually became weaker; the embargo had been submitted to the never erring test of experience, and information of its real effects flowed in from every quarter.

It was found that instead of reducing the West Indies by famine, the planters in the West Indies, by varying their process of agriculture, and appropriating a small part of their plantations for the raising of ground provisions, were enabled, without materially diminishing their usual crops of produce, in a great measure to depend upon themselves for their own means of subsistence.

The British ministry also became acquainted about this time (June) with the unexpected and unexampled prosperity of their colonies of Canada and Nova Scotia. It was perceived that one year of an American embargo was worth to them twenty years of peace or war under any other circumstances; that the usual order of things was reversed; that in lieu of American merchants making estates from the use of British merchandise and British capital, the Canadian merchants were making fortunes, of from ten to thirty or forty thousand pounds in a year, from the use of American merchandise and American capital: for it is notorious, that great supplies of lumber, and pot and pearl ashes, have been transported from the American to the British side of the lakes; this merchandise, for want of competition, the Canadian merchant bought at a very reasonable rate, sent it to his correspondents in England, and drew exchange against the shipments; the bills for which exchange he sold to the merchants of the United States, for specie, transported by waggon loads at noon-day, from the banks in the United States, over the borders into Canada. And thus was the Canadian merchant enabled, with the assistance only of a good credit, to carry on an immensely extended and beneficial commerce, without the necessary employment, on his part, of a single cent of his own capital.

About this time also the revolution in Spain developed itself. The British ministry foresaw the advantage this would be of to them, and immediately formed a coalition with the patriots: by doing this, they secured to themselves, in despite of their enemies, an accessible channel of communication with the continent. They must also have been convinced, that if the Spaniards did not succeed in Europe, the colonies would declare themselves independent of the mother country, and rely on the maritime force of Great Britain for their protection, and thus would they have opened to them an incalculably advantageous mart for their commerce and manufactures; for, having joined the Spaniards without stipulation, they undoubtedly expected to reap their reward in the exclusive commercial privileges that would be accorded to them; nor



were they desirous to seek competitors for the favour of the Spaniards: if they could keep the navigation, the enterprise and the capital of the United States from an interference with them, it was their interest to do it, and they would from this circumstance probably consider a one, two or three years' continuance of the embargo as a boon to them.

It is therefore, sir, undoubted in my mind, that the embargo, as it respects England as well as France, is inefficacious.

But, sir, are there yet other channels through which we can operate upon Great Britain, by means of this measure? It may possibly be said that disturbances among the manufacturers in England yet exist, and that they are only quieted for the moment. Sir, as long as I remember to have heard of the British nation, I have heard of tumults among her manufacturers, although I have never known any serious result from them; but every petty squabble between a manufacturer and his workmen is, by the magick of some gentlemen's imagination, converted into an alarming insurrection menacing the prostration of her government. Suppose, sir, by abstaining from the receipt of British manufactures, you make bankrupts of one hundred of her wealthiest manufacturers; what is produced by this? Within twelve months you have witnessed nearly as many bankruptcies in one of your own cities, and yet that city retains its usual credit and reputation for wealth. But, to extend this argument further, suppose, from the causes before-mentioned, you make bankrupts of five hundred of the wealthiest of her manufacturers, and that in consequence you deprive of employment fifty thousand of their workmen; what is the effect produced by this? What has become of the manufacturers of France? These men will not starve; they will not become non-entities; in time of war they have a certain asylum; they will be absorbed in her army or navy; and thus you take fifty thousand of the most turbulent of her citizens, who are in constant opposition to the government, from under the controul of a lax civil authority, and by placing them under the coercion of an efficient military discipline, you add in reality to the strength of the nation, and give to her the means of extending and retaining her maritime dominion: this surely is not desirable.

Some gentlemen may say, that the fear of famine is to effect what an insurrection among her manufacturers will not accomplish. Of all idle expectations, this is the most idle. It is well known, that the harvest in England is got in during the month of August, and the early part of September: I have before me, sir, a price current of the 20th of September, from which it appears that American flour, subject to the payment of freight, insurance, commission, and other charges, was selling in Liverpool at forty-seven shillings sterling the barrel.

Another fact will perhaps give gentlemen some information on this subject. Owing to the interdiction of the trade to the continent

of Europe, sugars, during the last winter, from the West Indies, had so greatly accumulated in England, as to render them unsaleable in any considerable quantity : this greatly incommoded the West India interest ; they petitioned parliament for a prohibition of the use of grain in the distilleries, and the substitution of sugar and molasses in lieu of it : the reasons assigned in support of the petition were, that it would give a double advantage to the nation, by affording relief to the West India planters, and also greatly reduce the price of food to the poor. The bill was however opposed by the landed interest, and at that time rejected on the single ground, that by bringing into the market so large a surplus quantity of grain, as six millions of bushels, being the amount annually consumed in the distilleries, the price would be so greatly reduced as not to pay the farmer for the labour and expense of raising it.

Thus it is evident, that we have no chance of operating on the fears of Great Britain on account of her harvest ; for it is shewn, that she has it at any time in her power, and even with an encouragement to her colonies, to throw into her corn market a quantity of grain nearly equal to the whole quantity of wheat exported from this country in the year ending in September 1807 ; for by the returns of the secretary of the treasury it appeared, that all the flour and wheat exported during that year, amounted only to what would be equal to about seven millions three hundred thousand bushels of wheat.

But, sir, if we cannot trade with France and England, why should we be deprived of all intercourse with Spain and Portugal ? These are nations struggling for their liberties. Will it be told you, sir, that the trade to these countries is an inconsiderable one ; that it will yield little or no profit ; and that it will be unequally and unjustly divided between different parts of the United States ?

Spain, Portugal and their dependencies, have taken of our exports about twenty millions of dollars in a year. Can this be called an inconsiderable trade ?

The exports of Spain and Portugal consists principally in wines, brandies and fruits. They are not grain countries, but depend principally for their supplies of grain upon other countries. They have formerly received them from the Mediterranean, from the coast of Barbary, and from the Baltic. Under the present circumstances of the European world, these supplies could probably be best obtained from the United States, and would require large quantities of wheat and flour from the southern states. The Spaniards and Portuguese professing the Roman catholic religion, and being obliged by its ordinances to abstain for part of the year from the use of meat, and being accustomed to live during that time principally on fish, have rendered Spain and Portugal the best market in Europe for that staple of the northern states. The lumber for their packages, their casks, and boxes, they obtain

chiefly from New York and Norfolk ; the lumber of the eastern states not being so well adapted for their purpose. Thus then it appears, that this trade, instead of being an unequal one, is more equally divided among the different portions of the union, than any other trade which is prosecuted from the United States to any part of Europe.

It remains now, sir, to consider the effects of the embargo on ourselves. Every gentleman must be the best judge of its effects within the immediate circle of his own observation. From the observation I have been enabled to make, it appears to me to be fraught with destruction. It appears to me to be wasting our resources instead of preserving them ; breaking down the spirit of the people, and dividing instead of uniting them. It is inviting foreign insult and aggression by the imbecility which it opposes to them ; and it appears to me to bear extremely hard upon the commercial and navigating states.

The human mind is composed of nearly the same materials in all countries. Extend over an enlightened community, possessing the means of easy communication, a great and severe degree of privation and suffering, without accompanying that suffering with an absolute conviction on the public mind of some great, some urgent public necessity requiring it, and some eventual good to emanate from it ; and there is reason to fear, you may create great discontent and uneasiness. Wherever this exists in a great degree, it will be manifested in memorials to the constituted authorities of the country. Legislative resolutions will next follow ; remonstrances succeed ; and if these are unattended to, resistance embodies itself, and the spark of discontent, which might easily have been smothered in its origin, is fanned into a flame of rebellion, spreading ruin and desolation around it, and in its progress perhaps overturning the liberties and government of the country.

Happily we have not reached this stage : I trust in God we never shall. It should be the duty of every man, both in and out of office, to adopt every measure, and make every exertion to prevent it. The removal of the embargo will, as I believe, be one means to check an incipient state of discontent. I am therefore for this, as well as for many other reasons, most earnestly and zealously in favor of its repeal, and the passing the resolution for that purpose.





# MR. GILES' SPEECH,

DELIVERED

IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

ON

*Thursday, 24 November, 1808, on the Resolution of Mr.  
Hillhouse, to repeal the Embargo Laws.*

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MR. PRESIDENT—Having during the recess of Congress retired from the political world, and having little agency in the passing political scenes, living in a part of the country too, where there is little or no difference in political opinions, and where the embargo laws are almost universally approved; I felt the real want of information upon the subject, now under discussion. I thought I knew something of the general objects of the embargo laws, and I had not been inattentive to their general operations upon society, as far as I had opportunities of observing thereupon.

When I arrived here, and found that this subject had excited so much sensibility in the minds of many gentlemen I met with, as to engross their whole thoughts, and almost to banish every other topic of conversation; I felt also a curiosity to know, what were the horrible effects of these laws in other parts of the country, and which had escaped my observation in the part of the country in which I reside. Of course, Sir, I have given to the gentlemen, who have favored us with their observations on both sides of the question under consideration, the most careful and respectful attention, and particularly to the gentlemen representing the eastern section of the union, where most of this sensibility had been excited. I always listen to gentlemen from that part of the United States, with pleasure, and generally receive instruction from them; but on this occasion, I am reluctantly compelled to acknowledge, that I have received from them less satisfaction, and less information than usual; and still less conviction.

It was hardly to have been expected, Mr. President, that after so many angry and turbulent passions had been called into action, by the recent agitations throughout the whole United States, resulting from the elections by the people, to almost all the important offices within their gift; and particularly from the elections of electors for choosing the President and Vice President of the United States, that gentlemen would have met here perfectly exempt from the feelings, which this state of things was naturally

calculated to inspire ;—Much less was it to have been expected, Sir, that gentlemen who had once possessed the power of the nation, and who, from some cause or other, had lost it ; (a loss, which they now tell us they *but too well remember*, and I fear, might have added, *too deeply deplore*,) gentlemen too, Sir, who at one time during the electioneering scene, had indulged the fond and delusive hope, that through the privations necessarily imposed upon our fellow citizens, by the unexampled aggressions of the belligerent powers, they might once more find their way to office and power, and who now find themselves disappointed in this darling expectation. It was not at all to be expected, Sir, that these gentlemen should now appear here, perfectly exempt from the unpleasant feelings, which so dreadful a disappointment must necessarily have produced. It was a demand upon human nature, for too great a sacrifice ; and however desirable such an exemption might have been at the present moment, and however honorable it would have been to those gentlemen, it was not expected.

But, Sir, I had indulged a hope that the extraordinary dangers, and difficulties pressed upon us, by the aggressing belligerents ; attended too, with so many circumstances of indignity and insult, would have awakened a sensibility in the bosom of every gentleman of this body, which would have wholly suppressed, or at least suspended, these unpleasant feelings, until some measures, consulting the general interests and welfare of the people, could have been devised, to meet, resist, and if possible, to subdue the extraordinary crisis. But, Sir, even in this hope too, I have been totally disappointed.—I was the more encouraged in this hope, when upon opening this debate the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) seemed sensible of this sacred obligation, imposed by the crisis, when he exhorted us in conducting our deliberations, utterly to discard the influence of party spirit. It would have given me great pleasure, Sir, if the gentleman had afforded us a magnanimous example of a precept so admirably suited to the present state of things. But in this too, Sir, I have been unfortunately disappointed. That gentleman's observations consisted almost exclusively of retrospective animadversions upon the original objects and horrible effects of the embargo laws, without seeming to think it was worth his attention, to favor us with any reflections upon the prospective course of measures, which the people's interests, the public safety, and general welfare so imperiously demand. That gentleman represented the embargo laws, as mere acts of volition, impelled by no cause nor necessity ; whilst the British orders, and French edicts, were scarcely glanced at, and certainly formed the least prominent feature of his observations. He represented these laws as a wanton and wicked attack upon commerce, with a view to its destruction, whilst he seemed scarcely to have recollected the extraordinary dangers and difficulties, which overspread the ocean—indeed, Sir, he described the ocean as perfectly free from dangers

and difficulties, unruffled by any storms, and that we had nothing to do, but to unfurl our canvass to the wind, that it would be filled with prosperous gales, and wafted to the ports of its destination, where it would be received with open arms of friendship and hospitality. I wish, Sir, with all my heart, the gentleman could but realize these dreaming visions; their reality would act like a magic spell upon the embargo laws, and dissipate them in a moment! But, alas, Sir, when we come to look at realities, when we turn our eyes upon the *real dangers and difficulties which do overspread the ocean*, we shall find them so formidable, that the wisdom of our undivided counsels, and the energy of our undivided action, will scarcely be sufficient to resist and conquer them. To my great regret, Sir, we now see, that the United States cannot even hope to be blessed with this union of mind and action, although certainly their dearest interests demand it.

Mr. President, perhaps the greatest inconvenience attending popular governments consists in this;—That whenever the union and energy of the people are most required to resist foreign aggressions, the pressure of these aggressions presents most temptations to distrusts and divisions.—Was there ever a stronger illustration of the truth and correctness of this observation than the recent efforts made under the pressure of the embargo laws?—The moment the privations, reluctantly but necessarily imposed by those laws, became to be felt, was the moment of signal to every political demagogue, who wished to find his way to office and to power, to excite the distrusts of the people, and then to separate them from the government of their choice, by every exaggeration, which ingenuity could devise, and every misrepresentation, which falsehood could invent; nothing was omitted, which it was conceived would have a tendency to effect this object. But Mr. President, the people of the United States must learn the lesson now, and at all future times, of disrespecting the bold and disingenuous charges and insinuations of such aspiring demagogues.—They must learn to respect and rally round their own government, or they never can present a formidable front to a foreign aggressor.—Sir, the people of the United States have already learnt this lesson.—They have recently given an honorable and glorious example of their knowledge in this respect. They have in their recent elections, demonstrated to the nation, and to the world, that they possess too much good sense, to become the dupes of these delusive artifices, and too much patriotism to desert their government, when it stands most in need of their support and energy.

The gentlemen from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) has made the most strict, and I had almost said, uncharitable scrutiny into the objects and effects of the embargo laws, in the delusive hope, I presume, of obtaining a triumph over his political adversaries. I propose to follow the gentleman, in a fair and candid comparison



of information and opinions upon this subject; and I shall do so in the most perfect confidence, that, whenever a thorough examination of the objects and effects of the embargo laws shall be made known, and the merits of the measure fully understood, that there is not a man in the U. S. who will not applaud and support the administration for its adoption, who has the uncontaminated heart of an American, throbbing within his bosom.

Mr. President, I have always understood that there were two objects contemplated by the embargo laws.—The first, precautionary, operating upon ourselves—The second, coercive, operating upon the aggressing belligerents. Precautionary, in saving our seamen, our ships and our merchandize from the plunder of our enemies, and avoiding the calamities of war. Coercive, by addressing strong appeals to the interests of both the belligerents. The first object has been answered beyond my most sanguine expectations. To make a fair and just estimate of this measure, reference should be had to our situation at the time of its adoption. At that time, the aggressions of both the belligerents were such, as to leave the U. S. but a painful alternative in the choice of one of three measures, to wit, the embargo, war, or submission.—I know that this position has not been admitted, though but faintly denied in the discussion. I shall however proceed upon this hypothesis for the present, and in the course of my observations will prove its correctness by the statements of the gentlemen in favor of the resolution.

Before the recommendation of this measure, the laudable and provident circumspection of the administration, had obtained tolerably correct estimates of the amount and value of the ships and merchandise belonging to the citizens of the U. S. then afloat; and the amount and value of what was shortly expected to be afloat; together with a conjectural statement of the number of seamen employed in the navigation thereof.

It was found that merchandise to the value of one hundred millions of dollars was actually afloat, in vessels amounting in value to twenty millions more—That an amount of merchandise and vessels equal to fifty millions of dollars more, was expected to be shortly put afloat, and that it would require fifty thousand seamen to be employed in the navigation of this enormous amount of property. The administration was informed of the hostile edicts of France previously issued, and then in a state of execution, and of an intention on the part of Great Britain to issue her orders, the character and object of which were also known. The object was, to sweep this valuable commerce from the ocean.—The situation of this commerce was as well known to Great Britain, as to ourselves, and her inordinate cupidity could not withstand the temptation of the rich booty, she vainly thought within her power. This was the state of information at the time this measure was recommended.

The President of the United States ever watchful and anxious for



the preservation of the persons and property of all our fellow-citizens, but particularly of the merchants; whose property is most exposed to danger, and of the seamen whose persons are also most exposed, recommended the embargo for the protection of both; and it has saved and protected both. Let us now suppose, for a moment, that the President, possessed of this information, had not apprised the merchants and seamen of their danger, and had recommended no measure for their safety and protection; would he not, in that case, have merited and received the reproaches which the ignorance or ingratitude of merchants and others have so unjustly heaped upon him, for his judicious and anxious attentions to their interests? It is admitted by all, that the embargo laws have saved this enormous amount of property, and this number of seamen, which, without them, would have forcibly gone into the hands of our enemies, to pamper their arrogance, stimulate their injustice, and increase their means of annoyance.

I should suppose, Mr. President, this saving worth some notice. But, Sir, we are told that instead of protecting our seamen, it has driven them out of the country, and into foreign service. I believe, Sir, that this fact is greatly exaggerated. But, Sir, suppose for a moment that it is so, the government has done all, in this respect, it was bound to do. It placed these seamen in the bosoms of their friends and families, in a state of perfect security; and if they have since thought proper to abandon these blessings, and emigrate from their country, it was an act of choice, not of necessity. But what would have been the unhappy destiny of these brave tars, if they had been permitted to have been carried into captivity, and sent adrift on unfriendly and inhospitable shores? Why, Sir, in that case, they would have had no choice; necessity would have driven them into a hard and ignominious service, to fight the battles of the authors of their dreadful calamities, against a nation, with which their country was at peace. And is the bold and generous American tar to be told, that he is to disrespect the administration for its anxious and effectual attentions to his interests? For relieving him from a dreadful captivity? Even under the hardships he does suffer, and which I sincerely regret, every generous feeling of his noble heart, would repel the base attempt with indignation. But, Sir, the American seamen have not deserted their country; foreign seamen may and probably have gone into foreign service; and, for one, I am glad of it. I hope they will never return; and I am willing to pass a law in favor of the true hearted American seamen, that these foreign seamen never should return. I would even prohibit them from being employed in merchant vessels. The American seamen have found employment in the country; and whenever the proper season shall arrive for employing them on their proper element, you will find them, like true birds of passage, hovering in crowds upon your shores.

Whilst considering this part of the subject. I cannot help ex-

pressing my regret, that at the time of passing our embargo laws, a proportion of our seamen was not taken into the public service ; because, in my judgment, the nation required their services, and it would have been some alleviation to their hardships, which the measure peculiarly imposed upon them, as a class of citizens, by affecting their immediate occupation ; and the other classes, as well as the public treasury, were able to contribute to their alleviation ; and I am willing to do the same thing at this time. Indeed, its omission is the only regret I have ever felt, at the measures of the last Congress. I like the character—I like the open frankness, and the generous feelings of the honest American tar ; and, whenever in my power, I am ready to give, and will with pleasure give him my protection and support. One of the most important and agreeable effects of the embargo laws, is giving these honest fellows a safe assylum. But, Sir, these are not the only good effects of the embargo. It has *preserved our peace—it has saved our honor—it has saved our national independence.* Are these savings not worth notice ? Are these blessings not worth preserving ? The gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. White) has, indeed, told us, that under the embargo laws, the United States are *bleeding at every pore*.---- This, surely, Sir, is one of the most extravagant effects, that could have been ascribed to these laws by the frantic dreams of the most infatuated passions. Blood-letting is the last effect, that I ever expected to hear ascribed to this measure. I thought it was of the opposite character : but it serves to show that nothing is too extravagant for the misguided zeal of gentlemen in the opposition.--- I have cast my eyes about in vain to discover those copious streams of blood ; but I neither see nor hear any thing of them, from any other quarter. So far from the United States bleeding *at every pore*, under the embargo, it has saved them from bleeding *at any pore* ; and one of the highest compliments to the measure is, that it has saved us from the very calamity which the gentleman attributed to it ; but which, thanks to our better stars and wiser counsels, does not exist.

The gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Hillhouse) not content with describing the general horrors of the embargo laws, has addressed himself, in plaintive tones, to several particular classes of citizens, and has kindly informed each of his particular hardships and sufferings. The gentleman asks, what has become of the merchant ? What has become of the farmer ? I know something of the situation of the farmer ; and, as to the merchant, I had felt serious apprehensions for his situation, until they were materially relieved by the information given by the gentleman. The gentleman tells us, that the great capitalists do not suffer ; they are in favor of the embargo ; but the young, dashing, enterprising merchant, without capital, is destroyed. This statement is highly honorable to the embargo laws, and proves a great deal. The capitalist, who has property, finds its security under the embargo ; he is therefore in

favor of the measure ; but the merchant, who has nothing, is deprived of an opportunity of making something out of that nothing. But his rights are not affected by the embargo ; he is left in the enjoyment of the nothing he possessed ; and has no reason to complain that the embargo does not give him something without laboring for it. I regret, however, that these merchants, without capital, have lost the chance of making their fortunes by the embargo ; but even the most of these, the gentleman tells us, would probably have become bankrupt, by their wild speculations, even if the embargo were not in being ; and, of course, their situation cannot be much worsted by it.

But, Mr. President, I am willing to admit, that there are many worthy merchants of small capital, who do suffer by the suspension of their employments ; and I am very sorry for them : but this suffering is incidental to every coerced state of things ; and is attributable, not properly to the embargo, but to the causes that rendered its adoption indispensable.

The gentlemen, however, tell us, with the most sympathetic feelings, that the ships of the great capitalists are rotting at our wharves, and yet these capitalists are in favor of the embargo. Why, Sir, this is a very plain case, when stripped of its exaggerations. The ships are precisely twelve months older than they were twelve months ago ; and the owners would rather have them there, with this difference of age and proportionate decay, than to see them torn away by lawless plunderers, and wholly lost forever. But, Sir, what would have become of many of these capitalists if it had not been for the embargo ? Their property would have been plundered, and they become bankrupts. Is it any wonder then, Sir, that these men should be in favor of the embargo ? Review, then, this statement made by the gentlemen, respecting the merchants, and what is the actual result ? Why this, Sir—that, although they do suffer by the necessary interruption of their particular occupation, (a suffering I deplore as much as any gentleman in the United States) yet the real owners of the property do not complain ; and almost the only grumblers are those who have nothing to grumble about.

But says the gentleman, what has become of the farmer ? The gentleman knows, that I am a farmer, and that I have long borne the appellation with sincere pleasure ; I may therefore be presumed to know something of the situation of the farmer ; and not only in my own name, but in the name of the whole happy, useful, and honorable fraternity of American farmers, I will tell the gentleman what that situation is at this moment.—The American Farmer is now enjoying the fruits of his honest industry, in peace and security, blessed at the same time, with every political, social, and domestic enjoyment, perfectly exempt from all vexations, and I had almost said taxations, and with pleasure beholds a surplus of fourteen millions of dollars in the public treasury after paying every



ry debt, which could be demanded of the honor of the government. All these blessings too, are sweetened by the noble consciousness that they are enjoyed by him as a freeman, and by a constant recollection, and perfect confidence, that he is protected in this enjoyment, by a government, which will never basely surrender his rights, nor the national sovereignty, to any foreign aggressor upon earth.—Blessed with all these uninterrupted enjoyments, I agree perfectly in sentiment with the gentleman from New-York (Mr. Mitchell) that with a heart overflowing with the most grateful affections, he should render thanks to the author of all good, that in the bountiful dispensations of his providence, he has been pleased to pour so many blessings into the lap of the American Farmer!! Grumbling and repining when thus favored, would in my judgment, be impiety to Heaven, and ingratitude to his own government.—

The gentleman does not tell you, Sir, that the Farmer wants any thing, but that he has plenty over much. The puzzle is, to know what to do with the surplus plenty.—And how does the gentleman advise the Farmer to dispose of it?—Why he tells him, raise the embargo and it will increase the price of your surplus produce; and for this supposed difference in price, he advises the Farmer to sell his own freedom and his country's independence; and in this contemptible and miserable barter, to purchase his own, and his country's vassalage—to cease to be a freeman, and to become a slave! To give up the noble feelings inspired by liberty and freedom, and to descend to the abject and ignominious existence of a slave without any mental feeling whatever.—Sir, let me tell that gentleman in my own name, and in the name of every farmer in the U. S. that we would repel with indignity and indignation, the disgraceful golden allurements, even if it could be realized. But, Sir, dishonorable as the allurements is, it is fictitious, it is visionary. It could not be realized.—I believe, and every sensible Farmer will believe, that he has for the last ten months obtained more for his surplus plenty under the embargo, than he could have done in any other state of things, which was in the choice of the government.—Let us suppose that the immense mercantile capital which is admitted to have been saved by the embargo had been seized and carried into foreign ports and there condemned; what would have been its effects upon the mercantile capital of this country? It would have so crippled our merchants, that they would not have been able for a long time to purchase the surplus produce of the nation.

But that is not all, these merchants would have claimed indemnification from the government for losses which, in that case they would have urged, were sustained by its culpable neglect; and they would have plunged us into war, to repair so great an injury inflicted upon the nation; the foreign plunderers too, would have told us, that they cared but little about a war, as they had taken from us sufficient means for defraying its expense. Thus, in that state of



things, a war would have been inevitable; and would you tell the farmer, that he would get more for his surplus produce in time of war, than he has received since the embargo? Sir, the farmer knows too well the calamities of war, to be thus deluded by these visionary golden dreams. In the event of war, he would not have received as much for his surplus produce, as under the embargo laws: hence, it obviously appears from a fair estimate of pounds, shillings, and pence; (since we are compelled to resort to that standard, as the only orthodox test of our national honor, national sensibility, and even national independence) yes, Sir, even according to that sordid standard, the farmer would have been the loser. Besides, Sir to say nothing of the increased taxes, and other burthens indispensable to the support of war, who can count its chances, or limit its duration? Who can calculate its demoralising consequences? But calamitous as war is, the American farmers would with eagerness encounter all its terrors, rather than surrender their own liberties, and the nation's honor, independence, and sovereignty—let us then for a time, Sir, bear our present privations—let war be the last experiment.

But, Sir, I will mention another circumstance, which may be some alleviation to the farmer, for the difference in the price of his surplus plenty now, and in ordinary times. When the price of produce is low, the temptation to raise large crops will be lessened, and the farmer will turn a certain portion of his labor to the improvement of his farm. The high prices of produce heretofore have induced the farmer to impose too much upon his land; too great demands have been made on it, and it has been in some degree exhausted. The embargo has apprised the farmer of this important circumstance, and taught him his true interest in this respect. I have observed a great change in the application of labor in this respect, and I have no doubt a general sentiment exists in favor of a still greater change; a greater portion of labor is also converted into household manufactures, which will lessen our demand and dependence upon foreign nations. In both these respects, I believe the operation of the embargo is favorable to the farmer, at the present moment, and will certainly be favorable to posterity by transmitting to it a more fertilized soil for cultivation. It will be favorable, at the present moment, in this respect; that before the adoption of the embargo, the farmer was tempted to apply too great a proportion of his labor to the annual increase of crops, and too small a portion of it to the permanent improvement and fertilization of his farm. I mention this as an alleviation, not as a complete exemption from the effects of the embargo, and its so far producing a beneficial influence upon cultivation and internal improvement.

I hope by this time, Mr. President, that the gentleman will concur with me in opinion, that the situation of the American farmer, is rather enviable than miserable—That he has good sense enough to

make a just estimate of his own interests, and possesses too much honorable sensibility not to repel with indignation every attempt to seduce him into a disgraceful surrender of his own liberties or his country's independence.

Let us now take a view of its effects upon some other classes of our fellow citizens, which seem almost to have escaped the gentleman's notice; or at least not to have excited so much of his plaintive sympathies; I allude to the manufacturer, the mechanic, and the laborer. The manufacturer seems to be in such a state of prosperity, as rather to have excited the gentleman's jealousy, than his tender commiseration; he fears that the real object of the embargo was to erect the manufacturing system upon the ruins of commerce. I do not mean, here, Sir, to reply to the suggestion of this unfounded jealousy. I mean, in the course of these observations, to make that a subject of distinct and separate examination. I shall here, however, take the liberty of remarking, without the fear of still further exciting the gentleman's jealousy, that I am extremely happy to see not only that we have abundant fabrics for manufactures, but that we have artizans sufficient to mould them into all the articles necessary for home consumption, and thus lessen our dependence upon foreign nations for our supply. I rejoice indeed, to see our infant manufactures growing into importance; and that the most successful experiment has attended every attempt at improvement. What is the situation of the mechanic, and the laborer? They have full employment, good wages, and cheap living. I am told, Sir, that within the last year, one thousand houses have been erected in Philadelphia; I see at this time, more houses building at Georgetown, even for mercantile purposes, and more improvements in this City, than ever I have seen before; and I believe this generally to be the case throughout the country. That this is a correct statement of facts, I have no doubt; how then is this agreeable and unexpected scene accounted for, amidst this mercantile clamor about the stagnation of business? It is because a greater proportion of the overgrown mercantile capital, is now diverted from external commerce, to internal improvements; and I am strongly inclined to think that this transposition of a certain portion of the mercantile capital, will produce a beneficial operation in a national point of view, and probably even more productive to the capitalist, than risking it in the employment of foreign trade. This I believe to be a fair, just, and candid statement of the operation of the embargo laws, upon the several great classes of citizens; and when correctly viewed, how different is its aspect, from the miserable picture of horrors presented to us by the gentleman from Connecticut. When you tell a mechanic or a laborer of his distresses and sufferings, when he has full employment, good wages, and cheap living, he would laugh at you; he would either think you silly, or that you meant to treat him with indignity and insult. These are all the blessings he could wish,

and they are enough for any man to possess, when he reflects upon the narrow span of human enjoyments, this world affords—Sir, the miserable laborer on the other side the Atlantic, would consider the enjoyments of the laborers here, Elysium itself; and, I can but lament for the sake of suffering humanity, that it cannot find the way to these enjoyments. I presume that during the late electioneering scene, that every laborer and mechanic in Pennsylvania, was told a thousand times that he was ruined by the embargo; but thirty thousand votes (majority) have told these frantic, officious disturbers of the public quiet, in loud and awful tones, how silly and ridiculous they consider the suggestion. The recent elections in most of the other states, speak the same emphatic language.

I have been thus minute, Mr. President, in the examination of this part of the subject, as well to relieve ourselves from the miseries and apprehensions of our own deluded imaginations, as to relieve foreign nations, as far as was within my power, from their delusions, which I shall show in the course of my observations, are the principal if not the only cause of the very hardships and sufferings so loudly and causelessly complained of by some gentlemen. Now, Sir, take an impartial review of the effects of the embargo laws, as operating upon ourselves, and what is the actual result? Why, Sir, as far as they were precautionary, their success has been complete; and whilst in their general operations, they have been attended with some privations and sufferings, they have not been without their beneficial effects on society.

The gentleman next triumphantly tells us, that the embargo laws have not had their expected effects upon the aggressing belligerents. That they have not had their complete effects; that they have not caused a revocation of the British orders and French decrees, will readily be admitted; but they certainly have not been without some beneficial effects upon those nations. Let me, however ask, Sir, is this failure a cause of triumph to the gentleman? Does he feel more pleasure in the delusive expectation of a triumph over a political adversary, than in the triumph of the nation over our common adversaries? Are his political feelings so strong, that they are to be indulged, even at the expense of his own, and his country's interests? Does he vainly suppose, that, disregarding or postponing all consideration of the people's interests, when their all is at stake, to the indulgence of these petty animosities, will give him a just claim to the people's applause? If he does, Sir, he is mistaken. It is by the reverse of this conduct that he can lay any just claim to their applause. It is by banishing his prejudices—it is by conquering his own passions, and by devoting the whole energy of his mind to their service, at this critical moment, that he can be justly entitled to their applause. This would be for him a glorious triumph—a triumph over his own passions; and it would secure him the public approbation, because the conduct would be right. Let us then, Sir, hope for this conciliation, which would be



so honorable to ourselves, and would promise so much advantage to the nation.

In this spirit of conciliation and patriotism, then, Mr. President, let us enquire, first, what have been the actual effects of the embargo laws upon the aggressing belligerents? And, secondly, what are the actual causes of their failure of complete success? The first enquiry involves much mercantile information. I have only some views of general mercantile principles—I know little or nothing of their operative details—I had, therefore, hoped for much information upon this part of the subject from gentlemen who possessed it; but have received very little satisfaction from them in that respect.

The first effect of the embargo, upon the aggressing belligerents, was to lessen their inducements to war, by keeping out of their way, the rich spoils of our commerce, which had invited their cupidity, and which was saved by those laws. If they had once possessed themselves of this enormous booty, it would have been a sure pledge for open and direct war. It would have defrayed the expenses of the war for several years. If they had not gone to war, they would have been compelled either to restore the captured property, or to make indemnification for it. Its amount alone, would have been a sufficient security against either of these acts of justice. And is it not better, that this enormous amount of property should be on this side of the Atlantic, than on the other? In the hands of its lawful owners, than in the hands of unprincipled freebooters? Is it not better that it should be drawn to our aid in the event of war, than applied to aid our unjust adversary? Upon this point, I presume, there can be but one opinion.

The second effect, which the embargo laws have had on the aggressing belligerents, is to enhance the prices of all American produce, especially articles of the first necessity to them, to a considerable degree, and, if it be a little longer persisted in, will either banish our produce, (which I believe indispensable to them,) from their markets altogether, or increase the prices to an enormous amount; and, of course, we may hope will furnish irresistible inducements for a relaxation of their hostile orders and edicts.—However, I may generally respect the mercantile information of the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd) and the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Hillhouse) they appear to me on this occasion, not to have been very correct. I have before me, two *Prices Current* from Liverpool, the one of the 8th, the other of the 20th September last. They, I presume, were written under no political bias, favorable to the United States. Let us draw our facts from them. I will begin with the article of the first necessity in Great Britain, and one which, at all times, excites her highest sensibility. She manifests, at all times, more anxiety about her corn laws, than any other subject of her political economy. This is a necessary result from the peculiar state of her population.



Let us then inquire what is the present state of bread stuffs in Great Britain. In the Liverpool Price Current of the 8th September, I find this information upon this subject.—“ Our grain market for the most part of the last month was very dull ; however, within this day or two there have been some extensive sales made of New York wheat at 13s 3d per 70lbs. and the holders now demand 13s 6d a 14s 0d for prime parcels, which may possibly be obtained, as the appearances for the harvest in most parts of this kingdom are not quite so favorable as was at first thought, the late heavy rains having proved injurious in many places, and the grain is much lighter in the ear than former seasons ; but as the dealers and country millers buy only to supply their immediate wants, we do not calculate upon a material improvement on the annexed prices, unless some export vent to Spain or our West India colonies takes place.—Good sweet American flour is not to be had in this market.”

In the Price Current of the 20th, I find these observations :—“ Large speculations have lately been made in Tobacco, in consequence of our stock becoming limited ; but should the embargo be raised, this and every other description of your produce must very materially decline in price, wheat and flour excepted.

Our stocks of grain are but moderate, although we have been much favored in our harvest.”

What reflection does this information naturally present to the mind ? That the crop is limited—that bread stuffs are high, and likely to be higher—that there is such a deficiency of bread stuffs, that our whole supply will not depress the market, even in the event of raising the embargo ; and certainly continuing it, (which does not seem at all calculated upon in England) would lessen the quantity and raise proportionably the demand and price.

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) tells us, we cannot starve Great Britain, she being mistress of the trade of the world, will supply herself with bread stuffs from other quarters, and particularly from Spanish America. I never heard it suggested, except by the gentlemen in the opposition, that we could starve Great Britain ; but, that through our produce, particularly our bread stuffs, we could make a strong appeal to her interests. This fact is demonstrated to my mind. The Liverpool merchants differ with the gentleman in his mercantile information. They tell us that our whole supply of bread stuffs will not depress their market. If a ready supply could be obtained elsewhere, upon better terms, there would be no need of a supply from us. But when has it happened, that Spanish America could afford this supply ? So far from affording a supply to Great Britain, it gets a portion of its own supply from us.—The gentleman tells us, that Spanish Americans export great quantities of hydes and tallow.—That is true.—These however, are not bread stuffs. It is not pretended that Great Britain is in want of meat, but bread ; bread is an es-

essential of life—meat is no substitute for bread—it could not prevent even a famine. These documents also go to show the reason of the low price of New York flour, quoted by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd.) It is because the flour was not sweet. It had been so long kept, as to become sour.—I have no doubt that the British cabinet is now looking at this subject with great anxiety; and particularly at our movements in relation to it. Again, Sir, suppose Great Britain should be able to provision her islands, it would be at such an expensive rate, as to render them very unprofitable.

The next important article is Cotton. Let us see the prices current respecting that article.—

“The operations in our Cotton-market during the whole of last month have been immense, while our total imports are inadequate to one half the usual monthly consumption; as the stocks of this article have become more depressed, the speculators continue purchasing with increased spirit, and many of them have already realised considerable profits; we therefore quote an advance on all descriptions of Cotton of from 4d to 6d per lb. above our last month's rates, which has principally occurred within the last ten days; but we must beg leave to remark, that such unexampled advances are scarcely ever so well maintained as when they are gradually established, and some occurrence may perhaps shortly take place to put a stop to further speculations; we are, however, of opinion, that prices may yet be driven considerably higher, although they have to encounter an extremely bad trade in Manchester.”

“West India Cottons have advanced nearly in the same proportion as American, and the recent arrivals have fully brought the annexed prices, with every appearance of much higher being realized.”

“In Cottons we have a great stir; and should we not soon have arrivals from the Brazils, prices must be enormous.”

Here the Liverpool merchants tell us, not only that the prices are extremely high, and may be driven much higher, unless some occurrence (to wit, raising the embargo) may perhaps shortly take place, to put a stop to further speculation; but *that the total imports are inadequate to one half the usual monthly consumption.*—Now, Sir, whence is one half of the usual consumption of Cotton to be supplied to the British market.—The Liverpool merchants seem totally at a loss for a supply from any place; but the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) has pointed out several places of supply—The East and West Indies; and even Africa has been resorted to.—They have supplies from all these places now, and yet the Liverpool merchants tell you, that the whole imports are not equal to one half the monthly consumption. I therefore have no confidence in the statement made by the gentleman. With respect to the illustration of his position, by

stating the supposed analagous case of his butter merchants, I shall make no reply. Its fallacy was ably demonstrated by the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Crawford.) I will only incidentally remark however, that it is the first time I ever recollect to have seen that gentleman in debate, when it appeared to me, that he did not know on which side *his own* bread was buttered.

But the gentleman tells us, that the provident British government, has sent Cotton seed to Africa to answer a supply of Cotton; that Cotton is an annual plant, and of course a competent supply may be produced from that quarter. I am inclined to think, that this p ovident government does not rely much upon this resource. Because I imagine the whole quantity of seed sent thither, would not be equal to the offal from one good South Carolina plantation; and although Cotton is certainly an annual plant, yet the conversion of the labor of society from one occupation to another, is not the effect of an annual effort. It is one of the most difficult operations to be performed on society. I therefore feel no apprehension of a supply from this source, at least, for many years.—If Great Britain should be cut off fr m one half of her supply of Cotton, it would certainly place the many thousand manufacturers employed in the various branches of the Cotton business, in a state of great distress; and must command the attention of the British government.

The next article I shall mention, is, the article of timber or lumber. I mention these articles particularly in relation to the supply of the W. Indies; and the rather, as the traders to these islands have been foremost in urging the British hostile orders. I recollect sometime since to have seen a report made, I believe to the House of Commons, shewing the proportion of these articles imported to the West Indies, from the United States, in relation to the same articles, imported thither from all the rest of the world; and the proportion of these articles was, 99 in the 100, imported from the United States. It is known that these articles are indispensable to the exports from those islands; particularly rum, sugar, and molasses.—And I am at a loss to know from whence these articles can be supplied, except from the United States. It should also be recollected, that timber and lumber are not of annual growth, they are part of the veteran sturdy oak itself; and therefore that their deficiency cannot be so easily supplied as is suggested in relation to Cotton.

The next article I shall mention is Tobacco.—What says the Liverpool merchants respecting this article?—

“During the last month Tobacco has experienced some fluctuation, and sales have been made at prices under those quoted; but some considerable orders having appeared for export, the market has again settled at these rates, and if any opening to the continent of Europe, through the medium of Holland, should be found, an advance may be expected; on the contrary, if we have only our



home consumption to depend upon, little alteration can take place until the sentiments of the American government be known at the meeting of congress in November next."

It is admitted that Tobacco is not an article of the first necessity, it is however material to the manufacturer, and highly important to the revenue.

Naval stores are, also, certainly entitled to some consideration, although some supply of those articles, is now furnished from Sweden.

I have selected these articles as specimens of the intimacy and importance of the commercial connection between the United States and Great Britain; and to demonstrate, that it cannot be withdrawn on our part without essentially affecting her interests. Again, Sir, what effect will this recession of intercourse have upon the revenue of that country?—I shall make no minute estimate, but it will certainly have an effect which cannot be disregarded; and the rather when it is recollected, that G. Britain has imposed an export duty of 4 per cent. upon her goods sent to the United States, which produces to her, an annual revenue of about \$600,000, probably much more; and that this is a discriminating duty against the United States, which ought to have been repelled the moment it was laid; and especially, as it was avowed, that it was imposed upon the United States with the view of placing them on the same footing with the British colonies.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd) tells us, even suppose that your embargo laws drive fifty thousand, or more, manufacturers from their employment in Great Britain, it will only add to her naval and military strength. It would only give her fifty thousand seamen or soldiers more than she now has. This, Sir, is an unfortunate specimen of the prosperity, which Great Britain is supposed to derive from the embargo laws. If I am rightly informed, generally, and particularly yesterday, by the learned gentleman from New York, (Mr. Mitchell) of the materials of which the manufacturers consist, I am disposed to think they would make poor seamen, and sorry soldiers. I do not think the world would have much to fear from their prowess. They are fit for manufacturers, and nothing else; and if driven from their habitual employments, they must starve, or become a charge upon the nation. But, Sir, the conversion of fifty thousand productive, into fifty thousand unproductive, and even expensive, laborers, could not contribute much to the wealth or power of any nation; and such an operation in Great Britain, where the poor rates are sufficiently high already, would command the serious attention of the government.

There is something essential to the physical power of a nation, besides the numbers of seamen and soldiers. It is money—it is revenue. This operation upon labor, could not be productive of revenue, but would be an enormous charge upon it. I am there-



more inclined to think that the British cabinet would not feel any great obligation to the gentleman for his ingenious discovery.—All these considerations must present strong inducements to Great Britain to revoke her hostile orders ; but she has hitherto refused to do so.

Let a candid inquiry be now made into the actual causes of this refusal. The gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd) informs us, that the British cabinet shewed some solicitude about the embargo laws, till some time between the 22d of June and the 29th of July last, within which time, information flowed in upon them, which relieved them from this solicitude, and reconciled them to the embargo. [Mr. Lloyd rose to explain. He said he referred to the months of June and July, without mentioning any particular days of those months.] I admit that the gentleman did not mention the particular days ; I took the particular days for greater precision, from the correspondence between Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Madison, from which I presume the gentleman had drawn his information.

What was the information that flowed in upon the British cabinet, from the 22d June to the 29th of July ? That period announced two events. First, the wonderful revolution in Spain ; although this event must have been pretty well understood in London before even the 22d June, perhaps not to its full extent. The other event was, the paltry attempt at the resistance of the embargo laws in Vermont, magnified into a formidable insurrection against the government ; and the unhappy discontents manifested in Boston and its neighborhood, together with the results of the elections in Massachusetts. All these circumstances were certainly greatly exaggerated, or, perhaps, utterly misrepresented. Here, then, Sir, we clearly discern the real causes of the refusal of the British cabinet to meet the just and honorable proposition of the United States, and to revoke their orders in council. The Spanish revolution, no doubt, contributed to their determination ; but the principal cause, was our own divisions and discontents, either wholly misrepresented or highly exaggerated.

Before the 22d June, Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Canning were engaged in the most informal and friendly communications : Mr. Canning had gone so far as to intimate to Mr. Pinkney, that he might in a few days expect to be able to communicate to his government, some agreeable intelligence, evidently meaning, either the revocation or relaxation of the hostile orders.—But, unfortunately, shortly after the 22d June, the packet arrived with this flood of disgraceful information from the United States. Immediately after the receipt of this information, or rather misinformation, Mr. Canning changes his conduct. All informal conferences with Mr. Pinkney are denied, and a formal note demanded, in reply to which, the note of refusal was returned, marked, as we have seen, with indignity and insult to the United States.

Now, Sir, let me ask, whether these facts do not demonstrate, that the continuation of the hostile orders is principally, if not solely, owing to the dishonorable divisions and discontents in this country, and the exaggerated accounts given of them to the British government? That events in Spain alone, however intoxicating to the British cabinet, were not, of themselves, sufficient to produce this effect; because they were known before the change in Mr. Canning's conduct took place, and had not produced that effect: But, the moment the extravagant accounts of the discontents and divisions in this country were received, was the moment of change in Mr. Canning's conduct, and, therefore, must be considered as the real cause that produced it. Besides, Sir, was not this change of conduct the natural effect of this disgraceful information? When Mr. Canning was informed that the people of the United States had become false to themselves; had refused to bear the necessary privations, imposed by the government; had, in fact, separated themselves from their own government—that they would elect persons to office, who would, voluntarily, yield obedience to Mr. Canning's orders—what inducement could he have for their revocation? If obedience and submission were gratuitously tendered by the people of the United States, he had certainly nothing to do but graciously to accept them; and his note affords full evidence of this impression on his mind. The refusal of the British government, to revoke their hostile orders, therefore, appears not to have been founded upon a calculation of its interests upon correct information; but upon a miscalculation of its interests upon misinformation. How much, then, is it to be lamented, Mr. President, that our sufferings and privations should be continued, by the discontents, which were intended to remedy them? How can the authors of these discontents, reconcile their conduct to the nation, or to their own consciences? What compensation or atonement can they ever hope to make to the people for the protractions of their privations and sufferings? What, for the disgrace brought upon the nation? What, for all the horrors and calamities of war, which may, and probably will be, the consequences of such conduct? Let the infatuated authors of it answer these questions. Ages of services cannot atone for these cruel, these unfortunate errors.

It is asked Sir, how do the embargo laws operate on France? It is readily admitted, that the commercial connection between the United States and France, is not of such a nature as to make a suspension of it operate as injuriously to France herself, particularly in the interior, as on Great Britain.—But our commerce cannot be deemed unimportant to France in the feeble state of her navy. At the time too, of laying the embargo, Spain, Portugal, and Holland, were in alliance with, or in subjection to France.—Its pressure was materially felt by Spain and Portugal from their want of provisions; and it is questionable, how far that measure contributed to the convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French.

army.—The want of provisions being one ground alledged for their late convention for that purpose.

The French West India islands too, have felt the pressure with great severity.—They are at this moment in a state of blockade—There were probably too objects in this blockade—The one to reduce the French Islands for want of provisions—The other, to seize upon our merchant ships, which it was presumed would hasten thither immediately upon raising the embargo. And it appeared extremely well timed to effect that object, if Congress upon their first meeting, had been weak or pusillanimous enough to have raised it. The loss of these islands, would be severely felt by the French emperor, and would probably produce some regret on his part, in having contributed to drive the United States to the extremity of the embargo laws.

But Sir, gentlemen are very much alarmed at an expression in a late French expose—They have made some general allusions to it, but in so vague a manner, as not to be understood with precision. As I am always fond of a correct statement of facts, I will read the expression probably alluded to. “The Americans, a people who involve their fortunes, their prosperity, and almost their existence in commerce, have given an example of a great and courageous sacrifice. They have suspended by a general embargo, all commerce and all navigation, rather than shamefully submit to that tribute, which the English impose on the navigation of all nations”—I cannot conceive the importance attached to this expression, or the view with which it was introduced. It is to be remarked that this is the character given to this measure throughout all Europe, and by none more loudly and decisively, than by the *federal American* merchants now in Great Britain.

It is only on this side of the Atlantic, that we hear it described as a weak or a wicked measure. But what of all this, Sir. Will this French expression change the real character of the measure? Shall we change our own opinions of the true character of the measure because the French government has thought proper to pronounce an opinion upon it?—Are we told to abandon our own right of judging of our own measures, because the French government officiously undertakes to judge for us? Sir, to me it is perfectly indifferent, what the French government thinks upon the subject; I shall take the liberty of exercising my own judgment upon it, perfectly exempt from any extraneous influence whatever.—

Mr. Canning, Sir, has also undertaken to say something respecting the character of the embargo laws. Let us hear what he says upon the subject.

“If considered as a measure of impartial hostility against both belligerents, the embargo appears to his majesty, to have been manifestly unjust, as according to every principle of justice, the redress ought to have been first sought from the party originating

the wrong. And his majesty cannot consent to buy off that hostility, which America ought not to have extended to him, at the expense of a concession made, not to America, but to France.

If, as it has more generally been represented by the government of the United States, the embargo is only to be considered as an innocent, municipal regulation, which affects none but the United States themselves, and with which no foreign state has any concern; viewed in this light, his majesty does not conceive that he has the right or the pretension to make any complaint of it; and he has made none."

"His majesty would not hesitate to contribute in any manner in his power to restore to the commerce of the United States its wonted activity; and if it were possible to make any sacrifice for the repeal of the embargo, without appearing to deprecate it as a measure of hostility, he would gladly have facilitated its removal as a measure of inconvenient restriction upon the American people."

Let me now ask *you*, Mr. President, what feelings must rush themselves into *your bosom*, upon hearing this last, this arrogant insinuation? What must be the feelings of every war-worn veteran, who has so long enjoyed the pleasing consciousness of having been instrumental in achieving his country's independence? What must be the feelings of every young American who has not basely degenerated from his father's virtues? Do you not see, Sir, in this sentence almost a direct overture of the interference of his most gracious majesty in our political concerns? Do you not see the vain and idle effort to encourage discontents by the expression of his majesty's good disposition to interpose his good offices to relieve the American people from the inconvenient restrictions imposed on them by their own government? What indignity, what insult could be greater upon the American people? What could more clearly demonstrate the infatuation, the intoxication of Mr. Canning's mind, produced by the unfortunate flood of misinformation which had poured in upon him? The American people will repel the overture with indignation, with disdain;—and, Sir, as a sure and pleasing anticipation of this result, I rejoiced to see the indignant resentment manifested by the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. White.) It was the more honorable to him, Sir, because it was the triumph of his American feelings over a host of prejudices with which I fear he is surrounded. I always knew that gentleman to be a patriot, and when it shall become necessary, I expect to see him amongst the foremost in the ranks of honor, in the defence of his country's rights.

Yes, Sir, this insulting overture will doubtless burst the strong fetters of the prejudices of thousands of other American patriots, who will rally to the standard of their own government, and will teach Mr. Canning, how little he knows of American character, or the American sensibility, when he thus ventures to insult it.

Sir, the sentiments contained in this extraordinary note of Mr.



Canning's, are not new to me. I have seen them for some months in some of the Boston newspapers—it contains nothing more than the ridiculous intimations contained in them, reduced to the form of a diplomatic note, not at all improved, nor dignified, nor better calculated to effect their object, by the sarcastic insolence of Mr. Canning.

Upon an impartial review of the whole of this part of the subject, Mr. President, I think I am warranted in the conclusion, that the embargo laws have not been without materially beneficial effects upon both the belligerents—that they have presented strong appeals to the interests of both; but that these appeals have not produced their complete effect:—I have no hesitation in saying, Sir, that when the proper time shall arrive, if these orders and decrees should unfortunately be persevered in, I shall, for one, be ready to make still stronger appeals to their interests—appeals limited only by the whole force and energy of the nation.

I think also, Sir, I am warranted in concluding, that if the embargo laws have failed of complete success, their failure has been owing to extraordinary causes which could neither have been foreseen nor anticipated at the time of the adoption of the measure, and therefore cannot furnish any imputation against its policy or wisdom.

Permit me, now, Sir, to make some observations upon the general character of this measure, as well as replies to some of the more general objections brought against it. I have said, Sir, that there are no substitutes for the embargo, but *war or submission*. I will now proceed to prove this position—a repeal of the embargo without a substitute, is *submission*, if with a substitute, it is *war*.—Gentlemen in the opposition, seem fully sensible of the delicacy and urgency of this part of the question. When pressed for their substitute, they manifest vast reluctance in producing it.

The gentleman from Delaware, indeed told us, he was not the pioneer of the administration; I never knew that he was called upon to act in that character; but I hope he will not voluntarily act as the sapper, nor the miner of the administration, especially when he must behold the administration assailed by the two most powerful belligerents in the world, unfortunately aided I fear, too, Sir, by an host of domestic sappers and miners, and underminers in the bargain. I am sure, Sir, the gentleman will not take upon himself such a character. The gentleman, however, did not withhold from us an intimation, at least of his substitute—an intimation which could not be mistaken. It was war with France. The question, therefore, as to him is at an end upon this point. War is the substitute.

But, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) after protesting against furnishing any substitute, intimates merely that he is in favor of an armed commerce. Why, Sir, do gentlemen in the opposition manifest such a reluctance in producing a substi-

tute, if they have one? They seem to be laboring under an impression that this is a mere question, between themselves and the administration; an unimportant question of ins and outs. The question is certainly of a very different description. It is a question between this nation, and foreign nations. It is a question involving our national existence and independence, and the dearest rights of the people.

Let me tell these gentlemen, Sir, that the people have a right to demand a substitute from them, if they have one; not merely a vague insinuation to fill up a chasm in a defective argument, but a written proposition, reduced to form, presented for serious consideration; that every word may be strictly examined, and all its bearings seen; then, Sir, we should be in a state of preparation to make a choice between such substitute, and the measures of the administration.

Besides, Sir, if this obligation were disregarded, every rule of criticism, every principle of common sense would require a substitute. If you criticise upon a sentence in writing, the criticism is incomplete until you shew a better. In law pleadings, if you object to a plea, as defective, you are bound to show a better. And, certainly, Sir, the magnitude of the question, does not lessen the obligation imposed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Again, Sir, I hardly could have supposed, that gentlemen of such lofty pretensions to wisdom and talents, would have contented themselves with the humble office of finding fault, without furnishing the proper correction. This inactive conduct, this doing nothing for the people, in these dangerous and critical times, can furnish but a poor claim to the people's gratitude and applause.

But, Sir, I will consider the gentleman's substitute, even with the glimmering views of it, which he has presented. His substitute is an armed commerce. Would he extend it to acts of reprisal? If so, it is immediate war. Would he stop short of that? It would still be war; but of a more inefficient kind. If our vessels are to arm, I presume their arms are to be used in self defence; they would be used against both the belligerents. In the present temper of Great Britain, the first gun fired in a spirit of hostility, even with a blank cartridge; or if it were a pop gun, would be instant war. It would be the signal to her navy to seize upon the whole of our commerce, which would be spread upon the ocean, the moment of raising the embargo. The gentleman's substitute I, therefore, believe to be war, and war of the most inefficient kind. A repeal of the embargo, without a substitute, is submission.— Submission to what! to colonization, to taxation, to tribute!!

That this is the true character of the British orders and acts of parliament, we not only know from the measures themselves, but we know it was so understood in the British parliament, at the time of their adoption. As an evidence of this fact, let me call

your most serious attention, Sir, to some of the observations made in parliament, at the time of their adoption, particularly the observations of lord Grenvillé in the House of Lords.

His lordship said, "as to the duties proposed to be levied under these orders of council, he should only say, that when the peace of 1782 took place, he never thought that he should have lived, or that the British parliament should have lived to see the day when a proposition should be made to tax America !" And when a similar suggestion was made in the House of Commons, what was Mr. Canning's reply ? Did he deny the object ? No, Sir : But begged the gentlemen in the opposition not to tell the secret to the Americans ! Hush, gentlemen, was, in substance, his reply. Thus adding indignity and insult to the arrogant pretension. Upon this part of the subject, I shall make no comment ! It is impossible to improve the eloquence of this parliamentary language ! It must strike deep into the heart of every true American ! !

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) says, no tribute will be paid, because there will be no inducement to pay it. France will not receive vessels into her ports, which have submitted to such a disgrace.—It is admitted that the tribute is imposed ; and to avoid the payment of it, we are to look to France : to give up our national character, and our national honor to the safe keeping of the French emperor. [The gentleman rose to explain. He protested against making any such inference.] This was admitted. He only stated the facts, and I supplied the inference. The inference from the facts I deem irresistible.—I despise Sir, this miserable subterfuge. Let us act like a nation of freemen—Let us be the conservators of our own honor and character.—We should be the gainers by it upon the most economical calculation, in pounds shillings, and pence. Our national character is now worth more than the delusive gains held out by this miserable commerce ; and would sell for more in every market : submit to this disgraceful tribute, it would not be worth a cent, and would not sell for it in any market.

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) says, that the embargo is submission to the mandates of both France and Great Britain, and therefore dishonorable.—He makes this statement,—France says, you shall not trade with Great Britain—Great Britain says, you shall not trade with France—and we say, we will not trade with either, and therefore gratify both. The fallacy of this argument consists in the misstatement.—France says you may trade with me, and I am anxious you should do so, but you shall not trade with Great Britain ; we say, we will not trade with you, nor with Great Britain. Now, Sir, is this yielding to the mandate, or gratifying the wish of France ? Certainly not.—Great Britain uses the same language, and meets with the same reply.—Now I contend that we have neither yielded submission, nor gratified the wish of either ; but have resisted the wishes and mandates

of both ; and I have no doubt that both are astonished at the honorable and dignified attitude we have assumed and hitherto persisted in.

But, Sir, the gentleman intimates, that the government of the United States, has suspended a rod over the head of Great Britain, and asks, whether any American would negotiate with a rod suspended over his head ? Let me ask in turn, Sir, if the gentleman's proposition, is not submission ; not indeed, while the rod is suspended over our heads ; but whilst it is applied with the most unrelenting severity to our backs ? I was really hurt, Sir, to see that any gentleman could make an observation which would bear the most distant tint of an apology for Great Britain ; and I cannot conceive how any gentleman can reconcile it to himself, when he reflects upon the many outrages committed by Great Britain against the United States, before even any attempt was made to do ourselves justice—and that these outrages were increased, in proportion to our patience under them.

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd) expresses his fears of some design for the destruction of commerce. He tells us, our commerce has grown to an enormous size, and warns us that it is not to be trifled with. The gentleman from Connecticut, too, tells us, that the avowed, was not the real object, of the embargo laws ; and that he so prophesied at the time of passing them—that their real object was to encourage manufactures, at the expense of commerce. This charge of insincerity is a serious one. It is of a nature to impose a restraint upon the feelings, against making the merited reply. It has excited my surprise more than any thing I ever heard fall from that gentleman ; and the only apology I can find for it, is, that he unfortunately prophesied it. It is a painful effort of the mind to admit ourselves false prophets. By this time, it is impossible, but the gentleman must be convinced, that this was a false prophesy. He reminds me of two lines in Hudibras :

“ A man convinc'd against his will,

“ Is of the same opinion still.”

The gentleman must be convinced, but retains the same opinion. Sir, whether it be a suspicion, or a jealousy, or whatever delusion the gentleman is laboring under, I peremptorily deny the existence of the fact he has insinuated. How has it happened, that the commerce of the United States has become so enormous ; but from the fostering and protecting influence of the federal government ? What act of hostility against commerce, has ever been shewn by the government ? I challenge the gentleman to name one, or a single act from the southern members unfavorable to our commercial prosperity. On the other hand, have we not always concurred in the stimuli given to commerce by discriminating duties, both on tonnage and merchandize, by the drawback system ? and many



other acts not material now to mention. It has been from these causes, added to the enterprizes of our people, that commerce has arrived to such a pitch of prosperity. They certainly do not warrant the charge brought against the government.

But what has excited my surprise, more than any thing else, respecting this suggestion is, that the delusion upon the gentleman's mind, should be so strong as to banish his recollection of the local interests of the different states in the union. He seems to suppose that the southern are manufacturing states.—This is not the fact.—The fact is, that the commercial are, also, the manufacturing states. The southern states are agricultural and commercial, not manufacturing, except in the household way; and that is not the species of manufacturing, that has excited the gentleman's alarm. The peculiar organization of society in the southern states, will, for a long time, forbid large establishments of domestic manufactures. This is the kind which gives the gentleman so much alarm; and, in this kind, the southern states have no local interests whatever. They have, however, an essential interest in commerce, although, generally, the merchants carrying it on, may not reside within them. The agriculturists know, that a prosperous commerce is essential to good prices, and, therefore, they have always contributed to its protection and prosperity. In this state of facts, the gentleman may find a perfect security against his extravagant, and unfounded jealousies. But the gentleman is alarmed, because he has discovered, in the President's replies to sundry addresses from the manufacturers, expressions of satisfaction at their prosperity and improvement in the manufacturing system. But the President has no where expressed an intimation, or a wish, that this improvement, or prosperity, should be encouraged and promoted at the expense of commerce. And if he were to indulge so extraordinary an inclination, he could not expect to get a vote south of Potomac, in favor of the system. Suppose the merchants had addressed the President, in the days of their prosperity, would he not have expressed his satisfaction at the circumstance? And would such expression have been just ground, or any ground, of alarm and jealousy to the manufacturer? Certainly not Sir. Every patriot must rejoice at the prosperity of each, and every class of citizens. Indeed, Sir, did not the gentleman himself, in the course of his observations, with a laudable animation, express his high satisfaction at the doings of his own legislature, giving encouragement to colonel Humphries, in his attempts at introducing manufactures into the state of Connecticut? Proceedings highly honorable both to the legislature and colonel Humphries; and which I have also seen with great satisfaction. But, Sir, would it be correct to infer from this circumstance, that commerce is to be assailed and prostrated? Such an inference would be as idle and absurd in this case, as it is in relation to the views of the general government. Indeed, Sir, I concur perfectly with the gentleman in the opinions he has ex-

pressed upon the manufacturing system, in relation to the commercial. I have taken more pains in repelling this extraordinary jealousy or suspicion, in the hope that in correcting the public sentiment, in this respect, it would, at the same time, dissipate a great portion of the objections to the embargo laws, which seem to me at this time, to be imperiously demanded, by the extraordinary crisis of our foreign relations.

I am now approaching a part of this subject, Mr. President, which fills me with regret. I know its delicacy, Sir, and deeply regret the necessity which impels the examination of it. It is however rendered indispensable, perhaps, by exterior events ; but certainly by observations made in the course of this debate. I allude, Sir, to the inexecution of the embargo laws ; or, rather, Sir, to the suggested incapacity of the government to enforce their observance. The gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Hillhouse) tells us, directly, that the government has not power to enforce the execution of these laws. The gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd) even points out the mode of resistance. He tells us they may be resisted, first, by town meetings, then by petitions, then by legislative resolutions, and, finally, by insurrections and rebellion. [Mr. Lloyd rose to explain. He said, "he did not say that this would be the course of events. He only stated them, abstractly, as probable results from those laws."] The gentleman is correct in his statement. I meant to be understood, as stating his observations in that way. It cannot escape observation, however, Mr. President, that this is the practical process now going on in the state, the gentleman has the honor to represent.

It is submitted to the patriotism and good sense of those gentlemen to determine, whether mentioning these circumstances, even in that way, may not have some tendency to produce effects, which must be so much deprecated by all ; and permit me to hope, Sir, by none more than by those gentlemen. And whether, Sir, they are not calculated to keep up the delusions in foreign nations, which, I believe in God, to be the principal causes of our present embarrassments. These circumstances were the less to be expected from gentlemen, who, a few years ago, arrogated to themselves the exclusive appellation of lovers of order and good government, whilst their political opponents were denounced as anarchists and disorganizers, and not even possessing virtue and honesty enough to be trusted with the public treasury. This, Sir, was an imposing appellation ; and as long as its sincerity was confided in, it preserved these gentlemen in the dominion of the United States.

It was hardly to have been expected that these gentlemen would now be found the first to sound the alarm. in favor of anarchy and confusion ; nor was it to have been expected, Sir, that the eastern states, which were the first to press the constitution upon us, and which have reaped a golden harvest from its operations, should be the first to wish to absolve themselves from its sacred obligations:

But, Mr. President, I believe this government does possess power sufficient to enforce the embargo laws. The real character of our government seems to be entirely misunderstood by foreigners and not fully appreciated by some of our own citizens. It has all the strength of *execution*, with the most despotic governments upon earth. It is aided, too, by the knowledge of every citizen; that when its will is pronounced, it is the fair expression of the will of the majority. The checks of this government are exclusively upon its *deliberations*, not upon its powers of *execution*. So far from it, that the constitution has expressly provided, that the government should possess all means necessary and proper for executing its specified powers. There is no limitation, whatever, upon the means for executing the general will, when fairly and deliberately pronounced. Nothing could be more absurd than to suppose, that after so many checks had been imposed upon *deliberation* in pronouncing the public will, after that will was thus pronounced, that any means, whatever, for its *execution* should be withheld.

Again, Sir, the fundamental principle of our government is, that the majority shall govern. This principle is known and respected by every citizen, and by none more than the people of Massachusetts. They are taught to respect it from the cradle to manhood. First in their town meetings—then in their legislature—and, finally, in the general government. They know too well the fatal consequences of resisting it. I have perfect confidence, therefore, in the people of Massachusetts; and, if their electioneering leaders and partizans, should unfortunately stimulate some of them into insurrection, I have no doubt but that the militia of that state, when lawfully called on, will obey the call, and will do their duty. Such a movement would share the fate of all similar attempts, which have preceded it; and its only consequences would be, that its authors, as they would be the first to merit the fate, so they would become the first victims of it. But, Sir, I have but little apprehension from these threats of insurrection and rebellion, for other reasons.

The peculiar interests of the people of Massachusetts, forbid the attempt. A few leaders may, perhaps, postpone their interests to their love of power—But few, however, could enjoy the power under any new order of things, and the people at large would soon see that their interests were sacrificed to the indulgence of this insatuated ambition of the few.

Let this subject, Mr. President, be a little further examined, in reference to the local interests of the eastern states, as members of this union. Potomac may be considered as the boundary line between the commercial and agricultural states.

When our first difficulties with the belligerents occurred, it respected merely a commercial right. What was the conduct of the merchants, and commercial states, upon the subject? You have heard, Sir, their memorials read, calling upon the government, in a voice too loud to be suppressed, to protect them in

their commercial rights; the call was obeyed.—As I think this part of the subject ought to be well understood, I beg the indulgence of the senate to read their own proceedings thereupon.

The senate resumed the consideration of the report of the committee, made on the 5th instant, on that part of the message of the President of the United States, which relates to the violation of neutral rights and the impressment of American seamen.

On motion,

To commit the second resolution, reported;

It passed in the negative.

On motion,

To strike out the following words in the second resolution, reported.

*“ Demand and insist upon the restoration of the property of their citizens, captured and condemned on the pretext of its being employed in a trade with the enemies of Great Britain, prohibited in time of peace; and upon the indemnification of such American citizens, for their losses and damages sustained by those captures and condemnations, and to” —*

It was determined in the negative, yeas 13, nays 16.

The yeas and nays having been required by one-fifth of the senators present, those who voted in the affirmative, are,

Messrs. Adair, Baldwin, Bradley, Gaillard, Howland, Logan, Maclay, Moore, Plumer, Smith, of Vermont, Sumter, Turner, Worthington.

Those who voted in the negative, are,

Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Bayard, Gilman, Hillhouse, Kitchel, Mitchill, Pickering, Smith, of Maryland, Smith, of New York, Smith, of Ohio, Smith, of Tennessee, Thruston, Tracy, White, Wright.

And several amendments to the said second resolution having been adopted;

On motion,

To agree thereto as amended,

It was determined in the affirmative, yeas 23, nays 7.

The yeas and nays having been required by one-fifth of the senators present, those who voted in the affirmative, are,

Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Bayard, Gaillard, Gilman, Hillhouse, Howland, Kitchel, Logan, Maclay, Mitchill, Moore, Pickering, Smith, of Maryland, Smith, of New York, Smith, of Ohio, Smith, of Tennessee, Tracy, Turner, White, Worthington, Wright.

Those who voted in the negative, are,

Messrs. Adair, Bradley, Plumer, Smith, of Vermont, Stone, Sumter, Thruston.

So it was,

*Resolved*, That the President of the U. S. be requested to demand the restoration of the property of their citizens, captured and condemned on the pretext of its being employed in a trade with the



enemies of Great Britain, prohibited in time of peace; and the indemnification of such American citizens, for their losses and damages sustained by these captures and condemnations; and to enter into such arrangements with the British government, on this and all other differences subsisting between the two nations, (and particularly respecting the impressment of American seamen,) as may be consistent with the honor and interests of the United States, and manifest their earnest desire to obtain for themselves and their citizens by amicable negotiation, that justice to which they are entitled."

At this time the question involved only a commercial right.—What was the conduct of the merchants then? They came forward and pledged their lives and fortunes to support the government in any measures for its protection. The question is now changed.—To the original question, is added a question of national sovereignty and independence.—What is now the conduct of these same merchants? They tell you, Sir, to tread back your steps, give up the contest, and disgrace your country. These merchants too, threaten you with insurrection and rebellion unless you yield implicit obedience to their mandates.

Again, Sir, I have little apprehension from these threats, for the following reasons:—first, many of the individuals engaged in these excitements, I am told are gentlemen of property and families. They are therefore, now, in the enjoyment of every political and domestic blessing; their infatuated passions to the contrary notwithstanding. I think persons of this description will pause, before they hazard all these blessings; and a moment's impartial reflection will be sufficient to check their career. In the next place, there are many local advantages accruing to the people of the Eastern states from the operations of the general government. They consist principally of the following, although there are others.

1. The protection afforded to their carrying trade, by discriminating duties, both on tonnage and merchandise.
2. Protection and facility afforded to the coasting trade.
3. Protection to their fisheries by duties on foreign fish.
4. Affording a good market for their surplus manufactures and other articles.
5. Payment of the public debt at par, which was bought up at very low rates.
6. As a result from all these advantages, the protection of their population on the seaboard, by lessening the inducements to emigration.

Permit me, Sir, to remind the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd) that these advantages are not to be trifled with.

But, Sir, I have heard it intimated that these advantages could be compensated by a connection with Great Britain. Indulge me, Sir, with an examination of this idea. A connection between New England, and Old England, could only be for the benefit of

the latter. They are essentially rivals in every occupation. First, in navigation—second in exports. The exports of New England are principally fish and beef. It would be a great object with Old England, utterly to destroy the New England fish market; and the Irish beef would come into an advantageous competition with the export of that article.

These are permanent points of competition, unalterably fixed in the nature of things; they cannot be altered, nor destroyed by any sudden ebullition of passions; nor by any connection resulting therefrom.

Again, Sir, what would be the effect of such a connexion upon the rest of the United States. In that case, the discriminating duties now in favor of the New England states would be turned against them, and would probably be given to the middle states, and thus New England would be effectually excluded from carrying the bulky and heavy productions of the southern states. Discrimination might even be made in favor of British ships. It is a matter of no consequence to the agriculturalist, whether his produce is carried to market in a New England, or Old England ship. The only interest he has in the transaction is the price of his produce; and that could always be driven to its highest point by the competition of British tonnage and British capital alone, without taking into the estimate the tonnage and capital of the middle states. The people of the southern states are perfectly sensible of the local advantages their eastern brethren enjoy from the operation of the general government. But they envy them not—they rejoice in their prosperity; and the southern people are pleased with the recollection that they contribute to this prosperity; they find in return their compensation in the general safety and protection: I do not mean safety and protection against any internal movements; upon that point I would agree with our eastern brethren upon a reciprocal absolution from all obligation; I mean safety and protection against foreign aggression. Under this plain and obvious view of this part of the subject, Mr. President, I should be disposed to think that our eastern brethren would be the last to desire to absolve themselves from the sacred obligations of the constitution.

In the southern states we feel no resentments nor jealousies against our eastern friends. There are no inducements with us to foster and encourage such unpleasant and mischievous feelings. The gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd) has ventured to interpose an opinion between Great Britain and France, respecting the character of the quarrel between them. He has ventured to say, Sir, that France is fighting for lawless domination; whilst Great Britain is fighting for her natali solum, for her national existence. Sir, in my opinion, it must be inauspicious to the interests of the people of the United States when their rulers not only feel, but

express sympathies in favor of one of the belligerent powers; and surely, Sir, the gentleman must feel no small sympathy for one of the belligerents, if he believes the character of the quarrel to be such as he has described it.

In my judgment, Sir, the United States have nothing to do with the character of the quarrel of the belligerents; but I differ entirely with the gentleman on this point. I believe the character of the quarrel is precisely the same on both sides—they are both fighting for lawless domination; and I believe that Great Britain has full as much chance of conquering France, as France has of conquering Great Britain. The only difference between them consists in the difference in the objects of their lawless domination. France claims dominion on the land, Great Britain on the water; they are both equally hostile to us.

The difference to us consists only in the different degrees of force they can bring to bear upon us—in this respect Great Britain does us most injury. We are, thank God, remote from the influence of French power—but the power of Great Britain extends to our shores. France, when she can, seizes and burns our vessels—Great Britain having more power on the ocean, seizes and confiscates them. The only limit of their hostility is the limit of their power. Both are equally the objects of our just resistance and punishment if we possessed the power.

I rejoice that I have heard no apologist for France on this floor, nor any where else. I feel, Sir, a condescension in introducing, for the purpose of denying, the idle and ridiculous tale of French influence, which has so disrespectfully and disgracefully to our country, been circulated by newspapers. Sir, this idle and ridiculous tale of French influence, I have strong reasons to believe, was originally suggested by British influence. The tale was probably invented by the British cabinet about the same time of the invention of the tale respecting the secret article in the treaty of Tilsit, that the Danes had agreed to give up their fleet to the French emperor to facilitate his invasion of G. B. This tale I believe lord Hutchinson has since pronounced, in the British parliament, to be a falsehood. About the same period this same energetic British cabinet probably determined upon the destruction of American commerce, although the orders for that purpose were not actually issued for several months afterwards. Some tale was thought necessary for the justification of the act, and the suggestion of French influence operating upon our councils was probably the one suggested.

I have heard it said, and believe it to be true, that the governor of Nova Scotia made the suggestion, in a letter addressed to certain British partisans in Boston. It is hardly to be presumed, that he would have taken upon himself, the responsibility of such a suggestion without the authority of the cabinet. I am inclined to think that this fact could be proved in a court of justice. Perhaps there may be gentlemen here from Boston, who could give us

more particular information upon this subject. I feel, Sir, a condescension in touching upon this subject. I wish to see all extraneous influence utterly banished from the country, and the only operating influence—American influence.

I have, now, Sir, gone through this unpleasant, and, I fear, unprofitable discussion, respecting the character of measures heretofore adopted by the government; the only hope I have from it is, that it may put us into a better temper for deliberating on the measures now proper to be adopted. Let me then, Mr. President, call the attention of the senate, to the actual situation of the United States at this time.

The United States are now left alone to protect neutral principles against the belligerent encroachments of a warring world.—In all former wars, the belligerent encroachments have been proportioned to the influence of the powers at war, compared to the influence of those remaining at peace; but I believe history presents no example of the warring powers at any former time putting at defiance all neutral rights, all public law. It remained for the present times to witness this unexampled aggression; and it remained for the United States alone to bear the shock. This state of things imposes on them a great, a sacred obligation. The obligation of protecting neutral principles.—Principles which lessen the inducements to war, and mitigate its rigor.—Principles highly interesting to mankind; not only to the present, but to future generations, and in a peculiar manner, to the people of the United States. This arises from their remote situation from the great contending nations of Europe.—Hitherto, Sir, the talents displayed in defining, and the magnanimity in protecting these principles, have obtained for the United States, the respect and sympathy of an astonished world.—And shall we, Sir, at the moment of an extraordinary pressure, basely abandon them without striking a blow? Forbid it interest! Forbid it honor! Forbid it American gallantry!—But, Sir, some gentleman seem not sufficiently impressed with the hostile character of the belligerent aggressions.—With respect to those of France, there is but one opinion. They amount to hostility itself.—But, Sir, to my astonishment, the acts of Great Britain seem not to have made the same strong impression on the minds of some gentlemen. Let me then inquire Sir, into the real character of acts, which can by some gentlemen be palliated or excused? They are acts amounting to colonization and taxation.—To the exercise of the national sovereignty of the United States. Great Britain has even gone so far, as to exercise an act of sovereignty over the people of the United States, which they would not entrust to Congress; but retained to themselves in their highest sovereign capacity.

The British orders of council, now sanctioned by an act of parliament, direct all vessels, laden with the produce of the United States destined to any of the ports of the enemies of Great Bri-



tain, to call at a British port, and then to pay an enormous transit duty, and accept a license for the further prosecution of the voyage; and upon refusal, they are forced to do so by British armed ships.—This is literally and precisely the introduction of the old, and long established colonial principle of coercing all the commerce of the colony to the ports of the mother country, there to pay a transit duty for their protection by the mother country.—In the colonial state, the mandate of the mother country was sufficient to effect this object.—Now the same object is effected by an armed force.—This is the only real difference in the two cases. But, Sir, this is not all; Great Britain has attempted by an act of Parliament, to exercise an act of sovereignty over the United States, solemnly given by the people to their Congress.—Amongst the powers given to Congress, I find these words.—“Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,” &c. Now, Sir, permit me to read an extract from an act of Parliament, and see whether it does not only impose a tax upon American productions, but also exercises this act of national sovereignty delegated by the people to Congress.

“And whereas it is expedient and necessary in order effectually to accomplish the object of such orders, that duties of customs should be granted upon certain goods exported from Great Britain; we, your majesty’s most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom, in Parliament assembled, do most humbly beseech your majesty that it may be enacted; and be it enacted by the king’s most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that from and after the passing of this act, there shall be raised, levied, collected, and paid unto his majesty, his heirs and successors, upon all goods, wares, and merchandise, enumerated or described in the tables (A.) (B.) and (C.) annexed to this act, exported from Great Britain, the several duties and customs, as the same are respectively described and set forth in figures in said tables.”

In those tables marked A. B. C. are to be found productions of the United States. It has been said, that Great Britain may lay an export duty upon any goods within her ports.—That is readily admitted—it being a mere municipal regulation.—But Great Britain has no right to compel our ships to carry our productions into her ports, for the purpose of imposing duties thereon; and this is the act regulating our commerce, of which I complain.

Again, Sir, Great Britain has attempted by this act of Parliament to lay an export duty upon the productions of the United States, a power not even entrusted to the discretion of Congress—I find in the constitution, these words: “no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.” Here then is an express prohibition to Congress against laying a duty on any articles ex-

ported from any state ; yet Great Britain has attempted by an act of Parliament, to lay an export duty on cotton exported from one of the United States-----an authority which can only be exercised by the people in their highest sovereign capacity. It is true, Sir, that Mr. Canning offered to commute this duty into an entire prohibition of the article, as an export from Great Britain.—This, Sir, was only adding insult to injury, and shewed that Mr. Canning possessed very little knowledge of the human character, if he expected to soothe the feelings by insulting the understanding.

I regret that so much respect was shewn to this proposition, to forward it to our government. It would have been more agreeable to me, if the American minister had thrown the proposition back upon Mr. Canning.

It is true, Mr. President, that the export duty, is to be collected in London, and not in Charleston. But, Sir, it is not the better in principle on that account ; and it is worse in practice. A vessel sailing from Charleston, is to be forced into London, for the purpose of paying this tribute—better would it be to collect it in Charleston ; because the circuitry of the voyage would be saved and many other vexations and expenses avoided which are now incurred by being forced into London, to make the payment ; and if this measure were to be submitted to, I should not be at all surprised to see his most gracious majesty in the spirit of a mitigated retaliation, send out his collectors to the ports of the U. S. for the accommodation of our merchants. In that case, I presume, we should all admit it to be a duty imposed upon an article exported from a particular state. Are we, Sir, not only basely to surrender to Great Britain our rights, entrusted to us by the people, but treacherous to them to surrender rights reserved to themselves in their highest sovereign capacity ? And in a case like this, Sir, can it be necessary to resort to argument, to rouse the indignant feelings of the American people ?

Mr. President, the eyes of the world are now turned upon us ; if we submit to these indignities and aggressions, Great Britain herself would despise us ; she would consider us as an outcast amongst nations ; she would not own us for her offspring ; France would despise us ; all the world would despise us ; and what is infinitely worse, we should be compelled to despise ourselves !!! If we resist, we shall command the respect of our enemies, the sympathies of the world, and the noble approbation of our own consciences.

Mr. President, our fate is in our own hands ; let us have union and we have nothing to fear. So highly do I prize union, at this awful moment, that I would prefer any one measure of resistance with union, to any other measure of resistance with division ; let us then, Sir, banish all personal feelings ; let us present to our enemies the formidable front of an indissoluble band of brothers : nothing

else is necessary to our success. Mr. President, unequal as this contest may seem; favored as we are by our situation, and under the blessing of a beneficent Providence, who has never lost sight of these United States, in times of difficulty and trial, I have the most perfect confidence, that if we prove true to ourselves, we shall triumph over our enemies. Deeply impressed with these considerations, I am prepared to give to the resolution, a flat and decided negative.

## NOTE.

IT was intended, in the course of the foregoing observations, to shew, that the British board of trade had, at length, undertaken to regulate our commerce with foreign nations, even when it did not pass through British ports. The paper intended to be offered as evidence of this fact, was then mislaid. It is now subjoined for that purpose.

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“THE lords of the committee of council, for trade and foreign plantations, having authorised us to make public the following answers to certain questions proposed by us to their lordships, we publish them for the information of all whom they may concern.

THOS. BARING,  
A. GLENNIE,  
THOS. MULLETT.

LONDON, 15th *Aug.* 1808.

### *Question 1.*

HIS majesty's order in council of the 4th July, 1808, having ordered, that all hostilities against Spain on the part of his majesty shall immediately cease, and that the blockade of all the ports of Spain, except such as may be still in possession, or under controul of France, shall be forthwith raised—

Can an American vessel proceed from a port in the United States of America, with a cargo, the produce of the United States, or colonial produce, direct to any port of Spain or Portugal, not being in the possession of the enemies of Great Britain, and return back to a port in the United States direct, with a cargo the growth or produce of Spain or Portugal, without being liable to capture and condemnation, under the orders of council of the 11th and 25th of November, 1807, and the several acts of parliament passed to carry them into effect?

*Answer.*

American vessels may proceed from a port in the United States of America, with a cargo, the produce of the United States, or colonial produce, *provided such produce be not the produce of the enemy's colonies*, direct to any port of Spain or Portugal ; such port not being in the possession, or under the control of the enemies of Great Britain, and return back to a port in the United States direct, with a cargo the growth or produce of Spain or Portugal.

*Question 2.*

Can an American vessel, having entered a port in Spain, previous to the commencement of hostilities by the patriots against the enemy, proceed from such port with a cargo, the growth and produce of Spain, direct to a port in the United States, without being liable to a seizure and condemnation as above ?

*Answer.*

An American vessel having entered a port in Spain, previous to the commencement of hostilities by the patriots against the enemy, may proceed from such port with a cargo the growth and produce of Spain, direct to a port in the United States, without being liable to seizure and condemnation as above, *unless the vessel entered in breach of the orders in council.*"



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MR. LLOYD'S SPEECH

IN THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

NOVEMBER 25, 1808.

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*MR. PRESIDENT,*

I FEEL impelled, sir, by a sense of duty, and by the observations of the honorable gentleman last up, [Mr. Giles] to make some further remarks on this subject.

When I had the honor before to address the senate, I did not enter into any numerical statements, which, as a mercantile man, might have been expected from me, of the value of the trade which would yet remain to be prosecuted from the United States, notwithstanding the existence of the French decrees or the British orders in council; nor did I enter into any detailed examinations of the different degrees of suffering, sustained by different sections of the United States, in consequence of the existing situation of our affairs. The reason why the latter was omitted will be presently mentioned. The reasons for not noticing the former were, that having seen so many details in the newspapers and other ephemeral publications, founded apparently on correct data, that I did not consider it necessary to lay any further statements on this subject, before gentlemen who must be so well informed as the honorable members of this house. But, sir, I had other reasons: having been recently introduced into the senate; not being much accustomed to public speaking, and being very unexpectedly called into debate, I felt desirous to take up as little of the time of the senate as could be done with propriety, being much more disposed to listen to the arguments of other gentlemen, than to obtrude upon them any remarks of my own.

When I objected to the postponement on the first day of the debate, it was not my intention at that time to have expressed my sentiments on this subject; but I had hoped to have heard the gentleman from Virginia, who addressed you yesterday, and whom I had observed taking notes for the purpose. Had I been present and heard the observations of the gentleman from Kentucky, [Mr. Pope] which I have since seen in the newspapers, I should not

have objected to the postponement; as 'it will always afford me pleasure to meet with civility and respect, the wishes of any member of the senate.

To do away any erroneous impression which may exist, these observations are perhaps not wholly useless.

When I before rose, sir, no gentleman in opposition to the resolution had then spoken on it; and having risen unexpectedly, I could only rely on conjecture for the grounds of that opposition. When I came to this city, from the general public impression abroad, my expectation was, that the embargo would be raised. The question then was, if the embargo were raised, what was next to be done? Of the leading gentlemen with whom I conversed, some had said we must have war; that the question would come to this point in a month; some that we must fight with both the belligerents; some with one of them. As I was not Quixotic enough, to think of fighting at the same time with the two nations, who commanded nearly all the force of Europe, the question, in my mind, for the consideration of congress, was narrowed to this point: ought we to go to war with France, or with Great Britain? And from this view, I made the discrimination between the circumstances of those two powers when last I addressed you: and I have now no hesitation to say, if we must have war, it would, in my opinion, be preferable to have war with France, rather than with Great Britain.

A great deal has been said in relation to the orders in council, and the act of parliament under them, imposing a duty, tax, or tribute—call it as you please—on the transportation of American merchandise from Great Britain to the ports on the continent. I shall say but a few words more on that subject. France says you shall not go to England on any terms: England says you may go to France, under certain conditions. Now, sir, as I have been taught to believe that the whole includes all its parts, I do not see by this how a limited exclusion can be more than a total one. England then had not, in this instance, behaved worse than France: they have both behaved bad enough. Still, after making these observations, I wish not to be misunderstood. The regulation is an offensive one: and if any gentleman will bring in a bill, making it highly penal for any American owner or master of a vessel to purchase this license for proceeding in his voyage from the United States to the ports on the continent, through the medium of Great Britain, or should pay the tax, and proceed, after being coerced into a British port, I will cheerfully unite with him in passing such a law.

With regard to the orders in council, the British say they are measures of retaliation, to be retracted as soon as the decrees which occasioned them shall have been withdrawn on the part of France. Gentlemen say they do not believe these professions; but that Great Britain has deeper and more hostile views than these;

that she is jealous of the prosperity of the United States, and fears them as a commercial rival ; that she wants to cripple and destroy our trade. Admitting this to be the fact (and very possibly it may be in part well founded) what does your embargo effect ? I contend that it is an act of absolute submission to her. This is strong ground, and I wish to have it noticed. Suppose Great Britain has the dispositions you attribute to her : she will not now attempt to enforce them : she dare not attempt to drive you from the ocean, because her own interests would at this time be materially injured by it. Suppose she were to attempt it, what would be the consequences ? Suffer even the merchants to arm their vessels, and her convoys and her minor cruizers would occasionally experience some unpleasant rencontres. In adjusting the depending accounts of her merchants with this country, she would sustain some inconvenience ; and she would also be obliged to submit to the loss of her colonies on the continent of America, now become doubly dear to her, from their recent prosperity, and from the supplies she is drawing from them for the support of her settlements in the West Indies. Now, sir, what does the embargo effect ? By it you are doing for Great Britain, without any inconvenience to her, precisely that which she will not venture to do for herself. Great Britain says, you shall trade only partially ; and you agree to trade not at all. The continuance of the embargo is, therefore, complete submission to her.

Much has also been said about British influence, and certain passages have been read from the memorial of the merchants of Boston, for the purpose, as I suppose, of demonstrating an inconsistency in their opinions in 1806, and at the present time. I have not seen the paper for these two years : but there is no inconsistency in it : the sentiments entertained then are the sentiments entertained now. Great Britain violated our neutral rights : the merchants of Boston, complained to their government in pointed terms, and called on it for protection and redress against Great Britain. Was this an evidence of British influence ? The charge, however, existed at that time as well as at the present ; but the scene is changed ; we had not then a Berlin decree, a Milan decree, a Bayonne decree ; our vessels had not been wantonly burned on the ocean, nor had we received any letters from Champagny.

And on this subject what says the secretary of state to general Armstrong ? He tells him, that " the burning of neutral vessels detained on the high seas is the most distressing of all the modes by which belligerents exert force contrary to right, and in proportion as it is destitute of apology ought at least to be the promptitude and amplitude of redress." Has this redress ever been obtained ? To my knowledge or belief it never has. The merchants of Boston, therefore, probably think that a war with France would now be more for the honor and the interest of the United States, than a war with Great Britain. For thinking this, are they justly

chargeable with being under British influence? This is an old story. I shall take none of it to myself, nor admit any of its allusions. I challenge any one to produce a shadow of plausibility for any such imputation.—I know they were not meant as personal allusions.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, the gentleman from Virginia still considers the embargo as a coercive measure; and if it is not, I know not what good it can effect; and if this good be not effected, then it ought not to be persisted in.

The gentleman seems to think, that by its continuance, Great Britain may still be seriously affected by her want of *bread stuff*, of *timber*, of *tobacco*, or of *cotton*. Sir, I am sorry that in this discussion we have to refer so much to foreign nations, and sometimes to appear to place their resources in opposition to our own; but I know of no other way; in which to take into consideration the propriety of this embargo, or the effects that are likely to be produced from it. The statements, if correct, must be known to them, if not to ourselves; and we ought also to know them.

The gentleman from Virginia thinks that the want of our *bread stuff* will affect Great Britain. From his extensive knowledge he must know, that the annual consumption of grain in Great Britain is estimated at about one hundred and fifty millions of bushels: that the whole of our exports, reconverting the flour into wheat, is about seven millions three hundred thousand bushels. Now admitting that every kernel of this grain used to be sent to Great Britain (which is very far from the fact) does the gentleman expect seriously to operate on Great Britain, by retaining within our ports five per cent. of all the grain she consumes? surely not, sir.

The gentleman also thinks that the want of our timber may affect her. Does he recollect that she now has at command the forests of Sweden, of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the whole coast of South America? With these resources, is it possible she can want *timber*? No, sir; and the worst evidence of it for us, is, that she has just laid such a new duty on timber from the United States, as, if the trade were now open, would amount to nearly a total exclusion from it.

Will she want *tobacco*? There are gentlemen on this floor so much better informed respecting this article, that I shall say little about it. It is not a necessary of life; and what is produced in the West-Indies, the Carracas, the Brazils, and the Spanish provinces, must, I should presume, be sufficient to prevent the embargo from affecting her by this commodity.

Does she want *cotton*? Yes, sir, she does. Although the mention made by the gentleman, of the “bad trade at Manchester,” is not a very happy illustration of the fact, too lively an interest cannot be paid to this article by the government of the United States. It is the great staple of the country, and more especially of the southern states. Great Britain imports seventy millions of pounds of



cotton annually. The exports from the United States of this article amount to above sixty millions of pounds : of this, Great Britain takes about two-thirds ; say, however, she receives from us forty-five, or fifty millions of pounds in a year, and that this supply is very important to her manufacturers : the question then is, whether, if we abstain from all intercourse with her, she can supply herself elsewhere ? I fear she can. In addition to the increasing supply from her own West India colonies, the Brazils can furnish fifteen millions of pounds. The annual export of cotton by the British from Bombay to China, is from fifteen to twenty millions of pounds, which can be sent to Europe with a profit. Here then are at least thirty millions of pounds. The cultivation of cotton in Bengal is progressing ; and Spanish America will further increase the stock. But I fear we have in our own neighborhood, a much more formidable competitor than can arise from any of the beforementioned places : the commerce of the whole coast of Guiana is under the controul of Great Britain ; a coast of three hundred miles in extent, as well calculated for the production of the best kind of cotton as any in the world. Until within a few years, it scarcely produced any quantity of importance. It now brings into the market more than fifteen millions of pounds annually, and is considered as being capable of producing, in a few years, more than sixty millions of pounds.

One of the worst effects of the embargo is, that it has trumpeted abroad what we never ought to have divulged : it has taught other nations the secret of their own self dependence ; it has induced them to seek new avenues of commerce, and when we are ready again to trade with them, it is greatly to be feared, that they will not leave their new, to return to their old customers.

The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Giles] thinks the embargo may be considered as a fortunate measure ; that the people in his part of the country are contented with it ; that the interior is improving ; that Philadelphia has increased, and so have Georgetown and Washington ; that the condition of the farmers of his neighborhood is ameliorated ; they cultivated too much land before ; they now raise less produce, but they are better situated. If this reasoning of the gentleman be sound, pursue the amelioration still further, and he will find his countrymen becoming exceedingly wealthy when they possess nothing at all. I am glad, however, to hear that any part of our country is in a prosperous situation. I should rejoice were the country whence I came, similarly circumstanced. With us, industry is paralyzed ; our produce is rotting on our hands, and real estate has become nearly unsaleable. This may in part arise from the difference in the nature of our produce. The principal products of Virginia are, I believe, wheat, corn and tobacco. The gentleman says, our exports are beef and fish. These are among the principal. Cattle cannot be sold while beef cannot be exported ; and must therefore be killed and lost, or

kept on hand for better times at an expense exceeding perhaps its value. In little more than twelve months, the fish must return to the ocean in a much more worthless state than it was received from it; while the tobacco of Virginia for a time improves from age, and the grain with care may be kept two or three years without essential injury.

The gentleman from Virginia also says, that the constitution of the United States has mostly benefited the eastern states; that it is immaterial to the southern and western states who are the carriers of their produce; the discriminating duties in favour of American shipping are nothing to them; that the northern states hold the public debt; and, I understood him to say, that the southern states protect them.

The constitution, sir, was a matter of compact; the partners to which, like the partners to all other contracts of the kind, probably surrendered something of their individual advantages for the general benefit.

Have the middle and eastern states surrendered nothing? For what reason is it, that northern citizens, on the floor of the other branch of the national legislature, have not an equal representation with southern citizens? It is because it was part of the compact; it was a concession made by the eastern states; and for what? for the protection of their commerce. How was this expectation expressed at the time of the adoption of the constitution? Emblematical representations of commerce and navigation, ships in miniature, were drawn triumphantly through the streets of all the principal sea-ports in the eastern states, as indicative of the expected protection to commerce from its adoption.—Without American navigation, how would southern produce have found a market for the last ten years?

As to the public debt, it has nothing to do with the question, unless you wish to criminate those who shewed most confidence in the stability of your government.

With regard to protection, sir; against whom do the northern states want protection? They have no internal enemies, nor enemies on their frontiers, against whom they cannot protect themselves. The assistance of the southern states may be useful in protecting their commerce from European enemies. If this can be done, and they can have an open trade, it is all they ask.

The drawing parallels of the different degrees of suffering, in the different sections of the union, is an unpleasant task; but in my opinion my duty requires it. I cannot believe, with the gentleman from Virginia, that any part of the United States is prospering under the present state of things. No, sir, we are all suffering too much. He does not agree with other southern gentlemen, and among them with his colleague. I think he stated that Virginia, he believed, suffered as much as the eastern states. This ought to be understood. For a national object our sufferings ought

to be nearly equal. I will therefore make a short statement to shew how the state of Virginia, and the state I in part have the honor to represent, (Massachusetts) are relatively affected by our present situation. They are both great states.

By the returns from the treasury office, it appears, that in the year ending September 30, 1807.

Virginia exported of foreign produce to the amount of, . . . . .	\$ 367,713
Massachusetts, . . . . .	13,926,377
Virginia exported of domestic produce to the amount of, . . . . .	4,393,521
Massachusetts, . . . . .	6,185,748

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thus then Massachusetts exported, of domestic produce, half as much again as Virginia, and more than thirty times as much of foreign merchandise.\*

But, sir, take another view of it. Large as it may be, *take no account* of the whole amount of the exports of Massachusetts as above stated, about twenty millions of dollars; *retain* in the account all the exports of Virginia, about five millions of dollars: taking it in this confined point of view, which suffers most?

The inhabitants of Massachusetts, in general, cultivate a soil which yields to their unremitting industry the necessaries of life; but affords none of the great staples of the southern states; still they envy not their southern brethren the possession of a happier climate, or a more fertile region. They do, however, consider the ocean, which the bounty of the God of nature has spread before them, as in some degree their property: they consider the use of it as their birth-right, as an inheritance bequeathed to them by their ancestors. Those of them who live on the sea-board look to it as the principal means of their subsistence: their vessels are therefore to them, what his farm is to the Virginian.

Of the whole tonnage of the United States, Massachusetts possesses more than one third. She has 450,000 tons: Virginia has 69,000 tons. Deduct these 69,000 tons, and estimate the residue at two dollars per ton a month; which is about the common rate of charter in times of active employment; and it will give upwards of nine millions of dollars for a year. Discard from this statement

\* How far the coasting trade may vary this statement is uncertain, as there are no documents before congress specifically shewing the state of it. On the one hand, a considerable quantity of the produce of Virginia is shipped from the sea-ports of other states; while, on the other, Massachusetts also ships to the same ports very large amounts of India and European merchandise, as well as considerable quantities of domestic produce and manufactures. And the India and China trade from Massachusetts alone, must amount to at least two millions of dollars more than their proportion of the amount as stated in the documents, owing to the principal part of that trade being prosecuted with specie, which is not included in the returns.

nearly one half the sum on account of the embarrassments on our foreign commerce, which might remain after the embargo was raised ; for the remnant of the coasting trade which is yet prosecuted ; for occasional want of employment, and for other incidental deductions ; and there will then be left a sum, lost to the owners of navigation in Massachusetts, not much less than the entire amount of the exports from Virginia, as stated in the returns ; with this difference, that the produce of Virginia yet remains, and one half, or one third, or a greater proportion, of its value may be now had, or may be obtained when the embargo shall be raised. Not so with the produce of navigation : that is totally lost : it does not exist, nor remain on hand like cotton or tobacco.

I regret extremely that the situation of different parts of the union is, to my view, so different ; and that a sense of duty to my more immediate constituents requires me to make the contrast : but be it what it may, the independence of the country is to be preserved at all hazards ; and the people of Massachusetts will, I trust, always manifest a love of order and of patriotism, which will carry them through every danger which menaces them, and through every danger which menaces the constitution.

Gentlemen opposed to the resolution say, that those who have brought it forward propose no substitute for the embargo ; and the gentleman from Virginia says, that I in particular have given no intimation on this head. I have no reserve in my opinion on the subject. I am free to say, remove the embargo, suffer the merchants to arm their vessels, put the nation in a state of defence, and assert your well-established and indisputable rights, or perish in the contest.



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## MR. HILLHOUSE'S SPEECH

ON THE

RESOLUTION TO REPEAL THE EMBARGO,

NOVEMBER 29, 1808.

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MR. PRESIDENT,

WHEN I offered the resolution for a removal of the embargo, and submitted my remarks to the senate, I was impressed with serious apprehensions for our country's welfare, on account of the embarrassments so forcibly described, and which have been painted in such vivid colours by the gentleman from Virginia. [Mr. Giles.] It was because I felt anxious that we should extricate ourselves as soon as possible from those embarrassments, that I came forward thus early with my resolution. I had been led to believe, and still believe, that the way to extricate ourselves is, to explore the causes of our difficulties, to examine into the truth of facts, and to have a candid and impartial inquiry into the *policy* and *expediency* of our present measures ; that if unfortunately we should be found in an *error*, we may retrace our steps, and not by an obstinate perseverance therein, involve our country in ruin. Little did I expect that I should be charged with having proposed a *tame submission* to foreign aggression, or a disposition to *abandon* our neutral rights, or *surrender* the independence of my country ; much less with having forgotten the *spirit and policy* of '76, which carried us safely through the revolution, and achieved our independence. I confined myself to general remarks, and was not perhaps so particular as I ought to have been, to make myself understood. I shall therefore now take the liberty of stating what were the *spirit and policy* of '76 ; and I shall be able to shew, from public documents and records, that as long as that *spirit and policy* were pursued, they secured us in the enjoyment of our independence, and

caused our maritime and other rights to be respected. Unfortunately for our country, it was a departure from that policy that has brought us into our present situation. It is not surprising that many mistakes should be made respecting the *spirit and policy* of '76, by those who must have derived their information from tradition, and not from their own personal observation. I have noticed that many of those who say the most on that subject, were either not born, or were in their cradles, or have since migrated to the United States, to enjoy the fruits and blessings of that revolution.

The patriots and statesmen who guided our public councils at the commencement of the revolution, believing our rights were invaded, and our liberties endangered by the arbitrary and unwarrantable claims of the British parliament, resorted first to respectful petitions and remonstrances, to induce the British government to abandon their unjust claims, and adopt such measures as would secure our rights and liberties. But when these means were found to be ineffectual, they nobly dared to make their appeal to *arms*, and to declare themselves a free and independent nation: and though we were without a regular organized government, and had neither army nor navy, they dared, in defence of their just rights, to wage war with a powerful nation. They did not tell us that we must abandon our right to navigate the ocean, or yield up any other right because of *surrounding dangers*. The maxims then were, that *rights*, which were not worth defending, were *no rights*: that to be *respected*, we must convince others that we would not *tamely submit* to *insult*; and that to preserve *peace* we must be prepared for *war*. This *spirit* and *policy* carried us safely through the revolutionary war, established our independence, and secured our national sovereignty; one essential attribute of which is the right to navigate the ocean. In 1783 we obtained an honourable peace. In 1793, war having commenced between France and England, our maritime rights were invaded by the latter, and our vessels were captured and condemned under the memorable November orders. An attempt was then made to introduce the same policy to defend our rights and vindicate our honour, which is now, and for some time has been, in the flood tide of experiment. The famous resolutions proposing duties of *discrimination* between foreign nations, the entering into a *commercial warfare* with England, and propositions for a *non-intercourse law*, and *sequestration* of British debts. will be remembered. The journals of that session of congress contain a record of them, and will shew who were the *friends* and *advocates* of that policy.

Fortunately for the nation, we then had a chief magistrate who was actuated by the *spirit*, and well knew, and was determined to pursue the *policy* of '76. He boldly came forward, and put an end to all those projects. by nominating an envoy extraordinary to the court of Great Britain, to remonstrate against the wrongs, and demand satisfaction for the injuries we had sustained. That minister

was not sent out with a *non-importation* or a *non-intercourse* act in his hand ; which the president well knew would have been understood and considered by Great Britain in the nature of a *threat*, or an attempt to *coerce* ; and would defeat the object of the mission. He was in *reality* sent with the olive branch on the principle of a *fair* and *honourable* negotiation.

In the mean time, knowing that a failure of the negotiation must result in war, or an abandonment of our rights, every preparation to meet the event, which it was in the power of the country to make, was made. Laws were passed for fortifying our ports and harbors ; to provide a navy ; to erect arsenals and provide magazines ; for raising artillerists and engineers ; for directing a detachment from the militia ; to prohibit the exportation of arms and ammunition, and to encourage the importation of the same ; to build or purchase vessels to be armed and equipped as galleys or otherwise ; and for making further and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States. These several acts were passed in the short space of about ten weeks ; and not only found their way into the statute book, but were promptly carried into execution : and being laws of a mere municipal nature, providing for our internal security and defence, they gave no umbrage to Great Britain. Yet they spoke a language she well understood. What was the consequence ? Great Britain admitted our claim, revoked her orders, and made satisfaction for the injury ; and a treaty was concluded, under which our citizens have received millions of dollars for the losses they sustained by the capture and condemnation of their vessels ; and since it went into operation, as the gentleman from Virginia candidly admits, the United States have enjoyed unexampled prosperity.

France, still at war with England, had expected that the differences between England and the United States, would involve the two countries in war. Dissatisfied, therefore, with the treaty, France manifested an unfriendly disposition towards our government. In 1797, the spoliations committed under the outrageous decrees of France, were such as could no longer be tolerated consistently with our national honour and interest : and the French government had moreover refused to receive our minister.

It was once more fortunate for the nation, that our then chief magistrate, and the councils of our country, were still under the influence and guidance of the *spirit* and *policy* of '76. Envoys extraordinary were sent to remonstrate against the injuries we were suffering, and to demand satisfaction : not accompanied by *non-importation* laws, or any other acts or resolutions which could wound the pride of that nation : at the same time congress provided means of defence ; so that the nation might be prepared to avenge its wrongs, and vindicate its honor, in case of refusal, on the part of France, to do us justice. Laws were passed, prohibiting the exportation of arms and ammunition, and for encouraging the importation there-

of; to provide for the defence of the ports and harbours of the United States; to authorize a detachment from the militia, and to provide a naval armament.

France did refuse to treat, and rejected our ministers. What was the result? *not long, detailed diplomatic correspondences, further remonstrances, and paper resolutions*: a negotiation of a different nature commenced; we spoke a language not to be misunderstood: we spoke from the mouth of the cannon. Our treaties with her were annulled; all intercourse prohibited; our merchant vessels authorized to arm, and defend themselves against French privateers; an army was raised; and our little navy equipped, manned, and sent out to protect our commerce, and capture the armed vessels of France. A war, not of *offence*, but *defence*, was commenced. Naval conflicts soon ensued, and a French frigate was taken, after a hard fought battle, by an American frigate commanded by the gallant Truxton. The French privateers and piratical boats, which had annoyed our trade, were swept from the ocean; our commerce resumed its wonted activity, and our vessels again navigated in safety every sea. What was the conduct of France? a declaration of war? far from it. Though she had before treated us with indignity, the manly attitude we assumed, in defence of our rights and national honor, commanded her respect; and she proposed and entered into a negotiation, which ended in a treaty, that was ratified by both governments, and was finally promulgated by a proclamation of the president of the United States, on the 21st of December, 1801. At this period the American flag was *respected* in every sea, and the American name and character were *honored* by all nations.

Since that period, unfortunately for our country, a different policy has prevailed in its public councils, founded no doubt on the idea "that a just nation is trusted on its word; while wars are only necessary to nations of an opposite character." A policy calculated on to save the necessity of ships of war, and exactly comporting with some of the *modern* ideas of *economy*. In pursuance of this policy, our navy has been suffered to decline; and some of our ships have, for years, been moored to rot in the mud of the Eastern Branch of the Potomac.

Many efforts have been made, but in vain, for removing our little fleet into the *salt water*, to protect our commerce, at least on our coast; and to secure us from being insulted, within our own jurisdiction, by the armed vessels of the belligerents. We were told that if our ships went out, and should meet with foreign vessels depredating on our commerce, or insulting our government, they would *fight*, and we should have *war*. That our ships would fight, on proper occasions, I have no doubt.

Though the discouragements which have been thrown in the way of our naval prosperity have greatly tended to depress the martial spirit, it still exists, and if an opportunity presents will be drawn forth into action. Believing this, I confidently rely on our being



ultimately able to extricate ourselves from the perplexing and distressing situation described by the gentleman from Virginia. That this opinion is correct, the conduct of our naval force in the Mediterranean sea, furnishes ample proof. The war with Tripoli has afforded the only active and *honorable* employment which our navy has had since the treaty with France; and in which the gallant deeds of our little band of heroes, deeds worthy of the American name and character, have commanded the admiration and applause of surrounding nations; and the recollection thereof will be cherished by the American people, when yonder marble monument, erected in honor of those heroes who fell before Tripoli, shall be mouldered into dust.

The question recurs, what is the cause of our present embarrassments? what has brought us into our present sad dilemma? for a sad one it is, if it be true, that we are reduced to the alternative of a war with both belligerents, or the continuance of the present embargo system. Surely they could not have originated in party newspaper publications, or the electioneering squabbles of the *ins* and the *outs*. The effects of these are greatly over-rated. Though they produce much excitement and noise here, they make but a small impression on the other side of the water. The public documents on our table, those furnished last session of congress, and information in possession of the senate, shew that our difficulties arise from our having forsaken the *spirit*, and departed from the *policy* of '76; and, in lieu thereof, adopted that *retiring policy* which recommends the *abandonment* of our right to navigate the ocean, because our commerce is exposed to *danger* from the illegal attacks and depredations of the belligerent powers. The *spirit* of '76 induced us to *face danger*, to secure that right: and would not the *same spirit* prompt us to hazard something in its defence?

It is a painful task to me to undertake to point out the impolicy and impropriety of our present system of measures; but I see no other way of avoiding those evils which the gentleman from Virginia has so forcibly described (to remove which I would most cordially co-operate) or to effect that union in our public councils, which he so ardently desires, and which I most devoutly wish for, than by going into the inquiry, to discover where the error lies.

I shall go no further back than to 1806, the date of the memorials of the merchants of New Haven, and the great cities and towns on the sea coast, now introduced by the gentleman from Kentucky. [Mr. Pope.] They complained of aggressions on their commerce by Great Britain, and prayed that the protecting arm of government might be extended for their relief. The Boston memorial suggested a special mission. They expected, no doubt, that the envoy would be sent, as heretofore, to attempt a friendly negotiation of differences; not to hold out a *non-importation* act for an *olive branch*, or to be bound by instructions to demand, as an *ultimatum*, that the American flag should protect all persons on board our merchant vessels;

which the British government contended could not be granted, because they said it would tend to unman their navy, and cripple that important means of defence against a powerful and enraged foe : and as they disclaimed all right of impressing American seamen, they supposed that our claim, in its utmost extent, might be considered a measure calculated to withdraw from their service their *own* seamen, rather than to protect *real* American seamen. This had been the subject of negotiation, as well under the former, as the present administration; and the point had been pressed as far as could be of any avail. The like answer was given to both administrations : the principle cannot be admitted.

The gentleman from Virginia has read a resolution, declaring there had been a violation of our neutral rights, and an encroachment upon our national independence, by the capture and condemnation of our vessels under the orders of the British government; which resolution passed in February, 1806, by the unanimous vote of the senate : a vote that does honor to that body, as it exhibits to the nation, and to the world, that whatever may be the collision of party on subjects of minor importance, whenever it is a question in regard to the defence of our *own rights*, and the *interest* of a *foreign power*, we are an *undivided people*. Yet notwithstanding this unanimous expression of the opinion of the senate, and the appointment of an envoy, which took place at this time, no measures of defence were adopted. A *non-importation act* was passed and relied upon for maintaining our claims ; this was declared in public debate ; and being made known could not be concealed. It was wafted to England before our envoy could reach her shores. So far from being able to use that act for the purpose of enforcing our claims ; to prevent its being an insuperable bar to negotiation, our ministers inform the secretary of state; in their letter of September 11, 1806, that in speaking to the British minister of that act, they mentioned it in these terms : “ after a short vindication of the act, in the course of which we did not omit to represent it in connection with the special mission which grew out of it, as manifesting the *friendly* sentiments and views of our government towards that of his majesty.”

Although the mission failed of success, have we not reason to believe, from the documents laid before congress, that if the instructions had been as *liberal*, and the negotiation had been conducted in the *spirit and policy* of '76, as was that of 1794, which doubtless was expected by those merchants, it would have had a like favorable termination ? an *intimation* having been previously given, by the British minister, of a *disposition*, which, in diplomatic proceedings, is nearly tantamount to a *direct offer*, to renew the former treaty (under which we had enjoyed ten years peace, and, to use the expression of the gentleman from Virginia, *unexamplified prosperity*) to remain in force two years after the termination of the present war. The overture was not accepted ; from an appre-

sion, perhaps, that our *dexterity* in managing a negotiation, aided by such measures as the *present policy* might dictate, would enable us to obtain *better* terms. That the non-importation act did not *aid*, but tended to *obstruct*, a friendly adjustment, is manifest from the following note of lord Holland and lord Auckland, addressed to our ministers.

“*DOWNING STREET,*

“*September 4, 1806.*

“GENTLEMEN,

“We have received a copy (sent by you at our request) of the act of congress to prohibit, from and after the 15th of November, the import into the territories of the United States, of a very large description of goods, wares and merchandise, from any port or place situated in Great Britain or Ireland.

“On a full consideration of that act, we think it our duty to express our earnest hope and expectation, that some means may be found to suspend the execution of a measure so opposite, in its temper and tendency, to the disposition and views with which our pending negotiation has been commenced and is carrying on.

“The measure, unless suspended, will take effect, if not before our discussions can be closed, at least before it is possible that their result can be known in the United States; and would obviously lead to the necessity of proposing to parliament similar steps on the part of this country, by which mutual irritation would be excited, and fresh impediments created in the way of such a final adjustment, as, we trust, is mutually desired.

“We rely on you for taking such immediate steps, in this business, as may best contribute to a happy termination of our treaty, and to a cordial and permanent friendship between his majesty’s subjects and the citizens of the United States.

“We have the honor to be

Your faithful humble servants,

“VASSAL HOLLAND,

“AUCKLAND.”

Our ministers did recommend a suspension of the act and it was accordingly suspended.

The effects usually produced by a policy which attempts to coerce by threats addressed to an independent power, were exemplified in the correspondence of our minister at the court of Madrid, appointed *soon* after the commencement of the present administration. After protracted diplomatic discussions, in which our minister laboured to convince the Spanish government of the justice of our claim, and the propriety of their acceding to it, and this appeal to their *reason* had proved ineffectual, a last attempt was made

in a pompous gasconading note, in which (as well as I remember from having heard the correspondence once read) our minister informed the government of Spain, that the United States were a great, powerful, and high spirited nation, who would not submit to injury or insult, and concluded by telling the Spanish minister that there were only two modes of settling controversies between nations, *arbitration* or *war*. The Spanish minister returned for answer, that the king his master had commanded him to inform the American minister, he should not choose *arbitration*.

Thus has the matter rested, and our claims are still unsatisfied. When it was discovered that the United States had abandoned the *spirit and policy* of '76, and placed their dependence on *acts of congress, paper resolutions, and diplomatic remonstrances* as their *system of defence*; what was the consequence? repeated violations of our neutral rights, and the capture and condemnation of our vessels. Long and elaborate reasonings have been gone into, to establish our rights, and induce a change in the conduct of those powers, and to *cause* them to respect our rights: all to no purpose. Evils have been accumulating upon us to that degree, that we are now told, that, to *save* our independence and honor, and *secure* our rights, we must agree to a *continued* embargo, "a *permanent* suspension of commerce:" that is, to *preserve* our rights, we must *abandon* them altogether. Logic this, which I do not understand. If there be *wisdom* or *policy* in the measure, it is beyond my comprehension. Had *this* been the *spirit and policy* of '76, should we ever have achieved our independence? should we now occupy these seats, under the constitution of the United States? our rights are attacked on the ocean: we are called upon to *abandon* them. If our shores should be invaded, would not this *retiring policy* invite us to flee to the mountains?

On my mind there rests not the smallest doubt, that if our public councils had been undeviatingly guided by the *spirit and policy* of '76, we should neither have had war, nor been under the necessity, in obedience to our own laws, of *abandoning* the ocean, and *submitting* to the loss of a commerce second only in importance to that of any nation on the face of the globe: whereby we are called upon to make a *sacrifice* of property greater than the *whole expense* of all the armaments and other defensive measures, adopted under both the former administrations, for the protection of our commerce, and the vindication of our national honor. In point of *real economy*, then, we are losers to a *vast amount*: and to what extent these privations and sufferings are to be carried, and how long to be continued, cannot be foreseen.

Gentlemen, who oppose the repeal of the embargo, tell us that Great Britain has obtained the complete dominion of the sea; that she is proud, haughty, avaricious; and that her object is to obtain the commerce and carrying trade of the world. After having secured the quiet possession thereof, will she *peaceably* suffer us to



become her rivals? Will she not tell us, you voluntarily abandoned, and shall not again resume them? and would it not be attended with more danger, expense, and difficulty to regain them, than to hold fast the possession?

In vain should we address her from that *retirement* recommended by the gentleman from Virginia, as *dignified*; a retirement in which would be dissipated the resources and wealth of the nation. In vain, I say, should we address her with *arguments* the most forcible to prove our right to navigate the ocean. In vain should we ask her consent, though we were to employ the persuasive eloquence of that gentleman, to permit us to resume our extended and profitable commerce. We should come forth from our *dignified retirement* under great disadvantages to commence a new conflict for our right to navigate the ocean. The enemy with whom we shall have to contend may have made peace with her rival, and we be left alone to maintain the conflict.

Or perhaps we may have to contend with an enemy all powerful on the land, and who may become formidable on the sea; with a power that has for a long time cast a wishful eye towards the fair fields of America, and has almost kept up continual claim to a large portion of the United States, which was once within her embrace, and which was wrested from her by the war of 1756. Then may we expect to see adopted the ancient Roman policy—the *turning out* of the old proprietors of the soil to *make way* for military adventurers. Then might we expect the feudal system in all its ancient rigor.

The gentleman from Virginia has told us that his brother farmers must raise less produce, and turn their surplus labor to improve and beautify their farms. Is there not some *danger* that even this may serve as a lure to tempt the cupidity of some foreign nation; and if the same *timid, retiring policy* should prevail, will they not be emboldened to attempt to possess themselves of those very farms and improvements? Nor should we be secure, were we to assume the savage garb and manner of life. Mr. President, if a conflict should be necessary to maintain our right to navigate the ocean, I wish it may happen while some of the revolutionary patriots of '76 are still living, who can *reanimate* their countrymen with *their spirit*. Some of the present generation may acquire that spirit by inheritance; but none, I fear, by education.

It has been insinuated more than once, that the opposition to the present system of measures (and to that system no one has been more opposed than myself) proceeds from *party feelings* and *disappointed ambition*. That this is unfounded, will appear by a resort to the journals of congress, our statute book, and to well known public transactions. At the commencement of the struggle for our liberties and independence, from a full conviction of the rectitude of the cause, I engaged on the side of our country, with the ardor natural to a youthful mind. And those who know me best will

not accuse me of having declined, through the whole revolutionary war, any *exposure* or *sacrifice* which the call of my country required. In 1794 I voted for all those efficient measures of defence then adopted, and opposed the *hapher resolution policy* then brought forward, the same substantially which for some years has been pursued, and is now urged upon us. In 1797--8 I voted for the naval and military preparations then made. Under the present administration, I have uniformly voted for all *such* measures of defence as appeared to me to have *efficacy*, or to comport with the *spirit* and *policy* of '76 ; though the gentleman from Virginia would seem to imagine I was *smarting* under the *unpopularity* of my former votes for armies and navies ; measures which are supposed to have gone far in effecting a change in the administration. I am happy, however, in the reflection, that if those votes *lost me* my *popularity* and *political power*, they contributed to *save* my *country's rights and honor*. I shall also be found uniformly to have opposed a *timid, humiliating* policy, which must ever end in war, or an *abandonment* of our nation's rights and honor. A senator of the United States is unworthy of that high and responsible station, and to be entrusted with the destinies of his country, if, upon questions of great national importance, involving our rights, honor and independence, his vote could be governed by his *attachment* or *dislike* to a chief magistrate, or others in power.

The gentleman from Kentucky, in referring to me, has used the expression "the gentleman in opposition," meaning, I suppose, to have it understood, that I am an *opposer* of the present administration. I do not admit that I am, or ever have been the *opposer* or the *favorite* of any administration. I avow myself to be the *opposer* only of such measures as in my judgement will not promote the public good. [Mr. Pope rose to explain, and said he meant only to refer to the opposition of Mr. Hillhouse to the embargo.] Mr. H. declared himself satisfied.

The gentleman from Kentucky has also announced (he does not say officially) that the presidential electioneering races for the present season are over ; and calls upon the several riders to dismount their *hobbies* ; not reflecting that I am not one of the *jockey club* ; nor had a *card* of invitation to the race ground, without which none were admitted. Neither I, nor any member from Connecticut, was invited to attend the *famous caucus* which was convened for the purpose of *manufacturing* the great officers of state. We were not emulous of that honor, being content with the mode pointed out by the constitution of the United States, for choosing president and vice-president.

To preserve our independence, and avoid *tame submission*, we are gravely told by the gentleman from Virginia, and also in a report pronounced by the gentleman from Maryland, [Mr. Smith] to be the most *luminous* production ever submitted to congress, (the result probably of the combined wisdom of the whole administration) that

“there is no other alternative but war with both nations, or a continuance of the present system.” The idea of going to war, at the same time, with the two great belligerent powers, is as novel and surprising to me, as the idea of a *permanent embargo* for a *measure of defence*. Suppose the warfare be on the land; in what manner, let me ask, would three belligerents, each hostile to the other, array their forces for action, and conduct the battle? would it be in the form of a triangle, each firing alternately, first on one enemy and then on the other? or suppose the fleets of two of the belligerents, say French and American, meet on the ocean; and after a bloody conflict, for I have no doubt both nations would fight bravely, the American fleet, for I would always incline to our own side, cripples and captures that of their enemy; a British fleet then comes up and takes both, though inferior perhaps, before the action, to either? the idea is too ridiculous to merit serious attention.

When two nations have a common enemy, they are inclined to cultivate a friendly disposition towards each other. If we were to declare war against England, France, no doubt, would revoke her decrees, give us a friendly reception into her ports, and afford us all the aid and protection in her power, both by sea and land. England would do the like, if we were to declare war against France. Such *unquestionably* would be the fact; and it is in vain to shut our eyes against the truth. There was a strong proof of this exhibited in the conduct of England and France in 1794, and 1798.

Is it not *national antipathies*, more than *foreign predilections*, that produce crimination and recrimination of an English party, and a French party, of English and French influence? for the honor of my country I hope it is; for I should be sorry to think so meanly of the American people as to believe they would prefer the *interest* of any *foreign nation* to that of their *own*. Should we unfortunately be brought to make the experiment, by being engaged in a *just* and *necessary* war (and none other I hope will ever be made by the United States) I am confident we shall find a *union* of sentiment and action. These are, however, unnecessary speculations; for I see no necessity of declaring war against any nation.

To permit our merchant vessels to arm, under proper restrictions, and to equip, man, and send out our public ships, to defend those maritime rights which are clear and indisputable, is not war, nor will it necessarily involve us in war. Every nation on earth would respect us for defending our essential rights. I do not agree with the gentleman from Kentucky, that the commanders of merchant vessels can commit the peace of the nation, if the government do not countenance and uphold them in their wrong, but promptly disavow the act. Vessels bound up the Mediterranean sea, and to the East Indies, have always been allowed to arm; and I have never heard that they have, in a single instance, committed the peace of the nation.



In answer to the inquiry, what good has the embargo done? the gentleman from Virginia says, that it has saved to our citizens one hundred and fifty millions of property, which would have been captured and carried into France or England; and to our country fifty thousand seamen, who, instead of being in captivity in a foreign land, are placed in the bosom of their families. This, if true, is an important consideration; but I doubt the fact. Not that I question the veracity of the gentleman: were he to declare a fact as of his own knowledge, I should have a most perfect reliance on it. But in this case the gentleman's declaration being but an expression of *opinion*, not supported by any one fact within his knowledge, he must excuse me if I cannot yield my assent to it; more especially as circumstances, some of which are within my own knowledge, lead me to a different opinion. It is a fact, that most of our vessels which escaped the embargo, or have since gone out under permits from the president of the United States, have returned in safety, and made good voyages, from which the seamen "have returned to the bosom of their families," and with something to administer to their wants and comfort; not, as in the other case, empty-handed from our dismantled ships, to share the distresses of their little households, and to hear their children cry for bread. Many of our vessels which were out when the embargo was laid, have remained out, avoiding the inhospitable shores of their own country, as they would a land infected with pestilence. Those vessels have been navigating the ocean under the American flag, with as much *safety* as before the embargo was laid, and have constantly been employed in the carrying trade to *vast profit*.

Having, at the commencement of this debate, submitted my observations on the supposed possibility of starving England or destroying her manufactures; and the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Lloyd] better informed on the subject of commerce than myself, having exhibited the facts to the senate in a manner that must carry conviction, I shall not trespass on the patience of the senate with any further remarks on that point.

Nor shall I add to what I have already said, to prove that one object of the embargo was to *put down commerce*, for the purpose of *raising up manufactures*, than to adduce the authority on which my opinion rests; which was not, as has been insinuated by the gentleman from Maryland, common place observations, and party newspaper publications, but the declarations of the president of the United States, not in an ordinary correspondence, but in an answer to an address from the legislature of New Hampshire, a New England state, participating in common with the other New England states in the benefits of commerce. Speaking of the embargo, he says, "It gave us time to make a last appeal to the *reason* and *reputation* of nations. In the mean while I see with satisfaction that this measure of self-denial is approved and supported by the great body of our *real citizens*; that they meet with cheerfulness the



temporary privations it occasions ; and are preparing with spirit to provide for themselves those comforts and conveniences of life, for which it would be *unwise ever more* to resort to distant countries." In another answer to an address, this sentiment is expressed, that the agriculturalist and manufacturer shall be planted down side by side, so as to receive, at our own doors, those comforts and conveniences of life, which we have been accustomed to seek on the ocean. No such effects could be produced by the embargo, nor can it answer any such purpose, unless made *perpetual*, or continued *for a great length of time*.

The gentleman from Virginia has thought proper to go into a consideration of the commercial advantages which he imagines are enjoyed by the people inhabiting the northern in comparison with the southern states, under the constitution and laws of the United States, and has indulged himself in remarks respecting a disposition in the people of New England to *insurrection, rebellion and disunion*; but these are topics on which I shall say nothing, as I do not think it expedient to discuss them at this time.

The *intimations* of the gentleman from Kentucky and the gentleman from Georgia, [Mr. Crawford,] about *amputation* and *military coercion*, I shall also pass by without further notice, than to assure those gentlemen, that in New England they will produce no *intimidation*, if they should excite any attention.

It was particularly unfortunate for the gentleman from Virginia, that he should feel himself under the necessity of making remarks that may be construed into a denunciation of a certain description of our fellow citizens as DEMAGOGUES, and as having attempted to excite *sedition* and *rebellion*, because they doubt the expediency of the embargo, and question the policy of some of the measures of the present administration. That gentleman, I imagine, will hardly consent that to doubt the policy and oppose the measures of an administration, shall be the criterion for deciding who are the DEMAGOGUES of our country ; for surely, if that is to be the rule of decision, the conduct of that gentleman during the *first* administration under the constitution of the United States, and the ability and perseverance with which he maintained his opposition to it, would give him a *pre-eminent* claim to rank high on the list of DEMAGOGUES. I extremely regret those remarks on another account. I know many of the most venerable characters of our country, men who were patriots of '76, men who made great sacrifices, and risked their lives in our struggle for liberty and independence, men who have acquired a well earned fame, which has never been tarnished. who doubt the policy of the embargo, and decidedly disapprove the measure, as being altogether *inefficient* as it regards foreign powers, and *ruinous* to ourselves.

The gentleman from Virginia is peculiarly unfortunate also, in ascribing the failure of the embargo, to produce the desired effect on foreign nations, to party misrepresentations, and newspaper electioneering publications, describing the embargo as an unpopu-

for measure calculated to excite general discontent, and bring about a change of rulers, which, he says, reached England between the 30d of June and the 29th of July, and produced a sudden change in the conduct of the British minister, and in his disposition to a friendly accommodation. I could hardly have expected, even in the heat of debate, such a declaration from a gentleman so well acquainted with the British character and government. The ministry there know full well how to appreciate party publications, and the representations of the *me* and the *outs*.

Those party misrepresentations, as the gentleman is pleased to call them, and those newspaper electioneering publications, would have had but little effect in England, and still less weight with the ministry, if they had not had an official stamp of truth put upon them, by the proclamation of the president of the United States. With the indulgence of the senate, I will read the proclamation.

*“ By the president of the United States, a proclamation.”*

“ Whereas information has been received, that sundry persons are combined, or combining and confederating together, on Lake Champlain and the country therein adjacent, for the purpose of forming insurrections against the authority of the laws of the United States, for opposing the same, and obstructing their execution; and that such combinations are too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by the laws of the United States :

“ Now, therefore, to the end that the authority of the laws may be maintained, and that those concerned, directly or indirectly in any insurrection or combination against the same, may be duly warned, I have issued this my PROCLAMATION, hereby commanding such insurgents, and all concerned in such combinations, instantly and without delay to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes : and I do hereby further require and command all officers, having authority, civil or military, and all other persons, civil or military, who shall be found within the vicinage of such insurrections or combinations, to be aiding and assisting, by all the means in their power by force of arms or otherwise, to quell and subdue such insurrections or combinations, to seize upon all those therein concerned, who shall not instantly and without delay disperse and retire to their respective abodes : and to deliver them over to the civil authority of the place to be proceeded against according to law.

“ In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with my hand. Given at the city of Washington the 9th day of April, 1861 and in the sovereignty and independence of the United States the thirty second.

• TH: JEFFERSON.

“ By the president,

• JAMES M. ADISON Secretary of state.”

The senate will recollect that the last session of congress was closed on the 25th of April ; and, although the proclamation was dated the 19th of that month, no intimation thereof, or of the state of the country to which it referred, was given to congress by the president of the United States. The proclamation was published in Vermont, April 30, and in the National Intelligencer, printed at the seat of government, on the 13th of May. Here was an official document, issuing from the same high authority that recommended the embargo, declaring to the nation, and to the world, that there existed so great uneasiness and discontent on account of the embargo, as to induce the forming of unlawful combinations to resist its execution, too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary process of law, and which required the employment of a military force. Superadd to this, that our small standing army, and the whole naval force in actual service, were put in requisition, to aid in its execution.

These circumstances present a melancholy view of our situation. An *embargo* recommended under the influence of the great popularity of the president, and *professed* to be laid for preserving in safety our vessels, our seamen and merchandise, and saving the honour, and vindicating the rights of our country, had become so unpopular, before the close of the session of the congress which imposed it, that in the president's opinion, it could not be executed by the ordinary process of law, and through the mild medium of courts of justice ; so that it had already become necessary to call in the aid of an armed force.

I could have hoped it would not have been found necessary to employ the American navy to cruize against our own commerce ; and little did I expect that the army I had so recently voted to raise, for the purpose, as I supposed, of opposing foreign aggression, would be required to point their bayonets at the breasts of their fellow citizens.





# GEN. S. SMITH'S SPEECH,

DELIVERED

*In the Senate of the United States,*

ON

MONDAY, 28th NOVEMBER, 1808, ON THE RESOLUTION  
OF MR. HILLHOUSE, TO REPEAL THE  
EMBARGO LAWS.

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MR. PRESIDENT—

WHEN I last had the honor to address the senate upon the subject now under consideration, to wit, the repeal of the laws laying an embargo, I took occasion to observe, on the transit duty, or tribute laid by Great Britain, on certain articles, the produce of the United States, when exported to the countries where they are usually consumed on the continent of Europe. It may not be improper for me to pursue that subject so far as the said tribute is imposed on all the articles usually exported from the United States, to the continent of Europe. I then spoke from memory, but find I was correct as to the amounts on the articles mentioned. I observe, however, a mistake by one of the stenographers, in the word *sterling*, in the article wheat, when I meant the *currency* of my country. By the act of Parliament, of the 28th March last. duties on exports are laid, to carry into effect the orders of council. I shall not notice any but those charged on the products of the United States. It will be recollected that I have already stated that none of the products of the United States can be carried to the continent of Europe without being subject to capture by British cruizers, unless they shall first be carried to, and landed in Great Britain, and there pay a transit duty, or tribute; of course, all articles the produce of the United States, are subjected to that tribute on their way to the countries, so far as they consume the same. On the following articles, those duties on tribute attach, to wit:

## *American Produce.*

Indigo, 45 cts. per lb. Pitch, 95 cts. per bbl. Tar, 95 cts. per bbl. Turpentine, 78 cts. per cwt. Rice, 45 cts. per cwt. Tobacco, per 100 lb. \$ 3 00. Cotton, 16 cts. per lb. Timber, staves, and lumber, a prohibitory duty. Ashes, \$ 2 22 per cwt. Corn, 15 cts. per bu. Wheat, 28 cts. per bu. Flour, \$ 2 00 per bbl. Fish, 90 cts. per cwt. Pork, \$ 6 86 per bbl. Beef, \$ 3 33 per bbl.

What amount would cargoes of some of those articles pay, of tribute?

A ship carrying 1,000 bags of cotton, will pay a tribute of \$ 50,000, being about the value in South Carolina; to which add merchants' commission, and other charges of port, of \$ 2,000.

A cargo of 400 hhds. of Tobacco, will pay of 1,000 wt. each 11,100 dollars.

A cargo of 3,000 bbls. flour, will pay 6,650.

A cargo of fish, as I am informed (for I am unacquainted with the number of quintals carried by a ship of 300 tons) will pay from 3,500 to 4,000 dollars.

Double insurance, double premium; double merchants' commission, insurance, and other charges not noticed. I leave that for the calculation of others.

It is true, the king may suspend or alter any part of the act as he shall see proper, and the continuance of the act, is only to the end of the next session of Parliament. It is to be hoped that England will see the error which she has committed as well as it affects her own interest as also the deep wound inflicted on the honor and interest of her most useful customer. But, Sir, if we retract from the stand which we have taken, will she not think from the instability of our councils, that she may proceed in her system of monopoly, until every branch of our commerce shall be extinguished? But, Mr. President, does the British nation lay similar duties of export on similar articles, from her own colonies, or her allies? She has heavily taxed the colonial produce, carried in American ships in her ports on exportation, but, her own coffee, sugar, and other colonial articles, are still exported free of duty; thus enabling her to undersell in the ports of Europe, similar articles carried there, the property of Americans. But, says the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Hillhouse) this tribute is a nullity of itself, for the decrees of France cause all goods that have been landed in England, to be seized and condemned on their arrival; of course, he presumes that none will go there: he is mistaken, Mr. President; if the articles shall promise a profit on the continent, men will be found (and many will do it) that will pay the tribute in England, (and this the English minister knows) and who will contrive ways and means of admittance. Is this visionary? No, Sir, what has been done, and is done every day, will be pursued when profits sufficient offer the temptation; what then has been done? American ships arriving in the port of London, have been chartered (unknown to their owners) to proceed to Holland with a cargo of British coffee, sugar, and other goods, at an enormous freight. The American crew, except the captain, is discharged; a new crew of Englishmen taken on board, to each of whom a promise is made, beside the usual wages, of a large sum, perhaps 50 or 100 guineas to be paid on the performance of the voyage. They are told, that they must declare, if questioned, *that the vessel has come direct from America, that she has not been visited by any British*

*eruizer, and has not touched at any British port.* Papers forged in England; for the English, Mr. President, are great manufacturers, and have a manufactory of all the papers and documents unusually necessary for an American ship. Every paper, even to the merchant's oath, that the property is his, that no foreigner is either directly or indirectly concerned therein; the consular certificates of origin of the French or Spanish consul, as the case may be, shewing that the cargo on board had been imported into the United States from some French or Spanish colony: every seal of office so completely imitated, that no man can know the difference. The ship thus provided, proceeds to Holland. The Dutch, Mr. President, are hostile, to those decrees of France; all are willing to countenance this trade; very little inquiry is made there; the trade is winked at by all the officers of government, and thus carried on with security. Now, Mr. President, as this trade can thus be carried on, I will ask the honorable gentleman from Connecticut, whether the temptations being great, it will not be carried on by our people and the tribute paid, for without paying that, they cannot escape the vigilance of the British cruizers; they will go into England, they will pay the tribute and pursue their voyages; and what right shall we have to say they do wrong, in so doing? What right has government to expect individual patriotism, when opposed to individual interest, when the government itself sacrifices the honor and independence of the nation, to *sordid interest*? Take off the embargo, Mr. President, and will not men say, our government has acquiesced in the tribute, laid upon commerce by Great Britain. We therefore do no wrong in paying it; we do what every prudent man will do, make our property as safe as possible, and pursue our trade; for we well know that if we do not stop and pay the tribute in England, our ship and cargo must fall a prey to British depredations. We will therefore go into England, pay the tribute, and take our chance to evade the decrees of France. Yes, Mr. President, and it will become such a trade as will in a very short time meet with security by insurances, and that, at no very high premium. Again, those vessels returning with articles for the consumption of the United States, must stop in England, (or subject themselves to capture) there land their cargo, and pay tribute, before they can proceed to their own country. Is this a state to which the gentlemen wish to reduce their country? Are they willing to pay tribute to Great Britain? If they are, take off the embargo, and you encourage further aggressions, and further exactions. Sir, there will be no end to them—we had better have remained colonies, than submit to such a state of degradation.

Let us take a view of some of the principal articles thus charged, that we may know in what countries they are usually consumed. *Cotton*—an article of such importance, that its value may be considered as amounting to nearly one-fourth of the value of all

the exports of the produce of the United States. Two thirds, some say less thereof, is required for the English manufactures, when in full work ; and one-third, for the continent of Europe. Under the orders of council, that one third, or twenty millions of pounds of cotton, are prohibited from proceeding to its usual place of consumption ; of course, that one third must either remain on the hands of the planter, or be shipped to England, where it cannot be consumed, and thus reduce, by so large a surplus, the price of the whole.

*Flour.*—This article is seldom wanted in France, for France exports the article ; nor in England, for *home consumption*, except when there is a defect in the harvest. It is principally exported to Spain, Portugal and Italy—to those countries we are forbid to carry it, by the orders of council. unless we submit to pay two dollars on each barrel, which two dollars must necessarily be taken off the price in this country, and thus operate *as a tax upon the farmer of two dollars per barrel.*

*Tobacco.*—This article is consumed principally on the continent of Europe, only about one-seventh thereof. or 14,000 hogsheads per annum, is believed to be consumed in England ; the residue, or 76,000 hogsheads, per annum, usually consumed in Germany, Holland and France, must either remain in the tobacco houses of Virginia and Maryland, or go to rot in the king's warehouses at London ; or, if removed from thence, subjected to a duty of three dollars per hundred pounds : This is peculiarly hard on the state of Maryland, for of the 14,000 hogsheads exported by that state, not more than 500 or 600 hogsheads is believed to be consumed in England ; the residue, say 13,500 hogsheads, can alone find a market in the ports of Holland and Germany, to which countries the English say we shall not carry it ; therefore the taking off the embargo would operate no relief to the numerous and respectable body of planters of the state, which I have the honor to represent.

*Fish* is consumed only in France, Spain, Portugal and Italy. To these countries we are forbidden to go with this article. It is not candid in gentlemen to state to the Senate, that the embargo compelled the owners of fish to keep that article to rot upon their hands, when it is well known that many vessels were compelled, after having made their voyage to the coast of Europe, to return home with their cargoes of fish, the English not permitting them to enter the ports of their destination. It is true, a small portion of the fish caught by the people of the United States is consumed in the W. India islands.—Gentlemen may be deceived by looking at the report of the secretary of the treasury, when they see the large amount stated to be shipped to Great Britain, of the products of the United States. Almost all our business passes in some way or other, through the hands of British merchants, either by consignments or remittances. By shipping to their address the American merchant is permitted to draw bills of exchange for a



proportion of the amount on the British merchant. The ship proceeds to Cowes or Falmouth, and there receives the order of the London merchant, to proceed to the country where the best market can be obtained for their articles—And in this way, the export to England is swelled to a large amount, *when, in truth, the consumption is in other countries.*

The gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Hillhouse) says that the embargo tends to demoralize our people. I fear, Mr. President, that the payment of tribute in England, and the perjury employed to evade the decrees of France, will not only demoralize and degrade them in the eyes of all Europe; but, also, in our own estimation.

When I was last up, I took a view of the exports still left to the people of the United States, *not implicated* either by the decrees of France, or orders of England. In answer, the gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. White) has stated that (the decrees of France and orders of council notwithstanding) there would still be an export free to the United States of four fifths of the amount exported therefrom. The gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd) more cautious, has stated that there would be still important branches of commerce left open to us. The gentleman from Delaware has given us the countries to which the four-fifths of our exports could go, to wit—Sumatra, Africa, Java, China, North West of America, Spanish possessions and islands, Sweden and her colonies. On examining the report of the secretary, I find that to those countries and to some others, we can export as follows, viz :

Spanish colonies, Florida, Main and Cuba,	\$2,617,348
Portuguese ditto, say Madeira, Western Isles, Cape de } Verd and Brazil,	570,303
Morocco and Barbary Powers,	8,358
China,	84,022
Africa,	369,924
South Seas,	3,385
North West Coast,	10,777
Sweden and colonies,	472,666
	<hr/>
	\$4,136,783

To those countries, (and they are the only ones to which we could have exported under the orders of council) it appears, that the total amount of exports is only \$4,136,783. I have admitted Sweden and her colonies to please the gentleman, although I understand them to be subject to capture under the French decree. A large item is to St. Bartholomews, a Swedish island, serving only as an entrepot. But we are told that G. B. in her great goodness, has lately permitted us to trade to Spain and Portugal, and that the orders of council no longer attach to those nations. I am of a different opinion, and I derive my opinion from the document now in my hand.

"The lords of the committee of council for trade and foreign plantations, having authorised us to make public the following answers to certain questions proposed by us to their lordships, we publish them for the informatoin of all whom they may concern.

THOS. BARING.

A. GLENNIE.

THOS. MULLETT.

London, 15th August, 1808.

*Question.* "His majesty's order in council of the 4th July, 1808, having ordered, that all hostilities against Spain on the part of his majesty shall immediately cease, and that the blockade of all the ports of Spain, except such as may be still in possession, or under control of France, shall be forthwith raised—

"Can an American vessel proceed from a port in the United States of America, with a cargo, the produce of the United States, or Colonial produce, direct to any port of Spain or Portugal, not being in the possession of the enemies of Great Britain, and return back to a port in the United States direct, with a cargo the growth or produce of Spain or Portugal, without being liable to capture and condemnation, under the orders of council of the 11th and 25th of November, 1807, and the several acts of parliament passed to carry them into effect?

*Answer.* "American vessels may proceed from a port in the U. S. of America, with a cargo, the produce of the United States, or colonial produce, *provided such produce be not the produce of the enemy's colonies*, direct to any port of Spain or Portugal; such port not being in the possession, or under the control of the enemies of Great Britain, and return back to a port in the United States direct, with a cargo the growth or produce of Spain or Portugal."

[Here Mr. White explained and said, that a proclamation had been issued declaring the ports of Spain and Portugal, *not in possession of France or her allies*, open to the admission of American vessels, with the produce of their own country, or of the colonies of those two nations; but that they must return direct to their own country.] Where the gentleman has got that proclamation I know not. I never have seen it, nor heard of it. I am, however, of opinion that the orders of council do still attach to Spain and Portugal; and that this is only a bountiful relaxation of his Britannic majesty, which he can change at pleasure, being authorised by the act of Parliament to repeal or alter, as he may see fit. It is a well known fact, that prior to the orders of council, we could trade with colonial produce to those countries. These regulations of the lords commissioners of trade and plantations, do not permit such commerce; of course the orders of council attach, and should Bonaparte get possession of any port of Spain, and an American ves-

se be bound to such port, she would, under the orders of council, be seized and carried into England—in which case I do not believe the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts would insure for ninety per cent. against condemnation in the courts of Great Britain.

Pursuing the idea of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Giles) that the regulation of the board of trade and plantations, if submitted to, will reduce us to a state of colonization—I beg leave to observe, that this same board of trade, regulated our commerce when we were colonies. We were then permitted to go direct to the ports of Spain and Portugal with our flour, Indian corn and lumber, and might return direct to America with salt; but, if we wished to bring wines or fruits, we were compelled to proceed to England, land them, and then proceed to this country. What are the regulations *now* made for us by the lords of trade? Why, Sir, we are permitted to proceed to Spain and Portugal, with the produce of our country, but we must return therefrom direct to the United States. If we turn to the right or left hand, we come under the orders of council, and are good prize. We are forbid to carry any of the produce of those countries to their colonies, although they permit the trade. And, why, Mr. President? Because the British thereby secure that advantage to their own ships. Again, Sir, when colonies, Great Britain compelled us to carry our tobacco indigo and rice to England, and there land the same, but permitted us to re-ship those articles, free of any duty, to the countries where they were consumed. Even in time of war, tobacco was re-shipped to France. Now, Great Britain, although we are independent of her power, (perhaps not of her influence) orders all the produce of our country to be landed in England, and prohibits the re-shipment, until we pay an enormous duty; when, at the same time, the produce of her colonies may be re shipped, *even to her enemies, free of duty*. Where is the difference, in principle, between the regulations made for us when colonies, and those made for us at this time? Does not Great Britain still assume the same rights over us, to wit, to regulate our trade in the one instance, as well as in the other? We are, in either case, completely in the situation of colonies. It cannot be misunderstood. The lords of trade emphatically say, what trade we shall, and what trade we shall not pursue. Nay, in England, I have little doubt, that many people will consider it as excessive impudence in us to complain, when put upon a footing with their own colonies. *They forget that we are independent.*—I trust, Mr. President, that *we shall not also forget it*. But let us indulge the gentleman, and add our exports to Spain and Portugal—To what amount are they? To Spain, Teneriffe and the Floridas, we export annually \$1,381,327; to Portugal, \$829,313, making, together with the \$4,136,783, already stated, the sum of \$6,347,323, being, as stated in a luminous report of a committee of the House of Representatives, less than \$7,000,000, free of danger from the decrees of France and the orders of Great

Britain—So that the gentleman's four-fifths appear, by public documents, (which cannot be controverted) to be reduced to an amount little more than one-eighth of the native exports of the Union, the total amount being \$48,699,592. Shall we, for this pittance, relinquish our independent rights as a nation?

The trade to China gives an export of only \$84,000 per annum. It employs an exportation of dollars to near \$4,000 000. Nankeens is the object in return of principal value, an export whereof to Europe we are now cut off from. If this trade should be pursued, under this oppression, I will venture without the spirit of prophecy, to believe that every dollar in the United States, will be shipped therefrom. The law prohibiting the importation of slaves has completely destroyed the trade to Africa, so that the item to that country can no longer be counted.

We are told that the sufferings of the commercial states are insupportable, and from the discussion in the senate, it would appear as generally admitted that the four New England states are the *only* commercial—comparisons are generally disagreeable—they appear however necessary upon the present occasion, to shew the relative state of commerce among the states. I am warranted also by the example set me by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd) in making the comparison which I intend to present to this house. In doing it, I pray I may be understood, as not meaning any offence to any state, nor to any individual thereof. *New Hampshire* cannot be considered a commercial state; judging from the treasury report, the products of its labor and agriculture go, I presume to swell the amount of exports from Massachusetts, for their export of native products is only \$ 365,950. *Rhode Island* may be considered commercial in proportion to her numbers. I have ever admired the industry and enterprize of her citizens, and have been gratified in the extension of her commerce; but their commerce does not exceed the proportion which is due to their numbers—The amount of export of their products is 741,988 dollars. But *Connecticut*, Mr. President, is she commercial? Every American traveller that visits the eastern states, returns highly gratified with that state; he states with exultation and pleasure, the delightful fields thereof; its high state of agriculture; its smiling villages; and the content and happiness that beams on every human countenance; but does this arise from its external commerce? No, Sir, we must give to *Connecticut* a higher rank; she is agricultural, and will also be a great manufacturing state; her citizens who annually emigrate, to swell the numbers of other states, will be induced to remain at home, and by their labor and ingenuity, extend and promote the manufactures of their native state. Her port of export is probably *New York*; with what state, as a commercial state shall I compare her? not with *Georgia*, for that state, though with only half her population, exports more than double the amount of *Connecticut*. With *South-*



Carolina? No, Sir, that state spares of her products, to swell the exports of Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, an amount equal to the whole of the exports of the native products of Connecticut. With Maryland? No, Sir, with a population very little greater, Maryland exports to near three times her amount. With what part of the union shall I then compare her commerce? It assimilates nearly to that of the District of Columbia, its export being \$ 1,363,352 when that of Connecticut is \$ 1,519,083.

*Massachusetts*, yes, Sir, Massachusetts is really commercial. But not more so in proportion to numbers than many other states; nay, not equal to some, for instance, South Carolina with half her number exports \$ 7,129,365, when Massachusetts exports of native products only \$ 6,185,748. New York whose population is the same with Massachusetts exports \$ 9,957,416, being half as much more as that exported by Massachusetts. Maryland exports \$ 4,016,699, being in full proportion to the exports of that state. Nay, Sir, New York alone, exports more than all the New England states together, their whole native export being only \$ 8,812,769. But we may be told what is true, that the trade of a country does not consist alone in its native exports. We may get some information by examining as well its native as its foreign articles of exportation. Let us examine it in that point of view. It will be found that New York alone who appears to approve of the embargo, if we are to credit their governor's speech and the answer thereto of both branches of the legislature, does export of all articles, foreign as well as domestic, to a greater amount than all the New England states together, for her exports are \$ 26,357,963, when the total exports of those states amount only to \$ 24,074,438. Nay, Sir, Maryland exports an amount equal to three fifths of the whole of the New England states, her general export being \$ 14,298,984.—I have deemed it not unprofitable to take this view of the subject to shew the commerce of the United States, as they compare with each other.

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd,) has told us, and told us truly, that the tonnage owned by the citizens of that state, is one third of the whole tonnage of the union; that the want of employment thereof causes an annual injury to the amount of six millions of dollars.—My calculation, Mr. President, does not make it near so much; but, Sir, suppose the fact, is this attributable to the embargo? I think not, Sir; on the contrary, that the owners of these ships ought to bless the wisdom and firmness of those who laid the embargo, and thus saved this immense tonnage from British depredation and condemnation under their orders of council, and from French burning and destruction under the infernal decree of Milan. For it has been truly said, by an eminent merchant of Salem (Mr. Gray,) that not more than one vessel in 8 that sailed for Europe within a short time prior to the embargo ever reached her port of destination. My own experience has severe-

y taught me the truth of his remark ; and as a further proof, I have in my hand a list of 15 vessels which sailed for Europe and were insured in an office in Baltimore. They sailed between the 1 Sep. and 23d December 1807.—Three arrived, one was captured by the French, one by the Spaniards, one was seized in Hamburg, and nine carried into England. But for the embargo, the ships of the United States that would have sailed for Europe would have shared a fate at least as bad (in my opinion much worse) than that of those 15.—Not one in 20 would have arrived, for those vessels that sailed in Sep. might well have arrived before the date of the orders in council (11th Nov.) or the decrees of France.—I say again let the ship owners return thanks to their best friends, to those who laid the embargo. As one whose property has thereby been saved I pray you to accept mine. But, Sir, let us compare in order to know the sufferings of each, whether the other states do not suffer, as to their tonnage, in proportion to the New England states. I take leave to submit the tonnage of the Eastern, and a few of the other states.

### *Tonnage.*

	<i>Tons registered.</i>	<i>Licensed.</i>
New Hampshire	20,606	3,493
Massachusetts	304,357	134,603
Rhode Island	28,715	6,523
Connecticut	26,022	20,000
Tons,	379,700	Tons, 164,619
New York	131,047	
Pennsylvania	86,723	
Maryland	71,648	
South Carolina	48,156	
	337,574	

By this it will appear, that the 4 states of New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and South Carolina, own of ships engaged in foreign trade nearly the same number of tons as the four New England states. Thus then, the loss to those states in point of tonnage is nearly equal to that of the other 4 ; and in addition they suffer the loss sustained by having on hand a greater amount of native products. In fact the state of Massachusetts suffers less, because she has an immense tonnage employed in the coasting trade, which renders its usual profits and usual employment for her sailors, when those other states have not the same advantage. This advantage applies more particularly to Connecticut than to any other state in the Union, for of her 46,000 tons of vessels, 20,000 are actually employed in the coasting trade, so that, as to the use of ships she suffers less than any other in the Union. Her trade by land and water to the other states still continues in

full vigor, and renders to her advantages not known to any other state.

We are told that the embargo is a measure injurious only to ourselves; that our fish, beef, pork, flour, tobacco and cotton remain to perish on our hands. I have already stated, that the fish finds its great consumption only in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France, from which countries we are excluded by the orders of council; of course the embargo cannot be chargeable with its loss, nor with that of tobacco, when not more than one seventh thereof as already stated can go to the places of consumption without being subject to British capture. The gentlemen from the states which produce cotton, do not appear to be alarmed at the danger presented to their view, arising from that article being produced in Guyana and Africa. For they well know that it will require population and men well acquainted with the culture of that article to enable those countries to enter into competition with them. They know, that cotton cannot be produced in the quantities required by the British manufacturers in any reasonable time, so that they feel confident that a sufficient supply cannot be obtained from any other country than their own. But no man can, no man will believe that any supply from any other country can be brought forward to prevent a stoppage taking place of the looms of Manchester.

We are told, that when the British islands are accustomed to receive their supplies of live cattle from the Main, that Connecticut will lose that valuable branch of their commerce. Yes, Mr. President, if Bonaparte should conquer Spain, her colonies will forever be lost to the mother country—they will become independent—they will be open to the trade of the world; and if cattle can, (as the gentleman has truly told us) be procured at their own door by the British planters for two or three dollars per head, it will very soon become unfashionable to go to Connecticut, and there to pay thirty to sixty dollars. But will this be chargeable on the embargo? Certainly not. The gentleman has also attempted to alarm us, lest the Spanish colonies should supply the islands with bread stuffs.—No impossibilities stand in his way—The sugar planter will turn his sugar land into corn grounds, and no longer take his supply from the United States. Yes, Sir, this will be done, when the gentleman, (Mr. H.) can prove that men will prostrate their own interest. The idea is an idle one, and does not merit an answer.

We are told that the embargo, as a coercive measure, has had and can have no operation, either on England, or on France—I differ with the gentlemen.

France, Mr. President, will feel its operation on the loss of their islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe, (which must fall a prey to the British fleet and army, now about to attack them) for want of those supplies of provisions they usually derived from the United

States. By the famine and distress that will ensue in the Isles of France and Bourbon. Those valuable possessions were formerly supplied from the Cape of Good Hope—but for years have relied entirely upon the United States, and will therefore be in the greatest possible distress, when cut off therefrom. They cannot now obtain supplies from the Cape of Good Hope—for that colony is in possession of the British. France will feel its effect and the consequent loss of our trade at home. She loses an immense revenue, heretofore collected by the duties on the sugar, coffee, pepper, tobacco and other articles imported into her ports by our ships.—Her people can live without the articles; but the want of the revenue will severely be felt by her government. New sources must be resorted to, which her subjects will be distressed to meet, being completely deprived of any sale for their brandy, wine, and other valuable articles drawn from France, by Americans, and distributed by them to every quarter of the world. France will be made to feel by a want of money. Holland can no longer, in so great a degree as formerly, supply that want. Cut off from commerce, what is Holland? If the emperor's system is pursued, the grass will be seen growing in the streets of Amsterdam. The German kingdoms, subject to his power, will be so reduced by the want of sale for their linens, and the want of commerce in the Hanse Towns, that they will be able to render him no aid in money. From the extremes of his power, it will press upon him even to the centre of Paris, and will knock with violence at the doors of his palace.

England, it is true, with her great navy and all-powerful fleets, might preserve herself from feeling the effects of the want of bread, provided that the ports of the Baltic were open to her; but shut out, as she is, from every country which has usually exported wheat, where will she find the quantity necessary to enable her to afford supplies to Spain and Portugal, now struggling for their liberties; for their West India islands, and for their immense fleets and armies now employed in foreign countries? From the coast of Barbary we are told!! Yes, Sir, Barbary, under a good government, could supply all the wants of Europe. But, Sir, that government, immediately it finds that the farmer has got his land into a high state of cultivation, the hand of power is laid upon his property, and the man, with his family, flies to the mountains. Nor is this all, the Dey lays such a duty on the export, as leaves but a small pittance, say 20d sterling per bushel, to the cultivator. From thence no important supply can be derived—and this is well known in England. But is the want of bread stuff the only suffering that Great Britain must endure? No, Sir—she will feel our embargo in the immense loss of revenue, resulting from the importation of our tobacco, cotton, rice, and other valuable products. Her cities will feel the loss of the non-arrival of our ships, which afforded to them a large revenue for the town dues, employment for the various mechanics and manufacturers employed about ships, the want of



commissions derived to their merchants, and from other causes not necessary to enumerate. Liverpool, which owes its rapid rise in a great proportion, to the American commerce, will feel the loss thereof in a manner that may make them be heard in the councils of the kingdom. Is it possible that that nation will not deplore the loss of their exports to us, amounting to twelve millions of pounds sterling, per annum? Will gentlemen believe they have no value therefor, when they know that they sent large fleets and armies to La Plata, not to conquer the country, but to force a trade—to compel the Spaniards to receive their manufactures? And what trade? Not more than one million or, at the most, two millions sterling per annum. What ridiculous policy must that be that can induce a nation to go to an immense expense of blood and treasure to secure two millions of trade, and at the same time wantonly to throw away a trade of twelve millions, arising to them without expense of either blood or treasure? Will they long shut their eyes to such a scene of folly and wickedness? No Sir—a non intercourse will open the eyes of the nation to such ridiculous conduct, on the part of their rulers. Is this all, Mr. President? The sugar planters of their West India islands, (and they most deserve it) will be made severely to feel; they will not starve, perhaps, but they will have to pay three or four times the price for every article of provision which they, or their slaves consume, and ten times the price for staves and other lumber. Heretofore, they have paid for such supplies in what I call the offal of their plantations, in *rum* and *molasses*.—Those articles must remain on their hands unconsumed, for none but Englishmen and their descendants make use thereof. We import from the British islands 350,000 gallons of molasses, per annum, value on the spot \$87,500—Of rum, 5,590,000 gallons, value about \$2,412,500. Will gentlemen believe, that the want of sales, (and the consequent loss of their value) to the annual amount of two and a half millions of dollars, will not be felt by the British planters? Yes, Sir, it has already been felt, if I am rightly informed, to wit, that the government has been obliged to grant large aid in money, to support the West India planters. But I shall fatigue the senate with details of this kind. My duty, however, has compelled me to present my ideas on this part of the subject, to the senate.

The gentleman from Delaware (Mr. White) feels all alive for the present rulers of the United States—he asks, where are we to get revenue, and with an air of triumph, tells us that we shall not have a dollar in the treasury at the next meeting of Congress. We were told the same story last year, and thousands of handbills had been distributed throughout the union asserting that fact. Yet, Sir, when we met we found fourteen millions of dollars in the treasury. We found our receipts more than in any preceding year. The gentleman is alarmed lest the present party in power shall be prostrated, as he thinks that was to which he belonged,

by the necessity of laying a direct tax. He is mistaken; they were dismissed, because that the tax after tax, duty on duty, that was laid by them were dissipated, the people knew not how, and because the people thought their system would lead the nation imperceptibly to monarchy.

I feel greatly obliged to the gentleman, for the tender feelings which he has expressed on the subject, but I am not alarmed. The present administration have pursued a course unknown to the last, to wit, the payment of the public debt; averaging for some years past, five millions of dollars, per annum. From this payment, we are now relieved, because the law permits us no longer to make payment thereof, except by purchase of the stockholders; *we cannot compel them to receive.* Besides, Sir, having paid off 33 millions of dollars of the public debt, we have relieved ourselves thereby from the payment of an annual interest of 2 millions of dollars.—Those two items, making together 7 millions of dollars will operate in effect for any purposes now required as so much received. But, Sir, we have other resources. It will be recollected, that the law of last session, authorised the articles of sugar, coffee, teas, pepper, and certain wines, to be deposited in the public stores, until wanted for exportation. Those articles will now be required for consumption, and presuming that as much thereof will be consumed as in former years we may fairly count on the following duties being collected thereon, to wit:

On Sugar,	\$ 1,843,199
Coffee,	867,259
Teas,	966,686
Pepper,	250,000
Wines, under 23 cts. duty,	41,377
	<hr/>
	\$ 3,968,521
On the public lands,	700,000
	<hr/>
Making together,	\$ 4,668,521
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Nor is this all; it is a well known fact, which will not be contradicted by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd) that the importations from India and China have, in the present year, been equal to that of any preceding year. The bonds (for the duties on which) will become due in the next year—nor has the importation of dry goods from England during the present year been so much less than former years, as materially to affect the revenue. On the whole, Mr. President, I believe that the receipts for the year 1809, may with safety be calculated upon, as at least twelve millions dollars, from which nothing being payable toward the principal of the public debt, we may count the actual supply to the treasury, as equal to any preceding year.

Let us take a view of the customary expenditures of the government for the year 1809.

Civil expenditure, . . . . .	1,000,000
Barbary Powers and Foreign intercourse, . . . . .	200,000
Military Department, . . . . .	1,280,000
Naval ditto, . . . . .	1,020,000
Interest on Louisiana debt, . . . . .	675,000
Interest on old debt and reimbursement, . . . . .	3,500,000
New regiments, . . . . .	1,000,000

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\$8,675,000

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If the gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. White) will not admit any other of my calculations, he will certainly admit that if we have 14 millions now in the treasury, and expend only \$8,675,000, that we certainly shall have some money in the treasury at the next meeting of Congress, even should the embargo continue all that time ; and in case of war, if the people do consume as much as usual, ways and means will be found to introduce the articles on which the duties have heretofore been collected. It must be admitted, however, that our revenue does sustain, and has sustained a material injury resulting from the orders of council of Great Britain. On articles heretofore imported from the continent of Europe, we derived a revenue equal to three millions of dollars, the importation of those articles is now prohibited by Great Britain. That gentleman may correct me if I am wrong. I will take a view of the articles annually consumed, to wit :

French Brandies, 2,739,711 gallons, duty thereon,	\$ 821,913
Ditto Wines, . . . . .	31,133
Goods ad valorem, from France and her allies, . . . . .	1,000,000
Hemp, Iron, Glass, Cordage, and other articles, . . . . .	250,000
Three and a half per ct. retained on drawback, and advantages from Neutral Trade, }	1,000,000

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\$ 3,103,046

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This item is a serious sum cut off from our revenue, by the orders of G. Britain. On the whole, Mr. President, I am however of opinion that we safely can calculate on a surplus, after paying the usual expenses of government, of a sum not less than 16 millions being in the treasury, at the next meeting of Congress, or at the disposal of government, provided war shall ensue. But do gentlemen calculate nothing upon the credit of the United States. It is now known to the world, that whatever party may be in power, the faith of the government, as it relates to the payment of its debts, has been held sacred. It will be recollected, that it was charged against the present ruling party, that when they got into power, all respect for public credit would be lost, and the property in our public funds would be in jeopardy. These, with other charges of a similar nature, having been found to be false, and that the present rulers are as tenacious of public credit, as their predecessors, all

fears, on that account, have ceased. The public credit will be admitted to be good, and there can be no doubt that any sum of money that may be required for a war, may be had by loan, either in our own country or abroad, without having recourse to a direct tax—So that I pray the honorable gentleman from Delaware, to quiet his tender feelings on this subject.

The Seamen.—We at length find the gentlemen are alive to the interest of this useful class of citizens. It may be considered a novelty to them. They tell us that our seamen have abandoned their country and gone into foreign employ. Will the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) say in his place, that the sailors of Connecticut have deserted their country to take refuge on board British ships of war? No Sir, he knows the abhorrence of his fellow citizens to that kind of service. The seamen of this union have fathers, uncles, brothers, friends, with whom they find employment. They will be found in the public works of the extensive manufactories which have been established, and among the farmers of the United States. I will not believe that any American sailors have left their country, except some worthless drunken men. I well know whence this idea has arisen. To avoid the complaints of Great Britain, the navy, prior to the embargo, had discharged all British deserters; they also discharged all British seamen found on board their ships of war—those together with foreign seamen employed in the merchant service have been collected by the British consuls (who have found that their numbers did not equal their expectations) and by them have been sent out of the country. That they may never return must be the sincere wish of every lover of his country! We should thereby silence the complaint of Great Britain, to wit, that we employ their subjects, and take from that government the pretext of impressing American seamen under the presumption that they are their own. The vacancy made by their thus abandoning our country will very soon be filled up by our own citizens—of whom sufficient for all the purposes of navigation will soon be found.

Gentlemen whose feelings are now so tender with respect to American seamen shewed little of this when their fellow citizens were seized, put on board British ships of war, and compelled to fight their battles against nations with whom theirs was at peace. Nay, Sir, we find some of them offering apologies in behalf of the British government for this violence offered to the liberties of our fellow citizens and to our independence as a nation. I have in my hand a public letter, and therefore I may use it, where the writer a senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Pickering) says “I will close this long letter by stating all the *existing pretences*, for there are *no causes* for a war with Great Britain,” &c. &c.

1. The British ships of war, agreeably to a right claimed and exercised for ages—a right claimed and exercised during the whole of the administrations of Washington, of Adams, and of



Jefferson—continue to take some of the British seamen found on board our merchant vessels, and with them a small number of ours, from the impossibility of always distinguishing Englishmen from citizens of the United States. On this point, our government well know, that Great Britain is perfectly willing to adopt any arrangement that can be devised, which will secure to her service *the seamen who are her own subjects*; and at the same time exempt ours from impressment."

Gracious God Mr. President! can that man feel for American seamen, who can say and write deliberately, that the impressment of 5000 Americans by Great Britain is no *real cause* but a *pretext only*. Will any man believe that a person making use of such expressions can have any feelings whatever for the sufferings of our seamen? I wish Mr. President, we had before us the able discussion held by the same gentleman, (Mr. Pickering) on the subject of impressment of American seamen with Mr. Liston. In that we should see our rights maintained by a strength of argument drawn from our just complaints. He did not then call our remonstrances on that subject *pretexts*. No, Sir, he thought as every American will think, that they were *grievous, intolerable*, and such as no free and high spirited people ought to submit to. In what estimation are we to hold the future opinions of a gentleman, who in 1806, did by a solemn vote in senate approbate the following resolution in senate, which advised the President to send a special mission to London, "to demand a reparation of wrongs, and *particularly as it related to the impressment of American seamen*" when we see a public letter in 1808 from the same gentleman calling the complaints on that subject—*pretences*; and not *just causes*.

"Resolved, That the President of the United States, be requested to demand the restoration of the property of their citizens, captured and condemned on the pretext of its being employed in a trade with the enemies of Great Britain, prohibited in time of peace; and the indemnification of such American citizens, for their losses and damages sustained by these captures and condemnations; and to enter into such arrangements with the British government, on this and all other differences subsisting between the two nations, (*and particularly respecting the impressment of American seamen,*) as may be consistent with the honor and interests of the United States, and manifest their earnest desire to obtain for themselves and their citizens by amicable negotiation, that justice to which they are entitled."

Let us cast our eyes back to the session of 1805-6, and we shall recollect the memorials presented from the merchants of all the great sea ports, praying Congress to adopt measures for the obtaining redress of the wrongs sustained by them from depredations committed on their property by the British, under the pretext "that they were carrying on a trade not permitted in times of peace," although it was acknowledged, that our commerce was carried on conformably to a convention solemnly made between

Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. King. The memorial from Boston advised a special mission; that from New Haven (Connecticut) "pledged their lives and fortunes in support of such measures as government might adopt to obtain redress and reparation for past losses"—Senate alive to those remonstrances advised the President to demand reparation for the past, and security for the future. The President in obedience to this advice and in respect to the memorialists did send a special mission; a treaty was made. It was sent back by the President. Why? It redressed not our wrongs. It required us to tax our exports, so as to put them on a footing with the British, as to their war charges in similar articles—It made no provision for that grievance to which senate had particularly directed the attention of the President, to wit, *In impressment of our seamen*, and before it was possible that the President could receive it, the British issued a new order for plunder, to wit, to seize all our vessels (without any previous notice) found trading from one port of their enemies to every other port of her or her allies, by which order 50 or 60 American vessels were seized, together with cargoes to the amount of near two millions,—this was followed up by other orders, until our commerce is entirely cut off from all its usual course, as well by British as by French decrees.—Government took a stand, I think an honorable stand, and now we find those same memorialists, indeed I may say the gentlemen in senate who advocated the advice to the President, telling us, that truly, they had no cause of complaint, that a pittance of trade may yet be pursued, (the orders or decrees to the contrary notwithstanding) and to pursue this miserable pittance they demand that government should tread back their steps, shall make this nation contemptible in the eyes of all Europe, shall repeal the embargo laws before they have taken any other step, or adopted any other measure.—The honor of our country forbids it, and that senate which gave the advice, will not meanly retract their own act, or bend the neck to any power on earth. *We know our power and fear not that of our enemies.*

In 1806, Senate passed the resolution already quoted. In addition to the wrongs then complained of, *wrong upon wrong* had been heaped upon us, prior to the date of the public letter already mentioned, who could have believed that the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Pickernig) at such a moment, after having recorded his vote on our journal, against the claim set up by Great Britain, would have written and published the following justification in support thereof.

*"The merchant vessels of France, Spain, and Holland, being driven from the ocean, or destroyed, the commerce of those countries with one another, and with their colonies, could no longer be carried on by themselves. Here the vessels of neutral nations came into their aid, and carried on nearly the whole commerce of those nations. With their seamen thus liberated from the merchant service, those nations, in the present and preceding wars, were enabled to man their ships of war ;*

*and the neutral vessels and seamen supplied their places, became in fact, though not in name, auxiliaries in war. The commerce of those nations, without one armed ship on the sea appropriated for its protection, was intended thus to be secured under neutral flags; while the merchant vessels of Great Britain, with its numerous armed ships to guard them, were exposed to occasional capture. Such a course of things Great Britain has resisted, not in the present only, but in former wars: at least as far back as that of 1756. And she has claimed and maintained a right to impose on this commerce some limits and restraints; because it was a commerce which was denied by those nations to neutrals in times of peace; because it was a commerce of immense value to the subjects of her enemies; and because it filled the treasuries with money to enable them to carry on their wars with Great Britain."*

What did the people of Salem, of Boston and of New Haven mean, when they pledged their *lives and fortunes* in support of any measures that government might take to obtain redress of the wrongs that this nation had endured? They meant that there *was* cause, and that they were prepared to go to war. And yet the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Pickering,) has written gravely, when other oppressions were added, to those then complained of; that truly, "there were *pretences*, but no *real causes* of complaint against Great Britain."

Hostility to commerce—Yes, Sir, I have seen a charge of that kind against the party in power in newspapers, and in town meeting speeches. I believed it to be used for party purposes. I did not believe that any man of respectable standing, would have asserted such a fact. The honorable gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Hillhouse) has now declared that he verily believes that there is a serious intention to break down commerce, and to raise manufactures upon its ruins. And what are his proofs? *That he did at the last session prophecy, that such would be the course of conduct.* In ancient days, Mr. President, there were prophets—there were *false prophets*, who went through the land, prophesying falsely to deceive the people. And I trust, Mr. President, the prophecy of the honorable gentleman may be ranked with them. I challenge the gentleman to produce one act—one solitary act to prove his assertion. He cannot produce one. He may report conversations with individual gentlemen, who might suppose that commerce had been too much favored; and such opinions are entertained, not only by gentlemen from the south, but also by gentlemen from the interior of the north and the east. Yet, Sir, I have never seen any of those gentlemen predicate any act hostile to commerce thereon.—It may not be unprofitable to take a view of the acts which I have considered as expressive of sincere friendship toward commerce.—The statute books are filled with laws establishing light-houses along the whole extent of our coasts, and a chain of lights are now to be seen extending from St. Croix to St. Mary's. No new duty charged therefor, has ever been proposed by any member to be im-



posed on the tonnage of the United States. The duty on tonnage has remained the same from the first law passed thereon. It is small and not felt. The coasting trade of the United States is countenanced in a peculiar manner. It is confined to our own vessels and free of charge. Early after the adoption of our constitution, Congress passed a law, levying a heavy duty on foreign tonnage, for the promotion of our own, and charging, on all goods imported in foreign vessels, a duty of ten per cent. on the duty imposed on similar goods when imported in American ships. This system secured the carriage of all goods imported into the United States, to our own vessels, and tended greatly to the immense tonnage now possessed by the merchants of the Union. This advantage was necessary to promote our navigation, when in its infancy, but being now in its manhood, I should have no objection to admit foreign ships on the same footing with our own, to such foreign nations as would admit us on terms of reciprocity into their ports; for on equal terms, I have no fear of the enterprize of any nation being superior to our own. A system was adopted, and *has been continued*, highly just in itself and proper, which conduced to the immense neutral trade carried on by the merchants of the United States—mean the system of granting drawbacks on re-exportation of foreign goods—by which system the nation has been greatly enriched and thereby aided in the payment of the national debt, but which agricultural men may permit themselves innocently to believe, has contributed to conduct the United States to the present crisis. We the merchants ought, therefore, to be cautious how we charge agricultural men with hostility to commerce. Had Congress been justly chargeable therewith, they had a fair opportunity of shewing it in 1806, when your tables groaned with memorials from the seaport towns. They might then have said, what have the agriculturalists to do with your neutral commerce? We will protect the commerce carried on in native exports, but will not entangle the nation with those of foreign origin. Did they do so? No, Sir; they, as well from the south as from the north, did declare their willingness to support and protect all the fair commerce of the Union. They treated the memorials with respect, and this house acted thereon.

Of 30 senators present, only seven members voted against the resolution of advice to the President. Three of those were from the East, two from the South, and two from the West. Those gentlemen feared that we should be implicated in war for that trade which the supporters thereof now wish us in a great measure to relinquish. For were the embargo off, it could no longer be pursued to any port of Europe.

But, say gentlemen, protecting duties have been laid on foreign goods to benefit the manufactures of the union. I sincerely wish there had been, but know of none, except on shoes and on ship-building; this latter I presume commercial men will not complain of. The duties heretofore laid were to obtain revenue, not to



protect manufactures. Nor did I ever until now hear any gentleman from Connecticut complain or oppose any aid contemplated for our manufactures. The complaint is novel to me, for I should suppose if any state in the union is in a situation to benefit by manufactures, Connecticut, from her population being full, will be that state. Some small duties have been laid to protect our agriculture, such as on hemp, indigo, and sugars, and a protecting duty has been laid on fish imported from foreign countries to secure the consumption of our own country to the labor of its own fishermen, to which little opposition was made by agricultural men. In truth, Mr. President, there has been no act of hostility shewn by Congress to the commercial interest, and much, very much of real friendship has been apparent in all the acts of that body.

I have in my hand, Mr. President, a report of a committee made to Parliament in June last. The object of which was to point out what aid could be afforded to their sugar planters of the W. Indies. In this report it is recommended, *vigorously to blockade the colonies of their enemies*, to prevent any *coffee, sugar or other colonial produce* being brought to the U. States from thence, to compel us to go to their islands for the supply of all our wants of sugar, coffee, rum, and molasses, and be subject there to whatever high price they may charge thereon, and to whatever duty on the exportation thereof they may think proper to impose. This system which will be to us a system of taxation, has already commenced, as may be seen by the blockade lately declared of all the French islands. It will be continued, Sir, and if the embargo were off we should find ourselves completely excluded from the benefits which gentlemen have promised themselves by a trade thereto. Retract our present measures, Mr. President, and we submit to every species of taxation and oppression on our commerce that Great Britain or France may think proper to impose thereon. They will think you a degraded people, fit only to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for them. Nor is this visionary; six years ago the British parliament taxed you in company with their own colonies, (for they still consider you as colonies) with a duty on all goods exported from Great Britain, of four per cent. when to all other nations they charge but one and a half per cent. Thus imposing on the United States an annual tribute of one million of dollars. We submitted to that imposition, and this has encouraged them to proceed with other and heavier oppressions.

The gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Hillhouse) has observed that were the embargo off merchants would buy the produce of the land, the farmer would be relieved, and the loss arising from capture by the belligerents would fall upon the merchants. Why should we take care of them said he, let the merchants take care of themselves. Is this the language used when the memorials were presented? Did we then tell the merchants to protect themselves?

And is this the tender friendship the gentleman from Connecticut means to shew to the commerce of the Union? Had such language come from a southern gentleman, the honorable gentleman from Connecticut would have good right to call it hostility to commerce. The same gentleman has told us, that although France had interdicted our commerce with England before the passing of the embargo law, yet insurance did not rise five per cent. on that account. The gentleman is correct—it did not rise at all, for no merchant apprehended any danger from French capture under the Berlin decree; for the explanation given to Gen. Armstrong by the French minister of marine gave full security against every capture *on the high seas* by the cruizers of France; for not one vessel was taken under that decree on the high seas; of course insurance never did rise on that account in America, nor in England, as appears by the examination of merchants before parliament, except for a short time. The moment the explanation given to Gen. Armstrong came to London the insurance fell to its usual rates, and this will account why insurance did not rise in America prior to the passage of the embargo law. But, Sir, it would be very different were the trade open and our vessels subject to capture under the Milan decree. Privateers of France knowing that our trade was unprotected, would swarm upon the ocean, and capture all that would be left from the depredations of Great Britain.

Should the resolution to repeal the embargo prevail, I have very little hesitation in saying, that the premium of insurance on vessels bound to England would, in a short time, rise to twenty or twenty-five per cent. against capture by French cruizers; and that no premium would induce the offices to underwrite vessels bound to the continent of Europe against British cruizers.

We are told by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd) that one of the belligerents makes war upon the world for universal dominion, and the other for her natali solum. For my part, Mr. President, I cannot conceive why the United States should take part with either. Our policy has been *entanglements with no foreign nation*. I hope Sir, we shall never turn Don Quixotes in support of one nation whose object is universal dominion on the land, nor in favor of the other whose object (more injurious to us) is tyranny and universal dominion on the seas. The same gentleman has told us of immense fortunes being made in Canada, by the advantages deriving to the merchants there, from our embargo. I believe there have been evasions in the articles of pot and pearl ashes, which went to Canada, but I cannot think it could amount to the quantity insinuated. The principal trade to that colony has been the export of specie where bills of exchange on London have been purchased at 5 per cent. below par, and sold at Boston and New York at  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. above par. The profits resulting therefrom has been to the merchants of those cities. The injury to the nation has been the export of its specie. Measures will no doubt be taken to prevent such injury.

The gentleman has said that if the embargo were off and we were brought into a war by her conduct, that G. Britain would sorely repent it, for that the loss of Canada and perhaps of Nova Scotia would be the consequence. The same gentleman has told us that Great Britain will be able to obtain timber and lumber of all kinds sufficient for her wants from Norway and Sweden. He is mistaken; for Norway belongs to the Dane from whose king the British plundered at Copenhagen sufficient for their navy for some time, and Sweden cannot supply Great Britain with staves and other articles of lumber. I agree with the gentleman that our ships are our farms; that government is as much bound to protect them as they are to protect terra firma, and Sir, it was for their protection, and not for the protection of the land that the embargo was laid, and that purpose has most effectually been obtained.

It may not be improper, before I conclude, to take a view of the dangers which would result to our commerce in case the resolution should obtain. All American vessels bound to Great Britain or any of her possessions in the East or West Indies, or in Europe, would be subject to capture by French cruizers under the decrees of France.

All American vessels bound to Russia, Denmark, Hamburg, Bremen, Holland, France, Italy, the Turkish dominions, Austria, or any part of Spain or Portugal in possession of French troops, would be subject to capture by British cruizers under their orders of council enforced by an act of Parliament. In this state of insecurity and danger to our commerce, I cannot give my consent to adopt the measure under consideration.

I will terminate by making use of an observation of Mr. Canning which I conceive equally applicable to us in our present situation.

“Character is power. To lose our character is to lose a material part of our power;” again “Not a doubt shall remain to distant times of our determination and of our ability to have continued resistance; and that *no step* which could even mistakenly be construed into *concession*, should be taken on our part, while it can be a question, whether the plan devised for our destruction has, or has not, either completely failed, or been unequivocally abandoned.”

NOTE. *The following was omitted on delivery.*

Great Britain will also feel severely the want of our commerce to her East India possessions; nay, Sir, it has already been felt there—our imports from thence amount to about four millions annually, for which we make payment in Spanish dollars; the goods we purchase are inferior to those made for the India company. The want of such vent for so large a quantity of goods will be felt; it has been, for the prices thereof fell twenty-five to thirty-three and a third per cent. in Calcutta the instant they

were informed of the embargo. And, Sir, the government of India will feel it as well arising from the complaints of those who manufacture, as in the want of the annual supply of \$4,000,000. Indeed, Sir, I am informed by a respectable gentleman just arrived from Calcutta, that the government of India, and English subjects residing there, were greatly distressed when they were informed that an embargo had been laid in the United States—they consider it as a measure peculiarly injurious to that government.



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MR. PICKERING'S SPEECH

IN THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

ON THE

RESOLUTION OFFERED BY MR. HILLHOUSE

TO

REPEAL THE SEVERAL ACTS LAYING AN EMBARGO,

NOVEMBER 30, 1808.

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MR. PRESIDENT,

THE ample discussion already given to the resolution on your table, leaves me nothing to detail on the *effects*, produced by the embargo, in regard to France, to England, or ourselves. On the two great belligerents, *practical* men, who knew the characters and resources of those nations, foresaw and pronounced, *that it would make no impression*. This we all now know to be the fact: while we ourselves severely feel its pressure. Why, then, not remove it? Because, as we are told, those two nations have violated our neutral maritime rights; and seeing, that to compel their respect for these, we imposed the embargo, and they treat the measure with contempt; to remove it would be submission. So we will endeavour to conceal our mortification; and because we cannot injure *them*, we will continue to punish *ourselves*. To renew our commerce, while their decrees and orders remain uncanceled, would, we are told, be "abject and degrading submission:" and that we have but this alternative, "to make war with both nations," or "continue and enforce the present suspension of commerce."

It has been justly remarked, by the gentleman from Connecticut, [Mr. Hillhouse] that to run away, and abandon our rights, is abject and degrading.

To make war on both the belligerents, is the most strange, quixotic idea that ever entered into the head of a statesman. I

suppose, as we have a thousand and a thousand times declared, that we have maintained an impartial neutrality towards those nations, so, to verify our declarations, we must now make war upon both, *impartially* ! And as their injuries are said to be equal, or, we will not inquire which has done us "the most harm:" so we must measure out to each an equal quantity of resentment, and give to each an equal number of blows !

In respect to our violated rights, so far as Great Britain is concerned, those presented by the administration in the front of our claims, are

I. An exemption from impressment of all seamen on board our merchant vessels.

II. A free trade with the colonies of her enemies.

III. An exemption from capture of our vessels destined for any port of her enemies not actually blockaded.

I am aware, sir, of the consequences of advancing any thing from which conclusions may be drawn adverse to the opinions of our own administration, which by many are conceived to be indisputably just. Merely to state these questions, and to mention such arguments as the British government may perhaps have urged in their support, on her side, is sufficient to subject a man to the popular charge of being under British influence, or to the vulgar slander of being a "British tory:" he will be fortunate to escape the accusation of touching British gold. But, sir, none of these things move me. The patrons of the miscreants who utter these slanders know better: but are nevertheless willing to benefit by the impression they may make on the minds of the people. From an early period of my life, I was zealously engaged in every measure opposed to the attempts of Great Britain to encroach upon our rights, until the commencement of our revolutionary war; and during its whole continuance, I was uninterruptedly employed in important civil or military departments; contributing all my efforts to bring that war to a successful termination.

I, sir, am not the advocate of wrong doers, to whatever country they belong; whether emperors or kings, or the administrators of a republic. Justice is my object, and truth my guide; and wherever she points the way, I shall not fear to go.

Great Britain has done us many wrongs. When we were colonies, she attempted to deprive us of some of our dearest birth-rights; rights derived from our English ancestors; rights which we defended and finally established by the successful conclusion of the revolutionary war. But these wrongs, and all the wounds of war, were intended to be obliterated and healed by the treaty of peace, when all enmities should have ceased.

Great Britain wronged us in the capture and condemnation of our vessels under her orders of 1793: and she has made reparation for these wrongs; pursuant to a treaty negotiated on *practical* principles, by a statesman who, with *liberal views* and *real candour*, sought adjustment and reparation.

At subsequent periods she has committed other wrongs : and if reparation had been demanded in the same spirit of candour and firmness which were manifested in 1794, that distinguished precedent authorizes the opinion, that a like equitable adjustment and reparation might have been obtained. But after a four years negotiation, in which volumes of essays and letters have been written, it has, like the seven years negotiation with Spain, been brought in the language of the president "to an issue of some sort:" that is, every subject of dispute remains as far, probably farther from adjustment, than when the negotiations were begun

It is this disastrous issue which now enters into our deliberations. According to the statements of the administration, we are brought into a situation from which we cannot advance without war, nor retreat without dishonor. Their negotiations with France have also terminated in mortification and defeat.

On the two questions of the impressment of seamen on board our merchant vessels, and a trade with the enemies of Great Britain prohibited in time of peace, the gentleman from Maryland, [Mr. Smith] was pleased to read some parts of a letter written by me last winter to the governor of Massachusetts, to be laid before the legislature : and on the latter (neutral trade) he also read the journal of the senate, which exhibited a unanimous vote declaratory of our right to that trade ; and then the names of the senators (mine being one who voted to request the president to demand and insist on reparation for the injuries done us in violation of that right ; *and for this purpose to enter into amicable arrangements with the British government.*

On these two questions, I should add nothing to the observations made yesterday by the gentleman from Connecticut, but for the apparent intention of the gentleman from Maryland, to exhibit an inconsistency between my votes in the senate and the observations of my letter on the same subject.

It is sufficient for me to remark, that in the passages recited by the gentleman from my letter, my object was to shew, by exhibiting in a few words, to the view of my immediate constituents, and through them to the people of Massachusetts, some of the reasons which might have influenced Great Britain not to relinquish her ancient usage of impressing *her own seamen* ; nor to consent that neutral vessels should carry on (as we and other neutrals were carrying on) the whole trade between the countries of her enemies in Europe and their colonies ; to show, I say, that as much was to be said on both sides, those rights, as claimed by the United States, were not to be considered so clear and indisputable *as to justify a war with Great Britain* ; into which the proceedings of the executive, in a variety of ways, seemed calculated to plunge us.

Before I quit this subject, I will make one more observation. It appears to be generally supposed that the rule respecting the colonial trade adopted by Great Britain, and usually called the rule of

1756, which it seems she has considered as "the ancient and established principle of maritime law,"\* was peculiar to Great Britain : and Mr. Madison says, " it is well known that Great Britain is the only nation that has acted upon, or otherwise given a sanction to it."† He also mentions this rule as having been introduced, for the first time, in the war of 1756 ; as having been in operation only a few years in that war ; and not afterwards acted upon until 1793. ‡ Let us examine the subject.

In Valin's celebrated work on maritime law (a book in the secretary of state's office) is a regulation of Louis the fourteenth, in 1704, from which I will recite some passages.

The title of the regulation is remarkable : it is " concerning prizes made at sea, *to secure the navigation of neutral states and allies during war ;*" implying that this regulation was intended to abate the rigor of maritime law before that time practised towards neutral commerce.

After observing that propositions had been made to him by the deputies of the council of commerce, the French king expresses his approbation of them, " seeing he finds in them the means which he has always sought of procuring equally the advantages of the subjects of neutral princes and French cruizers." He adds, " The subjects of neutral princes will thus find the care which his majesty has taken to preserve for them *the same extent and the same liberty of commerce which they have been accustomed to enjoy during peace.*"

I will now read such of the articles of this French regulation as relate to the question under examination.

"*Article 1.* His majesty forbids French privateers to stop or bring into the ports of his kingdom, vessels belonging to subjects of neutral princes, going from the ports of their dominion, and laden on account of the owners or other subjects of the said neutral princes, with merchandise of the growth or manufacture of their own country, to carry the same *directly* into any other states whatsoever, even those with which his majesty is at war ; provided nevertheless, that there be not in the said vessels any contraband goods.

"*Article 2.* They are in like manner forbidden to stop vessels belonging to subjects of neutral princes, going from the ports of any state whatsoever, even of those with which his majesty is at war, and laden on account of the owners or other subjects of the said neutral princes, with merchandise which they shall have received in the same country or state whence they shall have departed, to return *directly* into the ports of the dominion of their sovereign.

"*Article 3.* He also forbids them to stop vessels belonging to the subjects of neutral princes, departing from the ports of one of the

\* Mr. Madison's letter of March 25, 1808, to Mr. Erskine.

† Same letter.

‡ Idem.



states neutral or allied to his majesty, to go into another state alike neutral or allied to his majesty; provided they are not laden with merchandise of the growth or manufacture of his enemies; in which case the merchandise shall be good prize, and the vessels shall be released.

"Article 4. In like manner his majesty forbids privateers to stop vessels belonging to subjects of neutral princes departing from a state allied to his majesty or neutral, to go to a state the enemy of his majesty; provided there be not on board said vessel any merchandise contraband, nor of the growth or manufacture of the enemies of his majesty; in which cases the merchandise shall be good prize, and the vessels shall be released.

"Article 6. Vessels belonging to subjects of neutral states which shall depart from the ports of a state the enemy of his majesty, and there have taken their lading, in whole or in part, to go to the states of any other prince than their own, whether allied to his majesty, neutral or enemy, may be stopped and brought into his kingdom, and shall be declared good prize with their lading, even although laden on account of the subjects of his majesty, or of an allied or neutral state."

This regulation of Louis XIV. in 1704 (he being then at war with England and Holland) was re-enacted by Louis XV. in 1744, (France being again at war with England) with some exceptions in regard to those neutral nations with whom France had formed treaty-stipulations incompatible with that regulation.

In these five articles we have, if I mistake not, the whole doctrine of the British rule of 1756. The *direct* trade to and from *neutral* ports and the enemy's ports, being permitted; but not the trade to and from the ports of one allied or neutral state, to and from the ports of another allied or neutral state; *if the lading of the neutral vessels consist of merchandise the productions of the enemy's country*; much less to carry the same from one port of the enemy, to another port of the enemy.

The PRINCIPLE of the British rule and of the French regulation appears to be, to prevent *neutrals* coming in to aid the enemy in the commerce of one part of his dominions with any other part thereof, or in procuring a market for the enemy's productions, in any other country than that of the neutral actually transporting the same, and for its own use and consumption.

It appears moreover, by the preamble to the French regulation, that the restrictions on neutral commerce, which we are now examining, instead of commencing in 1756, were in exercise by the English and Dutch, antecedent to that regulation, and with greater rigor; the French king professing to *ameliorate* the condition of neutral commerce, by that regulation.\*

\* But Great Britain has admitted that the vessels of the United States might carry on an *indirect* trade from the European dominions of her enemies to their colonies, and from those colonies to their parent countries in Europe; and in both

On the subject of blockade, when vessels of war were not so stationed before the port declared to be blockaded, as to constitute what is called an *actual blockade*, undoubtedly abuses have taken place.

To form an actual blockade of a port, ships destined for that object must be "sufficiently near to produce an evident danger in entering." But these words by no means imply a *certainly* of capture, by the blockading ships, of the vessel so attempting to enter. What degree of risk from blockading ships will amount to a lawful blockade, may sometimes be a disputable question. Would the chance of capturing three vessels out of four, or seven out of eight, exhibit such an "evident danger in entering," as would constitute an actual blockade? that is, when to insure their entering in safety would be worth a premium of from 75 to 90 per cent. This must remain a question of some difficulty to adjust.

On these points, sir, and all others in dispute with Great Britain, my opinion remains unchanged, that they are yet proper subjects of negotiation, to be undertaken in the *real spirit* of *conciliation* and *adjustment*. That the *embargo* will not induce her to yield to our demands, we have ample proof, not only in the answer of the British government to our minister in London, but in the certain ability of that nation and her colonies to supply all their own wants. That she possesses the means, I think, has been demonstrated by gentlemen who have spoken before me. We have heard much of the patriotism and patient endurance of our fellow citizens, under the distresses of the embargo; and gentlemen

cases, the trade has been considered *indirect* when carried on through the United States: that is, when the cargoes laden on board American vessels, in the ports of the enemies of Great Britain, have been first imported into the United States, and carried thence in the same or other American vessels, to the enemy countries, or colonies respectively. But the facts which should constitute an *indirect* trade, not having been definitively declared; on the contrary, as they have been several times varied, either by the orders of the British government, or by the decision of her courts of admiralty—much vexation and injury have thence accrued to the commerce of the United States.

But the treaty negotiated by the president's ministers, (Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney) and signed by them, with the British commissioners on the 31st of December 1806, comprehended a definitive provision on this head. Such trade, between the parent countries and colonies of the enemies of Great Britain, was to be considered *indirect*, when the articles of the growth, produce or manufacture of Europe, were first carried to the United States; and on re-exportation, remained after the drawback, subject to a duty of one per cent. on their value. In like manner, all articles of the growth and produce of the enemy's colonies, being first brought to the United States, and there entered and landed, and on re-exportation remaining subject to a duty of two per cent. on their value, might be re-laden, and freely exported to any country in Europe. The duties in both cases, to be paid into the treasury of the United States.

This arrangement was calculated to prevent any further dispute between the United States and Great Britain, about the trade between the countries of her enemies in Europe and their colonies. But the president thought fit to reject this treaty, without laying it before the senate.

speak confidently; that this patience will hold out till Great Britain shall be brought to our feet. At the same time, they calculate on the distresses, which they fondly imagine the embargo will inflict on the people of Great Britain and her colonies, to excite discontents and insurrections sufficiently alarming to induce that government to abandon usages on which she relies to maintain her maritime ascendancy, and, at this time, her independence as a nation. But why should it be supposed that the people of Great Britain will be less patient under sufferings, than the people of the United States? Their's would arise from causes beyond their control; our's from some cause or causes operating on our *rulers*, but which the *people* can neither see nor understand. Within four months after the embargo was imposed, the president himself, by proclamation, announced to us and to the world the existence of one insurrection, occasioned by the embargo; and the provisions made in the supplementary acts, to compel obedience at the point of the bayonet, shew how apprehensive the government were of discontents and resistance. These extraordinary provisions for the execution of a *specific measure* demonstrate, that it was considered as *opposed to the general sense of the people*; and, in a free country, such a measure cannot long be carried into execution. The votes of approbation of the embargo by public bodies, and other assemblies of citizens, so ostentatiously displayed, while they manifest the *force of party*, are, to say the least, but equivocal indications of the general sense of the people, or even of the individuals composing those assemblies. Those votes have always had fewer *hearts* than *voices*.

Mr. President, the gentleman from Maryland mentioned the extreme danger to which our commerce would be exposed, while the French decrees and British orders remain unrepealed. It has been often said, and perhaps oftener insinuated, in newspapers and pamphlets, that if our vessels were permitted to go to sea, *all would be taken*. What escaped the French, would be captured by the English; and what escaped the latter, would fall a prey to the former. There is a want of truth in all this. The same gentleman quoted a statement made by an eminent merchant of Massachusetts, [Mr. Gray, of Salem] that of eight or ten vessels which sailed about the time the embargo was laid, one only had reached the place of her destination. I remember seeing a statement of that sort; and I think also, that I saw a *detection* of its *fallacy*. If they had not reached their destined ports, it did not follow that they were captured and condemned.

The same merchant has expressed his decided opinion, "that, notwithstanding the French decrees and British orders in council, if our embargo was off we should have *more trade* than would be enjoyed by us, if all the world were at peace, and the respective nations should monopolize as much of their own commerce as usual." Another eminent merchant [Mr. Thorndike, of Beverly] expressed, at the same time, the same opinion.

But without resting the question on *opinions*, we may appeal to *facts*. I have sought information of the risks which have attended our foreign trade, within the present year, from the two principal districts of Massachusetts.

By the statement in my hand, lately received, and which is of unquestionable authority, I find, that at one insurance office in Boston, 43 policies have been written, on vessels engaged in foreign voyages, since the first of January, 1808. Of these,

5 were undetermined.

1 vessel (the Neutrality) bound from Marseilles to Boston, captured and condemned at Gibraltar, for violating the blockade declared by the British orders in council.

37 arrived safely. In all 43.

It is stated, that there were three policies on the Neutrality ; and that possibly there might be more than one policy on one vessel among the 37 safe arrivals.

At another office in Boston, out of 75 risks, principally to the West Indies,

3 vessels were captured by the French, of which the British recaptured 2.

1 captured by the British, supposed to be French property.

16....about this number are undetermined ; and the rest, about

55, have ended safely. In all 75.

At another office in Boston, out of somewhat more than 100 risks,

4 vessels were captured by the British, of which 2 were condemned for breach of orders in council ; 1 probably enemy's property, and 1 remained under adjudication.

1 captured and condemned by the French ; and

1 seized by them at Alicant, while they had the power there.

25 risks were undetermined ; and the remainder ended safely.

The premiums of insurance have been about eleven per cent. to and from the West Indies, for the whole voyage.

7 per cent. from the West Indies, with cargo on board,

9 to 10 per cent. from Europe, if not violating British orders.

4 to 5 per cent. from Europe, against French capture only.

By a statement received from Salem, on the correctness of which I can rely, I find that in the district of Salem and Beverly, 22 vessels sailed, by the president's permission, between the 5th of April and the 10th of August. Of these vessels, one sailed to Sumatra, one to Senegal, and the rest to the different ports in the West Indies. Of the whole number,

1 returned leaky, and remained at home.

12 returned in safety ; and

9 remained undetermined ; but it was not known that any of them had been detained or condemned by any foreign power.

In all 22.

The insurance on the Sumatra voyage, out and home, was 14 per cent.



Martinico, }  
 Havanna, } The voyage out and home, 9 to 10 per cent.  
 Surinam, }  
 Havanna, at and from,  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

The premium of insurance from Calcutta to the United States, the last summer and autumn, has been 8 per cent.

Thus, Mr. President, we see that the risk on our foreign trade has been very little increased since the issuing of the French decree of Berlin, and the British orders in council.

The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Smith] asks—What would have been the insurance on an American vessel bound to France? I am not informed. Perhaps 75 to 90 per cent. though it is not probable that our merchants would hazard their vessels on such a voyage, or that the underwriters would insure them. But what does this prove? Why, that the risk, under the British orders, is so great, in attempting to enter a port in France, as perhaps to amount to an actual blockade.

I now beg leave, sir, to communicate the information I have recently received from the latter of the two merchants before referred to\*. Having requested of him the data on which his opinion before mentioned was founded, he has sent me an answer (dated the 23d instant) from which I will read the material parts.

He says, “respecting the comparative trade of profound peace, and the present moment, if the embargo should be removed, and the decrees and orders of council remain, it is a subject about which it is difficult to go into that detail which will show satisfactorily an exact result: because, if you resort to the exports of a year in time of profound peace, and compare the aggregate with a year in war, the prices being so different, the difference in amount will not give the exact data we want. And to take the quantity of each article of export will not be satisfactory; because in different years we export more of the same article to the same market, and in proportion to the increased quantity raised, or the goodness or badness of the crop. But of the *fact* I have no doubt, that our trade would be much greater and more productive, if the embargo were removed, than it can be in time of peace: because when the colonial trade of the European powers is confined as usual, we cannot carry any kind of provisions to the colonies of any of them, without being subject to a heavy duty, nearly equal to a prohibition. And we are not allowed to bring away any thing but rum and molasses; and of course we lose the whole of the colonial trade, so far as respects importing any articles with a view of exporting them again; excepting only from the Isle of France, and Bourbon, which has generally been free. But we may be shut out there. The trade to the colonies is now free for all exports and imports with small duties. And if the largest and most natural European markets for the sale of colonial produce are occluded, still we have open to us, *all* that the British have, and we can now carry those articles to Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Coast of Bar-

\* Mr. Thorndike.

bary, Turkey, Sicily, Sardinia and Malta; the three last of which are ports at which the articles sell high, and are bought for the purpose of smuggling over to the continent, where they are sent in great quantities.

The following statement is then given, of the amount of our exports from the 30th of September, 1806, to September 30, 1807, (taken from the report of the secretary of the treasury to countries and places other than those in Europe which are under the government or controul, or in alliance with the French emperor; all which are considered as shut up by the British orders of council.

Domestic exports (or of articles of the growth, } produce or manufacture of the United States), }	\$ 36,109,991
Foreign goods exported, . . . . .	24,140,495
	<hr/> 60,250,486

To this may be added Spanish dollars, exported to India and China, and which are not noticed in the report of the secretary of the treasury, and may be estimated at least at, . . . . . 6,000,000

Whole amount, . . . . . \$ 66,250,486

“ This amount may be exported without being subject to the British orders of council: and the extra premiums against *French captures*, would not exceed the following rates, viz.

To Sweden, 2 per cent.—Swedish and other West Indies, and the Spanish Main, 5 do.—Cape of Good Hope, 4 do.—England, Scotland, without the Channel, say Liverpool, Greenock, Ireland, &c. &c. 4 do.—And within the Channel, 6 do.—Guernsey, Jersey, &c. 5 do.—Gibraltar, 3 do.—Spanish ports in the Bay of Biscay, 6 do.—Spanish ports on the Atlantic, 3 do.—Spanish ports on the Mediterranean, 5 do.—Madeira, the Canaries, Fayal, and other Azores, 3 do.—Portugal, 3 do.—Cape de Verd, 3 do.—Sicily, 5 do.—Malta, 6 do.—China, 4 do.—Sumatra, 3 do.—Spanish and Portuguese America, 3 do.—Calcutta, and the Coast of Coromandel and Malabar, 5 do.—Africa, 4 do.—Arabia, and Red Sea, including Mocha, and Muscat, 4 do.—Manilla, 4 do.—North West Coast of America, 2 do.—Halifax and Newfoundland, 1 do.

“ In time of profound peace, our trade might be fairly estimated thus:—

	Domestic exports.	Foreign exports
	48,699,592	Nothing.
To which may be added specie to China and India, }	6,000,000	In time of peace these
	<hr/> \$ 54,699,592	must be so very in-
		considerable as to be
		unimportant in this
		statement.

This is supposing the same domestic articles as were exported in 1806, and allowing them to be at the same prices: so that the comparison stands thus:

Our exports, if the embargo were removed,  
would be . . . . . \$ 66,250,486

Free from any embarrassment from the British  
orders in council.

If peace were to take place, and the Eu-  
ropean nations assume their trade as usual ;  
and the prices of our domestic articles remain  
as the average prices in 1806, (which they  
would not) we should export, . . . . . 54,699,592

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Leaving \$ 11,550,894

less export trade in time of peace than we might now enjoy ;  
and which amount is to be twice water-borne, once in importing it  
from the places of growth, and again in carrying it to the con-  
sumers : and of course would employ shipping appertaining to the  
carriage of one freight, equal in amount to more than twenty-three  
millions, one hundred thousand dollars.

“ As an evidence of the correctness of this statement, it will be  
seen, by a recurrence to the statement of the secretary of the trea-  
sury for the year 1803, that the exports had fallen, in that short  
peace, from \$ 93,020,513, to \$ 55,800,033.

“ It is to be observed, that we might now enjoy a trade to South  
America and the Spanish Main, which might be estimated, at least,  
at from four to five millions of dollars, a considerable part of which  
would be again exported to Spain and Portugal, and which has  
never made any part of the secretary's report ; because the trade  
to those countries has been prohibited until lately. It may also be  
remembered, that the export trade does not show the whole ad-  
vantage of the colonial trade which we might now enjoy ; because  
all we import for our own consumption ought to be added.”

[Here Mr. Lloyd stated, that in his opinion the value of the trade  
which might now be prosecuted from the United States, consider-  
ing the present circumstances of the great nations of Europe, would  
be as extensive as could be carried on after a general peace, and the  
adoption, by the European powers, of their restrictive colonial sys-  
tems.]

On this clear and interesting view of the commerce which the  
United States might carry on, were the embargo out of the way,  
no comments are necessary. The observations of the writer of the  
letter are evidences of his being master of the subject.

Mr. President, the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. Giles] has  
been pleased to attribute the discontents, in New England, especi-  
ally in Massachusetts, relative to the embargo, solely to the arts  
of *demagogues*, who wish to get into office.

The gentleman from Connecticut noticed this reproach : but as it  
appeared to be levelled chiefly at leading citizens in Massachusetts,  
I feel it to be my duty further to remark, that of all the citizens  
of the United States, none stand more aloof from, none more  
detest the character of demagogues, than those to whom the gen-

tleman referred. I know those men who reprobate the embargo, and who, in conversation, and in newspapers, express their sentiments about it, or patronize those who do. *They* are not seeking for offices; many of them could not be persuaded to accept the best office in a president's gift; but to save their country from the effects of measures, in their view, alike ruinous and disgraceful. They are men, sir, whose age, whose experience, whose knowledge, whose wisdom, whose virtue, place them in the first rank of citizens. They are men, sir, ten of whom, had they been in Sodom, would have saved that city from destruction. Among them was the immortal AMES, than whom a purer spirit never left the earth. He wrote while he had strength to hold a pen. He died on the anniversary morning of the nation's birth-day—and this was among his last prayers: O! Save my country!

Gentlemen have said much about insurrection and rebellion; and, in language not very conciliatory, pointed all their allusions to the people of New England. Other rulers pronounced them rebels, more than thirty years ago: while many then unborn now wish to cover themselves with their mantle, and to share the honors of the patriots of seventeen hundred and seventy-six.

But why should gentlemen be surprised that great *discontents* prevail in that country; and that the legislatures, with a deliberation and solemnity which should command attention, have pronounced their opinions of the embargo? Gentlemen will recollect that *there* the revolution began, of which Boston was the cradle. And if they will turn to the declaration of independence, they will find one of the reasons for the colonies' separating themselves from Great Britain, and renouncing the government of the king, was, their enacting laws "FOR CUTTING OFF OUR TRADE WITH ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD."

Mr. President, in a public document on our tables, we are told, that "after a period of twenty five years of peace, hardly interrupted by transient hostilities, and of prosperity unparalleled in the history of nations, the United States are for the first time, since the treaty which terminated the revolutionary war, placed in a situation equally difficult, critical and dangerous."

That our country has enjoyed such unexampled prosperity, I readily agree: but the *present* is not the *first time* that these states have been placed in a *difficult, critical, and dangerous* situation.

The gentleman from Connecticut yesterday noticed the most difficult crises. In 1793, it required all the firmness and immense popularity of president Washington, to stem the torrent of popular delusion, that was hurrying the United States into the vortex of the French revolution.

In 1794, the same steadiness, the same undeviating pursuit of the public welfare, in spite of popular clamor and formal opposition, were necessary to institute a mission to Great Britain, to negotiate and settle with that government questions of the highest moment to these states, and which, if they remained much longer unsettled, might endanger the peace of the nation. That negotiation, committed



to the conduct of a statesman, than whom our country has produced not one more firm, more wise, or more upright, was, by his candor, ability and decision, brought to a happy conclusion, in fewer *months* than some more modern negotiations have occupied *years*, without being brought to any conclusion ; unless their utter *failure* may be called a *conclusion*.

In 1795, the United States were agitated to their centre, by the opposition to the British treaty. Artful and aspiring demagogues seized upon the known prejudices of the people in regard to the two great contending nations ; and exerting all their faculties to keep up the popular delusion, hoped that, by the loud and extended clamor, the president would be deterred from ratifying the treaty which Mr. Jay had so happily concluded. Here again were displayed the firmness and patriotism of Washington. Always determined to pursue the true interests of the people, although at the hazard of his popularity, he ratified the treaty. Here, it was presumed, all opposition would cease. But it again appeared, and with a more formidable aspect, in the national legislature. But I will not dwell upon it. The treaty was finally carried into execution. It had, however, one *more* enemy to encounter.

Revolutionary France, wishing to involve us in a war with Great Britain, which this treaty (merely of amity and commerce) had prevented, *pretended* that it was equivalent to a treaty of *alliance* with Great Britain. And seizing on this pretence, at once to vent her resentment, and gratify the rapacity of her rulers with the plunder of our citizens, she let loose her cruizers upon our commerce.

We urged the obligations of treaties, violated by these captures. She answered, *that she found only a real disadvantage in those obligations !* and continued her depredations. Repeated missions of respectable ministers to Paris endeavored to propitiate her rulers, and prevail on them to put a stop to such enormities. But they were deaf to the voice of justice. Then it was that our government authorized an armed commerce, and equipped a small but gallant navy for its further protection ; and made other defensive preparations, such as have been stated by the gentleman from Connecticut.

If, sir, our country is now placed in a situation more "difficult, critical and dangerous," than at any of the periods to which I have adverted (though I am very far from adopting that opinion,) where shall we look for the cause ? If in 1794, when England had powerful associates in her war with France, and the latter had been comparatively, but little extended beyond her natural limits ; the United States, with perhaps two-thirds of her present population, and less than half her present revenue, were able to induce England to accede to their just demands, and to close all differences by an advantageous treaty ; how has it happened that the present administration, with all the accession of power from an increased population, and a more than doubled revenue ; when, too, gigantic France wielded the force and the resources of continental Europe ; and England, single-handed, was left to meet a world in arms ; how

has it happened, that with these superior advantages and more powerful means, all the negotiations of the present administration with England (one excepted of local rather than general application, and which I need not explain) have failed? Had they been conducted with equal candour, ability and dignity, must they not have produced as early, and at least as advantageous results? Was this a cause of their failure, *that points of questionable right*, because not settled by the universally acknowledged law of nations, *and therefore of doubtful, or hopeless attainment, were pertinaciously insisted on?*

Mr. President—To find a remedy for evils, as well in the body politic as in the natural body, it is necessary to investigate their causes.

Nearly eight years have elapsed since we were told, by the highest authority in the nation, that under the auspices of the federal government, the United States were then “in the full tide of successful experiment.” And the report on our tables, to which I have before alluded, declares, in grave and solemn language, that during a period of five-and-twenty years, which brings us down to the embargo, the United States have enjoyed a “prosperity unexampled in the history of nations.” Yet during the whole of this period of unequalled prosperity, *arising from the active pursuits of commerce and agriculture, each giving life and vigor to the other*, that commerce has been exposed to the aggressions of the belligerent nations. For those of Great Britain, up to near the close of 1794, compensation was made, pursuant to the provisions of Mr Jay’s treaty. For the like aggressions by Spain, the like indemnity was given by virtue of the treaty with that power, concluded in October 1795. For French spoliations during the whole period of her revolutionary war (spoliations which have been estimated at not less than millions of dollars) we have received *nothing!* Nor have we obtained any reimbursement from Spain for the spoliations committed by her cruizers, *after she became the ally of France.*

Captures and condemnations, however, more or less extended, have never ceased: notwithstanding all which, and the continued impressment of seamen from our merchant vessels, the same unexampled prosperity has attended us; until suddenly, and to the astonishment of the nation, this flowing tide of successful commerce and agriculture, was stopped by that fatal measure, the embargo. The shock was aggravated by the concealment of its real cause. Sir, I hazard nothing in asserting, that to this day that cause has not been satisfactorily declared. Allow me time to justify this assertion. I will bring together facts and circumstances, and then gentlemen will judge whether my conclusion be erroneous or just.

On the 14th of December 1807, the dispatches brought by the *Revenge*, from our minister in Paris, were delivered to the secretary of state. On her arrival at New York, reports brought by her stated, that the French emperor had declared *that there should be no neutrals.* The sources of information, and the character of the emperor, rendered those reports worthy of credit; and though after-

wards publicly and stoutly denied, they were believed ; and no gentleman here will now be inclined to doubt the fact. These reports, and the mystery which surrounded the recommended embargo, naturally excited suspicions and alarms.

Of the French papers supposed to be brought by the *Revenge*, none were communicated to Congress, save a letter dated September 24, 1807, from General Armstrong to M. Champagny, and his answer of the 7th of October, relative to the Berlin decree, and a letter from Regnier, minister of justice, to Champagny, giving the emperor's interpretation of that decree. These three papers, with a newspaper copy of a proclamation of the king of Great Britain, issued in the same October, were all the papers communicated by the president to congress, as the grounds on which he recommended the embargo. *These papers*, he said "shewed the *great and increasing* dangers with which our vessels, our seamen and merchandise were threatened on the high seas and elsewhere, from the belligerent powers of Europe."

As to the proclamation of the king of Great Britain, requiring the return of his subjects, and particularly the seamen, from foreign countries, it was no more than every government has a right to issue, and commonly does issue, in time of war. This proclamation contained no evidence of *increasing* danger to "our seamen;" on the contrary, if I mistake not (for I have not the proclamation by me) there was a solemn, public injunction to his naval officers to conduct impressments with increased caution and care. So that impressments would probably rather be diminished than increased.

Let us now examine the three other papers, all of which, as I have noticed, and as gentlemen remember, related to the decree of November 21, 1806. This decree was issued at Berlin, by the French emperor, at the moment when, inflated with more than ordinary arrogance and pride, he was sitting in that capital of the Prussian monarchy, just then subverted by his arms.

The first article declared all the British Isles in a state of blockade. This, according to its terms, subjected to capture and condemnation all neutral vessels bound to and from British ports: but it seems to have been held in a state of suspence. But another article, declaring "all merchandise belonging to England, or coming from its manufactories and colonies (although belonging to neutrals) to be lawful prize," was to be carried into execution. Such was the decision of the emperor, as stated by his minister of justice on the 18th of September, 1807, in his letter to Champagny. This decision coming to the knowledge of general Armstrong, he, on the 24th of September, wrote to Mr. Champagny, and asked "whether it was the emperor's intention to infract the obligations of the treaty subsisting between the United States and the French empire." Mr. Champagny in his answer of the 7th of October, inclosing the letter of the minister of justice, with wonderful assurance, tells general Armstrong, that it was easy to reconcile the execution of the decree with the observance of treaties! although nothing was more obvious, (as Mr. Madison on the 8th of February

last, wrote to general Armstrong) than that it violated as well the positive stipulations of our treaty with France, as the incontestable principles of public law.

In the European ports, under the emperor's controul, and even in neutral ports, the decree was rigorously executed. And although it is said there was no formal decision in the French council of prizes, condemning American property, under the decree, till the 16th of October, 1807; yet Mr. Madison states, as early as the 22d of May, 1807, [in his letter of that date to general Armstrong] that "there were proofs that the French West India privateers had, *under colour of the edict* [the Berlin decree,] committed depredations" on our commerce. And moreover, that Spain "avowedly pursuing the example and the views of the French emperor," had issued a similar decree, and even in broader terms, which, "if not speedily recalled or corrected, would doubtless extend the scene of spoliations *already begun in that quarter.*"

Such were the French papers in this case. And now let us see the amount of "the GREAT and INCREASING dangers which threatened our vessels, our seamen and merchandise."

In the letter of February 8, 1808, from Mr. Madison to general Armstrong, speaking of the Berlin decree, and the emperor's decision thereon, Mr. Madison says, "The conduct of the French government, in giving this extended operation to its decree, and indeed in issuing one with such an apparent or doubtful import, against the rights of the sea, is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the *inability* to enforce it on that element, exhibited the measure in the light of an "*empty menace*!" And in his letter of the 25th of March, 1808, to Mr. Erskine, Mr. Madison, speaking of the same decree, says, that France was *without the means to carry it into effect against the rights and obligations of a neutral nation.*

Thus then we see the president's "great and increasing dangers with which our vessels, our seamen and merchandise were threatened on the high seas and elsewhere," from the French decree and its extended operation, rested on what he, through his secretary Mr. Madison, has since pronounced "an empty menace," a project "which France had not the means to carry into effect!"

Shall I be told, Mr. president, of the British orders of council? and that *they* were comprehended in the president's view of the great and increasing dangers to which our commerce was exposed? If that were the fact, was it not his duty to give such information of them as he possessed, to the senate? He gave none. I know that those orders were *afterwards* pressed into his service to justify the measure: and still later it has been confidently said "that those orders stood in front of the real causes of the embargo:" And yet they were invisible to the senate. What! the *great*, the *operative* cause of the embargo, "before which all other motives sunk into insignificance," not seen, not known to the senate? Not glanced at by the president in his message, nor intimated to any of the members who were honored with his confidence, and by them to the senate?



But from reasoning I will recur to written proofs, furnished by the president himself, and now on our tables.

In Mr. Madison's letter to Mr. Pinkney, the president's minister in London, dated December 23, 1807, the next day after the act laying an embargo was passed ; and this after it had undergone three days of earnest opposition in the house of representatives....during which it behoved the father of the measure, and his friends, to furnish every possible argument to silence opposition, and to satisfy the nation of its expediency and necessity....after all this, Mr. Madison in that letter, tells Mr. Pinkney, that " the *policy* and the *causes* of the measure are explained in the message itself." The contents of the message (comprehending the papers it referred to) I have already stated : and the statement demonstrates, that *they* were *not* the *causes* or *motives* of the embargo : for an " empty menace," a *decree without the means of carrying it into effect*, could be no *cause*, no *motive* for a measure, whose *avowed* object was " to save our vessels, our seamen, and merchandise from GREAT and INCREASING DANGERS."

Sir, let all the documents laid on our tables by the president be examined, and you will not find one in which he hazards the assertion, that the British orders of November 11th were known to him at the time he recommended the embargo, or that an expectation of them determined his recommendation. It was not until the 2d of February, when they had been officially communicated by the British minister, that he offered them to congress " as a *farther* proof of the increasing dangers to our navigation and commerce, which led to the provident measure of the act laying an embargo." And Mr. Madison, in his letter to Mr. Pinkney, of February 19, 1808, cautiously avoids ascribing the *origin* of the embargo to the British orders ; though, he says, the probability of such decrees was among the considerations which " enforced" the measure ; the language of the British gazettes, with other indications, having (he said, left little doubt that such orders were " meditated." And he adds, that " the appearance of these decrees (meaning the British orders) had much effect in reconciling all descriptions among us to the embargo."

But I must notice the change of language in Mr. Madison's last letter. In that of December 23d to Mr. Pinkney, he says, " the *policy* and the *causes* of the embargo are explained in the president's message." But in his letter of February 19th, he says, " my last (that of December 23d) inclosed a copy of the act of embargo, and explained the *policy* of the measure ;" leaving out " causes," and introducing the *unknown British orders* as among the considerations which *enforced* it.

The president, too, in his answer to the Boston petition for suspending the embargo, says, *not* that the British orders were *known to exist* at the time when the embargo was laid ; but only that *they were in existence* at the date of the law ; from which the unwary reader might suppose that they were *known to exist* at that date.

From all these considerations, it appears to be demonstrated, that the British orders, which were the cause of the embargo, were not known to exist at the time when the embargo was laid ; but only that they were in existence at the date of the law ; from which the unwary reader might suppose that they were known to exist at that date.

not known, and that the newspaper rumors concerning them never entered into the views of the president and congress, as a motive for laying the embargo. And here the well known maxim applies, *de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est lex*. Although the British orders *were in existence*, yet as they were *not known to exist*, they were, as to the embargo, non-entities.

The conclusions resulting from the facts and circumstances which I have collected and compared, are serious and alarming. They demonstrate, that the representation, in the president's message recommending the embargo, was delusive, calculated to lead congress into the belief that the situation of the United States, in relation to France and England, was extremely perilous, requiring the instant adoption of the measure recommended. And as congress did adopt it, enacting the law recommended, it must be presumed that they believed an embargo was necessary to preserve our vessels, our seamen and merchandise, from *great and increasing dangers*, with which the message stated that they were threatened.

It also follows, as no subsequent disclosure has been made of other dangers known at the time the message was communicated, *that the real cause or motive for the embargo has been, and yet is, veiled from the eye of congress and the nation*.

M. Champagny's letter of October 7, (one of the papers communicated with the president's message) requires examination. But I should first remark, that during the years 1806, and 1807, in order to reduce England, *by destroying her commerce*, the French emperor, in execution of, and in the spirit of his Berlin decree, ordered all English merchandise to be seized and confiscated, in every place on the European continent, enemy or neutral, occupied or which should be occupied by the French armies. For this purpose, and as one instance among many, his troops took possession of the city of Hamburg (a city with which American merchants carried on a large and valuable commerce, and which as *neutral* was entitled to the same exemption from hostile violence as the territory of the United States) and by the emperor's orders, Bourrienne, his accredited minister to that free city, addressed a note to its senate, in which, having stated that every person who traded on the continent in English merchandise, seconded the views of England, and ought to be considered as her accomplice; and that a great portion of the inhabitants of Hamburg were in that predicament, and notoriously attached to England; the emperor caused possession to be taken of their city, and his Berlin decree to be carried into rigorous execution. Accordingly, that minister, in obedience to the emperor's orders, among other outrages, declared, "All English merchandises that may be found in the city, in the harbour, or on the territory of Hamburg, *no matter to whom they belong*, shall be confiscated." This was done so early as the 24th of November, 1806, only three days after the Berlin decree was issued.

With equal atrocity the emperor caused to be seized and sequestered the vessels and cargoes of neutrals which were brought into, or voluntarily resorted to the ports of France for purposes of lawful trade. And we know from a source which will not be questioned,

that their liberation was hopeless ; *because they were worth eighteen or twenty millions of dollars.*

Of the vast property thus plundered, a large portion belongs to citizens of the United States. On the 15th of January last, the emperor's minister Champagny, wrote to our minister, general Armstrong, that their property would remain sequestered until a decision should be had thereon ; and this decision depended *on our associating or refusing to associate ourselves with him and his allied states in their war with Great Britain.* Indeed the emperor was willing to save us the trouble of considering and deciding for ourselves : he declared war for us. " War exists then in fact between England and the United States," are the words of Champagny, in the letter just mentioned ! What measures ought to be kept with such a Power ? While we are yet independent, he undertakes to prescribe the line of conduct we shall observe, on pain of confiscation of all the property of our innocent and unsuspecting merchants within his grasp ! And this monstrous outrage upon our honour and independence, the secretary of state, with very exemplary meekness, says, " had the air, at least, of an assumed authority !"\*

Where his armies did not thus penetrate and plunder, the French emperor sent to the several powers on the continent, whether emperors, kings, or petty states, requiring (or which from him was equivalent to a command, *inviting*) them *to shut their ports against the commerce of England*; and, Sweden excepted (between whom and the French armies lay a narrow sea guarded by Swedish and British ships) all obeyed. Even the emperor of Austria, though at peace with England, shut against her his two or three little ports at the head of the Adriatic sea.

The prince regent of Portugal, whose country for more than a century had lived in friendship with England, was the last to obey. But though he shut his ports, national faith and gratitude towards his friends, forbade his arresting Englishmen and English merchandise. By shutting his ports, he hoped to appease the emperor, and save his kingdom. But his fate had been determined : although Portugal had for many years been paying a heavy tribute to France, and been, moreover, anxious to observe the duties of a neutral nation. To save himself and family from disgrace and bondage, the prince quitted his kingdom ; finding an asylum in his American dominions.

Thus we have seen the French emperor not only shutting his own ports and those of his allies, but even those of neutral states, against British commerce ; and seizing and confiscating the merchandise proceeding from England and her colonies, although belonging to neutrals, and on neutral territories ; and that this unexampled scene of devastation commenced within four days after the Berlin decree was issued.

It was after she had witnessed all these atrocities, and seen the deadly weapon aimed at her vitals, that England issued her retaliating orders of November 11th, 1807.

\* Mr. Madison's letter of May 2d. 1808. to general Armstrong

I now recur to Mr. Champagny's letter of October 7, to general Armstrong, in answer to his inquiry, "whether (in executing the Berlin decree) it was his majesty's intention to infract the obligations of the treaty now subsisting between the United States and the French empire?" The answer to which has been already recited.

Allow me to repeat, that this letter of Champagny was one of the four papers communicated by the president with his message recommending the embargo, and one of the two which, after being read, was not then suffered to remain on the files of the senate, but was returned to the president, together with general Armstrong's letter to which it was an answer, agreeably to his request. Subsequent events drew it from the cabinet. Gentlemen will also recollect, that the concluding paragraph of the president's message, in which he desired a return of those two letters, was ordered by the senate to be omitted; so that no evidence of the existence of those letters could appear on the senate's journal, or in the printed copy. In this letter of Champagny, the views of the French emperor were but two clearly indicated. To render his degree of blockade "more effectual" (that is in destroying the commerce of England) "its execution must be complete." But as it could not be complete while the vessels of the United States (then with those of England carrying on, almost exclusively, the commerce of the world) continued their extensive trade with England; we were, in language sufficiently intelligible, invited to fall into the imperial ranks, with the maritime powers of Europe, whom the French emperor had marshalled against England, and "to unite in support of the same cause;" that is, to destroy the commerce of England. But the people of the United States would have been shocked at an open proposition to shut their ports against the English commerce, at the command, or invitation of the French emperor; they would not have endured it. The measure could be accomplished only by an EMBARGO, and that wrapped up in the mystery which I have endeavoured to unfold.

This letter of Champagny must have arrived in the *Revenge*; and general Armstrong's dispatches by her, reached Washington, as Mr. Madison informs us, on the 14th of December; and on the 18th the embargo was proposed and recommended! Four days gave little enough time to digest and mature SUCH A PLAN!

These, sir, are my views of the origin of the embargo; the result of a careful, and I trust, an impartial investigation. The material facts are on record. Of my reasonings and conclusions gentlemen will judge. If these be correct, the course to be pursued must be obvious. The *nation's honour* is compatible with the repeal of the embargo. The welfare of our country is not to be sacrificed to the views or feelings of those who have brought it into its present situation.

Let then, the resolution before us be adopted, and the embargo removed. As the British orders in council were not the *cause* of the embargo, the *honour* of the United States is not pledged for



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MR. GILES' SPEECH

IN THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

ON THE

RESOLUTION OFFERED BY MR. HILLHOUSE

TO

REPEAL THE SEVERAL ACTS LAYING AN EMBARGO,

DECEMBER 2, 1808.

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*MR. PRESIDENT,*

I SINCERELY regret, sir, to find myself driven again into this debate ; whilst every feeling of my heart admonishes me to retirement. I sincerely wish to retire, not only from this debate, but from the political world. I am now acting only in obedience to a sense of duty. I shall, however, limit my remarks to as few objects as may be consistent with this obligation. They will principally relate to facts, which, in my judgment, have been incorrectly stated ; and of course require correction. The first fact, to which I shall call the attention of the senate, is the one stated by the gentleman from Connecticut, [Mr. Hillhouse] and repeated by the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Pickering] that the non-importation act was an obstruction to an amicable adjustment with Great Britain. Both the gentlemen have stated that Great Britain would not treat with this rod suspended over her head ; I assert, on the other hand, that she did treat with this rod suspended over her head, and that its suspension was continued at the request of the British commissioners. Now, sir, let us resort to the evidence. This will be found in the correspondence from Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, to Mr. Madison. Speaking of

lord Holland, these gentlemen tell us, he said, "That in the mean time we could state to our government, what was unquestionably true, that those with whom we were treating were diligently and anxiously employed, in endeavours to devise an arrangement which should be convenient and honourable to us, and at the same time free from improper hazard to Great Britain ; that it appeared to him that the actual pendency of the negotiations here, unless their sincerity were distrusted, as he was sure it would not be, would furnish an adequate motive to Congress, for merely postponing the commencement of a law which was originally a very strong measure, and would certainly, if allowed to go into operation at a moment when Great Britain was affording, in the face of the world, an unequivocal demonstration of her wish to remove every ground of misunderstanding between us, acquire a character of extreme harshness ; that it was greatly to be lamented that the discussions in which we were now engaged, had not been sooner begun ; but that knowing, as we did, to what cause the delay was to be ascribed, we knew also, that it was unavoidable."

"To these details we take the liberty to add our opinion, formed upon a careful view of the whole subject, that it would be proper upon the meeting of congress in December, to suspend the act for prohibiting the importation of certain articles of British manufacture, so as to afford farther time for the completion of the negotiations which it evidently presumes and which are now in train."

"The ground which congress have taken in this just and salutary measure, we are far from wishing to abandon ; but to suspend and to abandon it are very different things. The last would wound deeply the honour of the nation, and prostrate the character of the government ; but the first is in perfect conformity with the spirit and purpose of the law, and while it would furnish a signal proof of the equity and moderation of our public councils, would preserve unimpaired, that firm and dignified attitude which it becomes us at all times, but now especially, to maintain. The suspension will be so far from relinquishing the measure or weakening its effect, that it will distinctly imply a re-assertion of its principle and policy, and an unshaken resolution to act upon and enforce it, as soon as negotiation shall have been sufficiently and unsuccessfully tried."

Our ministers here state, that *a suspension of this act* was all that was required by the British commissioners. We also know, that the commissioners of both sides, did go on to negotiate, and that a treaty was concluded on, without its being once intimated, that this act formed the smallest obstruction to the negotiation ; or had any influence in the smallest degree injurious to the provisions of the treaty. But, sir, I think this act facilitated and accelerated the negotiation. It will be recollected that before the passage of this act, every effort of our minister to negotiate had been either avoided or refused, and at the time of passing the law, the nego-

riation was itself entirely suspended.\* After its passage you will find, by attending to the correspondence just read, every disposition was manifested by the British commissioners to accelerate the negotiations; and every pledge of sincerity on their part to that effect was given, to induce our government here, to suspend the law merely to give time for completing the negotiation. I cannot place my hand on the note of the British commissioners requesting the American ministers to furnish them with a copy of the act; but in that note, to the best of my recollection, may be seen the real cause of the anxiety of the British commissioners, for the further suspension of that act. It was the injurious effect the measure was calculated to have on the commerce of Great Britain, if it once should go into operation; and it was this they were anxious to prevent. This act appears to have been viewed by the British commissioners, precisely in the light in which it was seen here by the favourers of the measure. Its character and operation answered every expectation. It produced a treaty; and I regret, sir, that the provisions of the treaty were not such as to justify its ratification. I am aware the gentleman told us, that he paid but little respect to the representations of our ministers; but, sir, they ought certainly to be respected; or we ought to abandon the policy of having ministers at foreign courts. In this case, however, there was the less reason for disrespecting their communications, because they have been some time published; and neither disrespected nor contradicted by the British commissioners. In this case too, sir, it is not necessary to resort to this evidence exclusively in proof of this fact. It is proved by the note of the British commissioners, read by the gentleman himself. Let us review that note, and see what information it gives.

“September 4, 1806.

“On a full consideration of that act, we think it our duty to express our earnest hope and expectation, that some means may be found to suspend the execution of a measure so opposite, in its temper and tendency, to the disposition and views with which our pending negotiation has been commenced and is carrying on.”

Here, sir, is a request merely to *suspend the execution of this act, &c.* which is the only rod that gentlemen complain so much of here, but which was no further complained of by the British commissioners. The true reason of their anxiety for this suspension I have before stated. Now, sir, how does this fact stand? Why, that the British commissioners did treat with this rod suspended over their heads; and so far from its having had any injurious influence on the negotiations, it probably had a beneficial one. The gentlemen then, are utterly mistaken in this fact. For, sir, whether it touched the pride or affected the sensibility of Great Britain or not, she unquestionably did treat with this same rod suspended over her head.

\* See note at the end.

The next subject I shall mention is, the attempt to reproach the president for his instructions respecting the impressment of American seamen. This is an attempt, sir, which really excited my astonishment. Let us critically examine the circumstances, under which these instructions were given. The basis of our late negotiations at London, was laid in the senate. What did the senate say to the president upon the subject of the impressment of American seamen? Let me read a part of their resolution upon that subject: "and to enter into such arrangements with the British government, on this and all other differences subsisting between the two nations, (and particularly respecting the impressment of American seamen,) as may be consistent with the honour and interests of the United States, and manifest their earnest desire to obtain for themselves and their citizens by amicable negotiation, that justice to which they are entitled."

Here, sir, we find the senate, not content with intermingling the safety of our seamen with the other objects of the resolution, manifest a laudable solicitude upon this subject, by calling the president's attention to it in a special manner, "*and particularly respecting the impressment of American seamen,*" say the senate, both these gentlemen voting in favour of the resolution: and now when instructions are given in strict conformity with this special injunction, the gentlemen come forward with the most indignant reproaches for this conduct. The ground of objection is stated to be, that the president instructed our ministers to insist, that the American flag should protect all persons sailing *in fact under its protection*; when the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Pickering] with an irascibility of temper the most wonderful, tells us that the president *knew* that the British government would not accede to the proposition; and then ascribes to the president the unworthy motive of intending thereby to defeat the objects of the negotiation. It is necessary to restrain the feelings in replying to this groundless and unworthy insinuation. But, sir, I will tell the gentleman, that the president *knew* no such thing; that the gentleman himself *knew* no such thing, until the experiment was made. Indeed, there was one time, during the negotiation, when there was a great probability that it would succeed. But, sir, whether the proposition would succeed or not, the president, acting under the recommendation of the senate, and particularly of this very gentleman, was bound to make the experiment; especially, sir, when he offered the British commissioners to make their own terms for securing to themselves the service of their own seamen. But, sir, why not make the proposition? Is it because it is not our right? Is it because it is not just? No: that is not pretended: but because the president *knew* that the British government would not accede to the proposition, just or unjust. Now, sir, for one, I am not disposed to indulge the British government in this capricious



outrage upon our unquestionable rights. But, sir, the president was bound to make the experiment, and was bound never to admit the British pretension ; if he thought *that* the only arrangement competent to the protection of American seamen from impressment. Yes, sir, and if the president had given no instructions upon this point, this same gentleman would have been as liberal in his reproaches as he now is ; and they would have been much more merited. This singular freak of passionate invective is, to me, unaccountable. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) gives me great credit for my candor, in ascribing the commercial prosperity of the United States to the British treaty. The gentleman is entirely mistaken in this statement. I admitted the fact of our commercial prosperity ; but I ascribed it to its proper causes, to wit, the encouragements given to it by the government, and the enterprize and talents of our fellow citizens. I am willing to admit that the British treaty had not so baneful an effect upon society, as to have prevented this commercial prosperity ; but it is the last cause to which, I think, it can properly be attributed. If however, sir, I had really been convinced, or supposed, that the British treaty had been instrumental in producing that effect, I should have no hesitation in admitting the fact, notwithstanding my opposition to it. I am very far from deeming my opinions infallible : I have often experienced their fallibility : and whenever I shall be convinced of an error, I shall feel no difficulty in avowing the conviction.

The next circumstance, to which I shall advert, is the extraordinary suggestion, that the embargo is intended to be made permanent. This is a most singular notion ; and nothing but the respect I feel for the candor and sincerity of the gentlemen who suggest it, could induce me to believe that they are in earnest. I really before thought, Mr. President, it was merely what I should call an electioneering watch-word. I never expected that it could have had any operation beyond the electioneering ground. No, sir, the embargo is not intended to be permanent. But, sir, let us wait a little while, before we make ourselves bloody in the wars of Europe. Let us have a little patience, a little self-denial. I am as much opposed to a permanent embargo as either of the gentlemen from Massachusetts or Connecticut : I think the idea perfectly absurd. I am as ready to fight for the *birthright* of the ocean as either of the gentlemen. But, sir, I never will consent to raise the embargo, until some measures shall be substituted, better calculated to assert and maintain our national rights and national independence ; measures of more activity and more energy. I am not certain, sir, that this is not the time for their adoption ; but, sir, no great mischief can arise from waiting a little longer ; waiting events in Europe, now in a state of rapid succession.

The next fact suggested, which I shall notice, is, that the embargo has arrested and destroyed commerce. I think very dif-

ferently : I think it has been, and still is, a shield interposed for the protection of commerce. French edicts and British orders would have destroyed commerce ; but the embargo, I hope, has saved it. It is very easy to say that the embargo destroyed commerce ; because it was the act immediately preceding its suspension, and is easily resorted to as the proximate cause : but there is such a thing as an original or primitive cause : this was the French edicts and British orders. These would have *caused* its entire destruction ; but they *caused* the embargo, which *caused* the suspension of commerce, and has, I hope, shielded it from destruction.

The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Pickering] has taken great pains to shew that the orders of council had no influence in producing the embargo laws. I think this circumstance of no sort of consequence to the community, but the gentleman seems to think it is of the last importance to himself individually. It probably is ; I suppose he stands committed to the public upon that fact. I was not present at the time of passing the first embargo law ; but the gentleman's labor has perfectly convinced me, that he is utterly mistaken in the fact. Let me critically examine the gentleman's evidence. First, he says, that the orders are not mentioned in the president's message ; and secondly, that the secretary of state refers Mr. Pinkney to the president's message for the causes of the embargo laws. I have examined the president's message, and think it perfectly correct, the gentleman's angry invectives to the contrary notwithstanding. I do not believe the gentleman could now frame as good a one, after all the lights, which time and a farther disclosure of events have shed upon the subject. Permit me now, Mr. President, to call your attention in a particular manner to the contents of this message. " The communications now made, shewing the great and increasing dangers, with which our vessels, our seamen and merchandise, are threatened on the high seas and elsewhere from the *belligerent powers of Europe*, and it being of the greatest importance to keep in safety these essential resources, &c. &c." Now sir, what were the communications accompanying this message ? The correspondence between Mr. Armstrong and Mr. Champagny, shewing that the Berlin decree was in a state of execution, which had before been suspended in its operation in relation to the United States. But, says the gentleman, no papers were communicated respecting these orders of council, and therefore the gentleman infers that no apprehensions existed, which could influence this transaction. I draw a very different inference from the message itself. I presume the communication of this hostile act of France, so immediately after it was known to the executive, and avoiding a direct reference to the apprehended hostility of Great Britain, could not be conceived to be an act of favoritism towards France. That some hostile act from Great Britain was in contemplation, is most evident from the message itself. From what quarters does the message say that great and increasing dangers are

threatened to our vessels, our seamen and merchandise? *From the belligerents of Europe.* Here is no exception. The belligerents of Europe, mean *all the belligerents.* If the president conceived there were no dangers threatened from any other quarter than France, he would have used the term *France*; not the *belligerents of Europe.* But why communicate the evidence of his apprehensions from France, and not from Great Britain, if he entertained any? Why, sir, for the most obvious reason imaginable; because the information from France was official. The information from Great Britain was not. It was contained in newspapers only, which were in the hands of every gentleman; and their contents every gentleman could appreciate, as well as the president. Now, sir, under these circumstances, was not the message of the president perfectly correct? Let me ask the gentleman, if he can now mend it? If, sir, the president in his message, had communicated this newspaper information, respecting the apprehended hostility of the British government, what a glorious theme of invective would have been afforded the gentleman, of favoritism to France and hostility against Great Britain? The omission, however, to do this, could not screen the president from the same angry reproaches. If the gentleman will impartially review all these circumstances, and then turn his eyes towards his own heart, he will find that the errors he has so uncharitably ascribed to the president, will be found in his own unhappy, ungovernable passions. But, sir, this is not all. I will now refer the gentleman to some evidence to shew the incorrectness of the assertion he has made; evidence which he cannot deny, because it comes from his own words, and was attended with such circumstances in the face of this senate, that it cannot be mistaken. In the gentleman's passionate zeal yesterday, he told us, that no time was allowed in the senate for the discussion of the original embargo law; but that it was discussed in the house of representatives; and the principal arguments urged there in favor of the measure were drawn from the hostile acts of Great Britain. The gentleman said, that it was urged in that house that the measure would starve Great Britain; that it would bring her to our feet, &c. &c. Now, sir, why these arguments in that house, if there were no apprehended acts of hostility from Great Britain? They would have been strange arguments, if the only hostile acts inducing the measure, were the hostile acts of France, not of Great Britain.

[Mr. Pickering rose to explain; he said he mentioned these circumstances yesterday, to shew the effects expected from the measure by the friends of it; in which they had been mistaken. He did not speak of them, as inducements to the measure.]

I readily admit that the gentleman, at the time of making these observations, was intirely insensible of their irresistible operation in establishing a fact, which he thinks so important to himself to disprove; and in my judgment, sir, they do unquestionably prove that these British orders, or the apprehensions of them, stood in the front of the inducements to the original embar-

go law. Sir, were not these arguments in the house of representatives immediate results from these inducements? And what was the actual state of the facts? Why, sir, that although the orders were not received in such an official form as to justify their communication by the president; the intention to issue them was announced in the newspapers with so many marks of probability, as justly to excite apprehensions in the government for the safety of our seamen and commerce, and to justify the measure for the protection of both. It has been proved, not only that this information was published in newspapers before the passage of the act in the senate; but the gentleman will recollect, that it did not pass the house of representatives for two or three days after it had passed the senate: it was therefore very natural, that the longer these apprehensions were felt, the stronger would be the inducements to the measure deduced from them; and hence the character of the discussions in that house described by the gentleman. But the gentleman seems to think, that apprehensions are not correct grounds for legislation. In ordinary cases it is admitted; but this was an extraordinary case. The measure was precautionary, and if these apprehensions had not been realized, it would at any time have been in the power of the government to dispense with the precaution; whereas if congress had waited for a formal authentication of the orders, their intended object would have been answered, and the precautionary measure rendered unnecessary. But, sir, I think this explanation of very little consequence to the nation. It can be of little consequence to ascertain whether the adoption of the embargo was a lucky hit or a dictate of wisdom; and I should not have taken the trouble of this examination, if the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Pickering] had not availed himself of this occasion, to assail the reputation of his late colleague [Mr. Adams]; a gentleman who represented the state of Massachusetts with so much honor to himself, and advantage to the state, and the nation; upon a point too, in which the gentleman here present, has put himself so clearly in the wrong from his own shewing. I had hoped, Mr. President, that the gentleman would have so far restrained his feelings, as to have permitted this gentleman's retirement to have shielded him from these unmerited reproaches; but it now seems that no delicacy of situation can procure an exemption from the inveteracy of the gentleman's passions. This cruel attack has imposed upon me an indispensable obligation to defend this absent gentleman; and it has been principally this circumstance, which has driven me again most reluctantly into this debate. Sir, I can attest, and now do attest with great pleasure, the disinterestedness and purity of the motives which dictated that gentleman's [Mr. Adams] late political conduct. As to its wisdom, that is matter of opinion, and now in a course of experiment; but as to his exemption from all views of personal promotion, or aggrandizement, I here assert that fact, upon my own knowledge and upon my own responsibility, as far as can be



warranted by the most explicit and unequivocal assurances from the gentleman himself; given too under circumstances which render their sincerity unquestionable. It gives me great pleasure to defend this absent gentleman, not only on account of his innocence of these reproaches, but on account of his merits, his virtues and his talents, which, in my judgment, place him on so high a ground, as not to induce a wish, on his part, to shrink from any comparison with either of the five worthies of Massachusetts, of whom we have been informed by the gentleman [Mr. Pickering.]

Permit me now, sir, to proceed with the discussion. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Pickering] proceeds to tell us, that Mr. Rose was sent here as a messenger of peace; that he brought the olive branch in his hand, but that it was designedly refused by the administration, and of course a subject of serious reproach and lamentation. Sir, I do not know what Mr. Rose brought in his hand; he never would tell the government what he brought. But let me ask the gentleman, what he left behind him? The gentleman has furnished me with an apposite figure. He left behind him, a rod in pickle for us. He left behind him these very orders of council, which were designedly concealed from him; although they had been long deliberated upon, and were matured before he left London; and were actually issued almost as soon as he lost sight of the land. If, therefore, he brought in his hand the olive branch, he certainly left concealed behind him the scourge of our commerce. Yes, sir, it was the besom which was intended to sweep, and would have swept our commerce from the face of the ocean. And the gentleman tells us in a tone of lamentation, that when Mr. Rose arrived here he was met by the embargo. Yes, sir, the judicious vigilance of the government had saved our commerce from the destructive influence of these concealed orders of council. Could you have supposed, Mr. President, that this would have been a subject of lamentation to any American citizen? Could you have supposed, sir, that it could have been made the subject of reproach against the administration? Could you have supposed, sir, that the most jaundiced passions could have deluded any American citizen so far, as to commit himself upon such a charge? Sir, we differ so much in our facts, that it would be more wonderful if we should agree, than differ, in our conclusions. Is there a gentleman here, sir, prepared to say, that this is not a correct statement of facts? And if it is, what is the result? Why, simply, that Great Britain had, in the most insidious manner, issued orders for the entire destruction of our commerce; and that our government had completely disappointed their iniquitous object, by interposing the embargo for its protection.

But, sir, the gentleman, not content with the profusion of his invectives against the administration collectively, and the absent gentleman, whom I have defended with great pleasure, has directed his bitterest resentments against the secretary of state, individually:

He, sir, has ventured to accuse the secretary of insincerity in his diplomatic correspondence. Permit me to tell that gentleman, that the secretary of state is incapable of an act of insincerity, either as a man or a politician. The gentleman himself, sir, has been secretary of state ; and even in the phrensy of his passions, it is wonderful to me he did not see, that he was forcing himself into a most disadvantageous comparison. I think the instances of insincerity he has quoted partake nothing of that character. I think them perfectly proper, the gentleman's angry criticisms to the contrary notwithstanding. Let us attend particularly to the instances quoted. The first is, that the secretary had told the British minister, that the Berlin decree, so far as it professed to place all the British Isles in a state of blockade, was an empty menace. Now let me ask the gentleman if that was not, and is not, the fact? I believe that no gentleman is more strongly impressed with the truth of this fact, nor rejoices more in its truth, than the gentleman himself: But the gentleman infers, if this decree was a mere empty menace, as it respects the blockading the whole British Isles, it could not furnish any inducement to the measure of the embargo. I differ entirely with the gentleman in his inference. The Berlin decree, after it was put into a state of execution against the United States, would operate very differently upon the defenceless American commerce spread along the French coast, from its operation as forming the blockade of the British Isles ; and therefore would be, as it in fact was, an empty menace in that case ; whilst it would have a most serious effect in the other ; and would certainly furnish a just inducement to the government for the protection of the exposed commerce of the United States. Here then, sir, I see a perfectly correct sentiment without any mark of insincerity upon it.

But, sir, the gentleman has brought into view another act of insincerity. Let that be also examined. The gentleman complains, that our ministers in London were instructed to tell the British minister only of the precautionary object of the embargo laws ; and of course leave their coercive object to be inferred by the British minister. This was both polite and proper. It was an instruction to our ministers in fact, to avoid touching the sensibility of the British minister and nation. What would the gentleman have done himself, sir? Would he, because there were two objects in passing the law, have instructed our ministers to have pressed both upon the British commissioners, although one of them would have touched their national pride, and sensibility? This was unnecessary, and would not have been very urbane. It would have been an outrage upon every principle of diplomatic delicacy. I cannot therefore see the ground of objection to this instruction, unless it is, that the secretary of state has not taken the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Pickering] for his model; that he had not resorted to some of the gentleman's bold meta-

phorical flourishes ; that he did not instruct our ministers to tell the British, " that the tiger crouches before he leaps upon his prey." Yes, sir, I am extremely happy to behold the striking contrast exhibited between the former, and present secretary of state ; a contrast so highly honorable to the present secretary. Indeed, sir, I am the more astonished at the gentleman's driving us into this comparison, so unfortunate to himself, when he must know, or certainly ought to know, that his own inveterate passions utterly incapacitated him from the discharge of the duties of that office, and finally expelled him from it. The gentleman seems to be still harping upon the miserable tale of French influence. I suppose he also, unfortunately stands committed upon that idle suggestion. Sir, insinuations of this nature are degrading to the national character ; and I always feel a condescension in being compelled to make a reply. Indeed, sir, it is necessary to impose strong restraints upon the feelings in making the reply the suggestion deserves.

But, sir, the gentleman, so intent, I suppose, upon his own self-justification, that he has manifested great labor and ingenuity in making a collection of scraps from the numerous documents before us ; from which he has attempted to infer, not only that the executive department was acting under French influence, but that this honorable body was also acting under the same influence.... yes, sir, the body of which the gentleman himself is a member. Yet, sir, the gentleman knows, notwithstanding his jealousies, his surmises, and his inferences, that it is impossible ; that the fact is not so. Let me ask that gentleman, if he is prepared to say in his place, that any one member of this body, or that this body itself, is acting under French influence, or any improper influence ? The gentleman must have too much respect for himself to make such an unfounded assertion. Why then, sir, all this labor at surmise, suspicion, and inference ? I leave the gentleman to answer this question. Equally unfounded are the miserable intimations towards the executive.

Let me ask the gentleman, through what channel his unhappy, suspicious mind has taught him to suppose, that these dark, these invisible negotiations could be carried on ? I suppose he would necessarily reply through Mr. Armstrong, our minister in Paris. Yet Mr. Armstrong has lately retrieved himself entirely from the gentleman's delusive suspicions. We are now told, Mr. Armstrong is a patriot ; follow his advice. Again, sir, let me ask the gentleman, if he has heard any apology for the hostile conduct of France, either in this house, or any where else ? Has not every person declared, that the conduct was hostility itself ? Mr. President, whether the gentleman intended to make insinuations, or inferences, or surmises, or suspicions, or assertions, if he pleases, of French influence, as operating either upon the executive, or upon this body, I here in my place do pronounce the whole to be utterly

unfounded. But, sir, the gentleman boldly says, there is something concealed. I really should like to know what it is that he supposes can be concealed : I should really like to know, what witchcraft it is that has continually tortured the gentleman's mind with these unhappy, fantastic delusions. No, sir, there is nothing concealed : there is too much exposed ; for, sir, in the present whirlpool of inordinate passions, all honorable confidence seems to be disrespected. I will not accuse this gentleman of acting under British influence : \* I feel too much respect for the American character to do so. I hope and trust he is not. I am willing to admit that his views are American. But, sir, this consideration will not deter me from expressing my wonder and astonishment at the extraordinary views that the gentleman takes of American interests ; first, in the unremitting labor he has taken to put his own government in the wrong upon every point of discussion between it and the British government ; and in his strange misrepresentation or total disregard of facts ; of outrages, sir, upon our dearest rights, by the British government ; outrages which ought to rouse every American feeling into action. Secondly, in the comparative view he has taken of the hostile acts of France and Great Britain. Sir, he has used every effort to magnify, if possible, French aggressions ; whilst he has faintly admitted British aggressions, and even palliated or excused them. Let us now see, sir, what is the true character of aggressions which are treated with so much tenderness ? Sir, I said the other day, and I have not heard it contradicted, and I say again to-day, that the British government seizes and confiscates our vessels engaged in a lawful trade : that she has attempted, by an act of parliament, to colonize and tax us : that she has, in the same manner, undertaken to exercise acts of national sovereignty solemnly given by the people to congress : that she has undertaken to exercise an act of legislation over the people of the United States refused to congress, and retained to themselves in their highest sovereign capacity. Are these facts denied ? No, sir : if true, let me ask the gentleman, what can be worse ? what can be more injurious to our interests, or derogatory to our national character ? what can the French do, that is worse than this ? Nothing, sir : these acts form the climax of outrages. But, sir, the gentleman tells us, that the French emperor has said, there shall be no neutrals. I do not know whether he has used that identical expression or not. I believe it is not the expression in the paper to which the gentleman alludes. But, sir, suppose it is : what then ? Is the gentleman so ready to obey the mandate of the French emperor, as to take part in the war, because he orders him to do so ? I did not think the gentleman would take the yoke so quietly. In effect, both Great Britain and France have said, there shall be no neutrals ; and I care nothing for the form of expression. The first declaration to that effect, which I have seen, is contained in the polite note of lords Holland and Auckland, at-

\* See note at the end.



tached to the late unratified treaty. The language in effect is, if you do not make war on France, we will reserve to ourselves the right to make war on you, according to this treaty of *amity and commerce*. But, sir, because these two great belligerents command us to take part in their wars, are we bound to obey their cruel mandates? Are we to abandon the right of judging of our own interests and policy? I am disposed to think they will ultimately drive us into their wars; but let us keep out of them as long as we think our own interests and policy require the recession.

The gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Hillhouse] has attempted to place our situation in a ludicrous point of view; he asks how are we to fight at triangles? Are we to fight France and Great Britain at the same time? Why, sir, this is the very circumstance which increases our embarrassments. It is a situation perfectly novel and unexampled; and distinguishes it from all the cases put by the gentleman as analogous to it. At every other time we have had but one adversary; if we had but one at this time, there would be no difficulty in the choice of measures; but having two at the same time, and both so formidable, presents an unexampled difficulty in the choice of measures; and is the strongest argument imaginable in favor of the position we have assumed. This, sir, is made more evident by the gentleman's illustration. The gentleman says, if two men were to attack him at the same time, would he avoid the combat until he could get one by himself? I presume he would, if he were a man of prudence; especially if either of them were a full match for him; and he knew the moment he set on one, the other would set on him, and tear him to pieces. I think under such circumstances, a dignified retirement would be at least as honorable as being tumbled in the dust; and would certainly be more the dictate of prudence and wisdom. It therefore appears to me, that the gentleman's illustration is an extremely happy one, to justify the position assumed by the United States, under the peculiarity of their difficulties.

The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Lloyd], I presume with a view of shewing, that our supply of provisions can be of little consequence to Great Britain, has favored us with a statement of her annual consumption of grain, and our annual exports. The annual consumption of Great Britain he states at one hundred and fifty millions of bushels, and our whole exports at seven millions. I am willing to take his estimate, although our whole exports are probably much more. From this statement, the gentleman seems to infer, that this small supply can be of but little consequence in a market requiring this enormous consumption. I draw a very different inference from these data given by the gentleman: and I am the more disposed to examine this point, as I have often heard the same inferences drawn by others. According to this statement, if Great Britain should raise barely enough for her own consumption, except seven millions of bushels, and it is probable she

will not exceed this product the present year, she would want a supply for her whole population for above a fortnight in the year. This would be a serious deficiency : and to appreciate my argument, the gentleman should first make the experiment of starving a fortnight ; and I think, before the expiration of that time, he would be willing to admit there was some force at least in my argument. It would be the same case with a nation, if the scarcity operated equally, and upon every individual in the nation, at the same time. But that is not the way in which a scarcity does operate. It operates by raising the prices of grain, and thus excluding those from the use of it, who have no money to buy. In the event of a scarcity in Great Britain, Mr. Canning would probably not have a dish less to his table on that account ; whilst the poor would suffer for the want of bread. As the scarcity increased, the greater would be the numbers excluded from the use of bread ; and the stock in the nation would be exclusively consumed by those who had the means of purchasing a proportion of it. This would be the course of things as long as the order of society could be maintained, and the suffering poor compelled to bear their hard fate. But, sir, if this quantity of provisions should be wanted in Great Britain this year, and it cannot be obtained any where, but from the United States ; and if the want of it should drive the prices very high, and bear of course with great severity upon the suffering poor ; would not these circumstances alone furnish strong inducements to Great Britain to relax her orders, and to do us justice ? To do us justice, did I say, sir ? No, sir, to do us half justice : we do not require more than half justice at her hands.

If the suffering poor could be apprized that the deficit of provisions could be made up by opening an intercourse with the United States, and that this depended upon the pleasure of the British cabinet, would there not be strong representations to them, to relieve the suffering poor, when nothing but an act of half justice, would be necessary to effect the object ? Under such a state of things, the cabinet could not withstand the representations of the people. May we not hope then, sir, if this should be the state of things in Great Britain during the present year, that these appeals to her interest will not be unavailing ? But, sir, I am ready to admit, that I derive the less consolation from this hope, from the apprehension that if even a relaxation of these orders should take place in consequence of any coerced state of things in Great Britain, the relaxation would be but temporary ; and the moment the pressure ceased, the hostile measures would be resumed. Since Great Britain has become intoxicated with this extraordinary project of recolonization, I verily believe, we shall again have to fight her out of it ; and I am inclined to think, that now is as good a time for the contest, as we can expect in any future time. But, sir, we are told, that this subject has a commercial as well as a political bearing : the commercial must certainly be a subordinate

one. Let me, however, bestow a few thoughts on its commercial bearings. I mean no disrespect to merchants; but upon this subject I do not think their statements ought to be confided in. I am sure they will excuse the observation, when I tell them, that I was taught this lesson at the time of laying the former embargo, by one of the most respectable merchants in the United States; and then a representative in Congress from the city of Philadelphia. That gentleman then told us, that upon the question of an embargo, the information of merchants was not to be relied upon; that without imputing to them any improper motive, their statements would necessarily partake of their calculations of their own particular interests.

The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Pickering] has favored us with mercantile information from the insurance offices at Boston and Salem; as well as information from some of his respectable mercantile correspondents. I am willing to respect this species of information as far as it extends and merits attention; but, sir, it does not contain all the information I want; and as little as I know of mercantile principles, I know that it is essentially erroneous. Sir, the information from the insurance offices does not extend to all the objects it ought to embrace. I want to know in the first place, sir, if we repeal the embargo laws, without any substitute, and agree to trade under the British orders in council; what would be the premium of insurance upon our national character, and national independence? This important article of barter seems to have escaped the attention of the offices altogether; whereas it appears to me to be the previous question. All others sink into insignificance before it. Sir, cent per cent. would not insure them. The policy must be made upon a calculation of a total loss. The insurance could not be done upon *these essential articles of barter*, in all the insurance offices in the United States. Now, sir, as these are articles which I hold with others in trust, I can never violate the sacred deposit, or put it at risk, until I deem the policy perfectly competent to cover the loss. Again, sir, I wish to know the premium against the British orders in council, upon a voyage to France, or any where else, where an American vessel may go under the protection of the laws of nations. Cent per cent. would not insure in the exercise of this right; and for one I would rather fight for it, than abandon it. Again, sir, what would be the insurance against French captures to European ports, in case the embargo were raised? It would be difficult to make a calculation, until some experiments should be made. The reason of the low insurance now, is, that the French have no inducements to send out privateers, to depredate upon our commerce, as long as the embargo restrains it within our ports: raise the embargo, and the temptation to plunder would fill the ocean with privateers. The commerce would stand little chance to escape the plunderers. These observations are sufficient to shew, first, that the informa-

tion from the insurance offices does not embrace all the articles of barter we have in the market: particularly those of the *first necessity*. Secondly, that the policies upon most of the articles embraced by it, are calculated upon incorrect principles, and not adjusted to the state of things which would exist upon raising the embargo without a substitute. Further, sir, with my little knowledge of commercial details, I will venture, without the fear of contradiction, to question the accuracy of the information furnished by the gentleman's respectable commercial correspondent [Mr. Thorndike]. I am willing to admit, sir, that he is, as the gentleman describes him to be, a merchant of the first respectability; and as such I respect him; but I cannot, in all points, subscribe to his mercantile information. I will mention only two points in which he is evidently mistaken, and they will be important enough to vary the whole aspect of the calculation he has made, as to what trade we could carry on under the orders in council. First, he has made a calculation of our trade to Great Britain upon the usual prices of American articles in British markets. This is an extremely incorrect standard of prices; because, if all American articles were driven into the British market, and excluded from the markets where they are consumed, they would bear no price at all. They would not defray expenses. Take the article of tobacco for instance. The United States export upon an average 75,000 hogsheds; of which Great Britain consumes 14,000. The rest are exported to the European continent. What would be the price of an article, when there is five times as much at market as is wanted for consumption, or for any other use? The merchants examined before the house of commons unanimously agree, that this article would not defray expenses. They have not only sworn to this fact, but I would ask, if it is not the dictate of common sense, and the common result of every principle of barter? The same remark would apply to cotton and rice, and other American articles; but perhaps not in the same degree. As to cotton, I am perfectly convinced, from the immense, and increasing quantities of that article, raised in the United States, the only way to keep up its price, is to keep open all the markets in the world where it is consumed. The gentleman also includes in his estimate, exports to the French West India islands. They are now in a state of strict blockade, and of course the whole of this item ought to be expunged. There are probably other material errors; but these of themselves are sufficient to vary the whole aspect and bearing of his calculation. Indeed, sir, I am of opinion, that little or no commerce could be carried on under the conflicting orders and decrees. All these calculations are made upon the assumed principle, that the rules prescribed in these hostile decrees and orders would be invariably adhered to in their practical operations. I intertain a very different opinion. The commerce which might strictly be permitted by the orders and



decrees, would be subjected to so many vexations by the ignorance or artifices of the commanders of the hostile armed ships, as to render all the remaining commerce dangerous and unprofitable; and I am perfectly satisfied, after incurring the disgrace of submitting to these arrogant and unwarrantable impositions, we should, covered over with disgrace, be compelled to fight for the miserable pittance of commerce, apparently held out to us by these hostile and conflicting orders and edicts. This miserable and disgraceful commerce, affords no allurement to me; and it will disappoint all those who have made these delusive calculations upon it. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Pickering] in a great degree unravelled the mystery, which was before suspended over the calculations of his mercantile friend, by telling us, that this friend had at this time several vessels laden with southern productions, ready to set sail the moment the embargo shall be raised. This circumstance, without any imputation upon the motives of the gentleman, may be fairly conceived to have had some bearing upon his calculations, and is a case in point to prove the correctness of the information derived from the gentleman of Philadelphia, on a former and similar occasion.

Before I sit down, Mr. President, permit me to explain some expressions which fell from me in debate a few days since, and which seem to have roused into action the indignant feelings of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Pickering.] The gentleman might have saved himself these painful feelings, if he had been more attentive to my observations. He supposes, that I called his federal friends in Massachusetts, political demagogues. Now, sir, those gentlemen were not particularly alluded to, either in words or intentions: I made an observation in very general terms upon the structure of popular governments. I stated, as an inconvenient circumstance in the operations of such governments, that when the union and energy of the people were most required to resist foreign aggressions, the pressure of these very aggressions would present temptations to political demagogues, to separate the people from their own government, and through the people's discontents, to find their way to office and to power. I applied this observation to the present and all future times. I then gave the late and present proceedings, under the pressure of the embargo laws, in evidence to prove the correctness of the remark. I made no particular application of it to any description of gentlemen, nor to any particular part of the United States, nor was it intended to be so applied; it was intended to be general in its application to every part of the union. The gentleman himself has made the application to his friends; and I readily admit, without reminding him of the old adage, that he is better informed than I am, whether his own application suits his own friends. But, sir, I did not particularly allude to these gentlemen. I feel the same respect for the gentlemen of Massachusetts, that I do for those of any other part of

the union. Nor have I any difficulty in saying, that a difference in political opinions is no ground of personal disrespect ; and that I do not now, and never have made it one. On the contrary, I am willing to proclaim it to all the world, that I know many federal gentlemen for whom I feel great personal respect. I regret also, Mr. President, that some of the observations which fell from me the other day, have made so strong impressions upon the feelings of the gentleman from Connecticut, [Mr. Hillhouse] for whom I do feel a high personal respect. Upon reviewing some of them, I fear they were calculated to have too strong a bearing upon that gentleman's feelings ; but, sir, it will be recollected, that to his observations I was principally replying, and therefore, that my remarks had apparently a stronger application towards him personally, than in fact they were intended to have. It will also be recollected, that most of the remarks of this nature, were directed against the repeal of the embargo laws without any substitute, and which, in my judgment, would have been submission to foreign aggressions. Since the gentleman has disclaimed all ideas of submission, and has come forward in the true spirit of '76, I am as ready as any gentleman, to do honour to his patriotism. Mr. President, we have now made a fair comparison of opinion and information upon the measures heretofore adopted by the government. Gentlemen have been indulged with a full retrospect of these measures ; may we not hope, that we are better prepared to see what measures are now proper to be adopted to save the nation from surrounding dangers ? Sir, if we could prevail upon ourselves to act under the scriptural injunction ; if we could first employ ourselves in taking the motes out of our own eyes, instead of being so busy in taking them out of the eyes of our neighbours, is it not reasonable to expect, that we should see more clearly the course of conduct most proper to be adopted for the people's interest and the general welfare ? If we could seriously turn our eyes in upon our own hearts, and impartially examine our own passions, might we not expect to find there, some of the errors which we delusively ascribe to others ? Is it not to be feared, that this is the real source of our disunion ? and is it not greatly to be regretted, sir, that union can not be obtained, when it is all that is wanted to ensure us complete success against our unjust adversaries ? Let us, then, sir, with a magnanimity becoming ourselves and our stations, banish all personal animosities ; let us act like brethren of one family united in interest, united in honour, united in affection. A knowledge of this circumstance alone, might probably secure justice from our adversaries without striking a blow. But, sir, if unfortunately we should be compelled to engage in the bloody scene, how indispensable is it, that we should be able to exert the whole energy of an undivided nation ?

## NOTES.

*French influence.*...What are the means of French influence in this country? None: the idea is absurd.

*British influence.*...What are the means of British influence in this country? The following amongst others:

Language, jurisprudence, law books, literature; tories, and the descendants of tory families; blood connections, intermarriages; mercantile capital, mercantile partnerships; newspapers, &c. &c. &c. These influences are interwoven into society, and if we mean to preserve our independence, demand the most watchful vigilance of the politician.

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*Extract of a letter from Mr. Monroe to Mr. Madison, dated,*  
 "LONDON, May 17, 1806.

"After my interview with Mr. Fox, on the 25th ult. I waited a fortnight without hearing from him. This new instance of delay surprized me, because he had shewn a sensibility to the former one, and did not seem aware of the necessity of adding to it. Independent of the general object, the war with Prussia, and the blockades incident to it; the doctrine and practice respecting which it was necessary to arrange, furnished a new motive for a communication with him. On mature reflection, I thought it best to call informally, which I did on the 11th, with a view to enter on these topics in the familiar manner I had heretofore done. Mr. Fox was at the office, but did not receive me. He sent the expression of his regret at not being able to do it, being, as he said, just going to attend the cabinet, who were waiting for him. I called again on the 13th, and experienced the same result, though I had left word that I should then be there. I was informed by his desire, that a summons from the king, to attend him at the palace, prevented his receiving me on that day. I met him on the 15th at the drawing room, but had no opportunity of speaking to him. Sir Francis Vincent, the first under secretary of state, being acquainted with my desire, promised to arrange with him an interview, and to inform me of it. These are the only circumstances worthy notice that have occurred here since my last, till to-day. I mention them that you may be better enabled to judge correctly, in all respects, of the light in which the incident of this day ought to be viewed."

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
*Extract of a letter from Mr. Monroe to Mr. Madison, dated,*  
 "LONDON, May 20, 1806.

"With respect to the delay to which I am exposed, it is utterly out of my power to explain to you the cause. I have no reason to change the opinion which I have heretofore expressed of Mr.

Fox's disposition on the subject, though I have had no late communication with him. His present reserve is unfavourable, but it may be otherwise accounted for, and on principles which are quite natural, and therefore presumable. He may have experienced more difficulties in the cabinet than he had expected. Many of the members may be indisposed to an arrangement on such terms as can be accepted, and most of them willing to postpone any decision, until the result of the proceedings in congress is known. Under these circumstances he may find it most eligible to avoid any further communication with me for the present.


"It becomes, therefore, very difficult, if not altogether improper, for me to press the business at this time. It seems to be my duty to postpone such pressure to the same epoch, that is, till the final proceedings of congress are known. I shall doubtless receive with them the instructions of the president on the whole subject, which I beg to assure you, I shall use my utmost exertions to carry into effect."

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 The foregoing observations in reply to Mr. Pickering, refer to two speeches delivered by that gentleman, one of which only has yet appeared in print.









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